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There is an international law duty on South Africa in terms of the Convention on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Woman (CEVAW). Section 12 (1) (c) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 guarantees a right to be free from 
violence either from a public source or a private source. South Africa ranks amongst 
the most dangerous countries in the world. It is submitted that intimate partner violence 
is at its peak. Domestic violence is a direct violation of various other rights including 
the right to life, equality, human dignity, privacy, labour and housing. The Domestic 
Violence Act 116 of 1998 (the DVA) was passed as a means to combat domestic 
violence primarily by issuing protection orders to victims of domestic violence. This 
dissertation affirms that the protection order is the core machinery in the DVA for 
combating domestic violence. However it is further submitted that there are other 
machineries within the DVA that may equally be effective. It is trite that domestic 
violence still rears its ugly head. There are various causes for this. On one hand, some 
argue that the machineries are ineffective, and on the other hand, some argue that 
they are not being properly implemented. 
 
Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to set out the core machinery for 
combating domestic violence and then to critically examine the advances made in the 
implementation of the same machinery, focussing primarily on the criminal justice 
system and the challenges they face while implementing the DVA and providing 
possible solutions. 
 
Chapter 1 is the introduction. It sets out the purpose of the study. It draws on the legal 
historical background, possible causes and consequences of domestic violence. It also 
tracks legal developments prior to the DVA. Chapter 2 sets out the DVA and the 
various machineries available to combat domestic violence within the confines of the 
Act. This chapter details the process of obtaining a protection order, being the core 
machinery in the DVA. It chapter makes it clear that there are other machineries within 
the Act and those machineries follow in chapter 3. It also discusses other topical issues 
such as the abuse of process by ‘victims’ and the remedies available to respondents 
in such circumstances. Chapter 3 is a critical evaluation of the machineries. This 
chapter builds on the foundation laid in chapter 2. It sets out each of the machineries 
that are available within the confines of the DVA other than a protection order. Each of 
these machineries is evaluated by taking into account the nature of the machinery and 
the problems associated with the implementation of such machinery. Up to this point 
an attempt has been made to refer to all available cases including those that are 
unreported. Chapter 4 contains summation of arguments, recommendations and the 
conclusion. Some of the recommendations call for statutory amendments.  
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1.1. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
 
‘Family violence is one of the most insidious forms of violence against women [and 
children]. It is prevalent in all societies. Within family relationships women of all 
ages are subjected to violence of all kinds…’1 
 
Studies have shown that South Africa is amongst the world’s most violent countries,2 
with women and children being the most vulnerable to such violence.3  Violence in the 
private context can take many forms including physical assault, verbal assault, sexual 
assault, intimidation, psychological abuse, economic deprivation, harassment and any 
other controlling behaviour. The foregoing is true, especially with domestic violence 
which is a form of violence that usually occurs behind closed-doors when no one is 
looking. The knowledge that domestic violence intrudes on the comfort of a home, 
directly encroaching on the natural feeling of safety within one’s home is on its own 
appalling. It is this characteristic of domestic violence that causes victims to suffer in 
silence and this only perpetuates the abuse rather than solving it. 
 
While anyone can be a victim of domestic violence, women and children are at the 
forefront of victimology,4 to the extent that some writers regard the rifeness of domestic 
violence instances as a clear indication that there still exist gender-based inequalities 
within the South African community.5 The unfortunate consequence of domestic 
                                                          
1 Paragraph 23 of General Recommendation 19 in terms of the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
2 C. Bendall 'The Domestic Violence Epidemic in South Africa: Legal and Practical Remedies' 39 (2010) 
Women’s Studies 100, 101 available at www.volunteer-human-rights.org accessed on 9 February 2017. 
3 Their rights tend to be pried on by reason of their gender and the natural inability to defend themselves. 
At the time of writing this chapter The New Age newspaper reported about an 8-year-old girl who had 
been killed by her stepfather over issues he had with her mother. The stepfather killed and buried the 
little girl on a shallow grave just behind his shack at Inanda Township just outside Durban. 
4 Omar v The Government of the Republic of South Africa and others 2006 (2) SA 289 (CC) 294. 
5 B. Clark ‘Cold Comfort? A commentary on the Prevention of Family Violence Act’ 1996 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 587. 
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violence is that children learn at a tender age that the use of violence is an acceptable 
way of dealing with problems or getting an advantage over others.6 
 
There are international law obligations on South Africa to combat domestic violence. 
The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women enjoin the state to take all 
necessary measures, statutory or otherwise, to ensure equality of men and women as 
well as eliminating the alarmingly high levels of violence against women. 
 
Section 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa7 (hereinafter referred to 
as the Constitution) further provides generally that everyone has a right to freedom 
and security of the person. More specifically section 12 (1) (c) provides that everyone 
has a right to be free from violence either from a public or a private source.8 The far 
reaching consequences of domestic violence are a clear indication that it affects 
various other rights such as the right to equality9, the right to human dignity10, the right 
to life11, the right to privacy12, rights to freedom of belief, opinion and expression13, 
right to freedom of movement14 and the rights to property and housing.15 Section 7 (2) 
of the Constitution binds the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights, 
which, in essence culminates into a duty on the state (in all its facets) to shield its 
citizens against any violation of these rights. This dissertation is concerned mainly with 
the right to be free from domestic violence. However, the drastic effects that this social 
evil has on other rights will be thoroughly discussed.  
 
The legislature has discharged its international law and constitutional duty by the 
passing of the Domestic Violence Act16 (herein after referred to as the DVA). The DVA 
                                                          
6 S v Baloyi (Minister of Justice and another intervening) 2000 (2) SA 325 (CC), 341D – F. 
7 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
8 J. Heaton South African Family Law 3rd Ed (2010) 267. See also Bendall (note 2 above; 102) wherein 
it is pointed out that this section places a positive duty on the state to safeguard against, and penalise 
acts of domestic violence 
9 Section 9 
10 Section 10. 
11 Section 11. 
12 Section 14. 
13 Section 15. 
14 Section 21. 
15 Sections 25 and 26. 
16 Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. 
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has been appraised as the best of its kind in the world.17  In Seria v Minister of Safety 
and Security18 Meer J described it as “a commendable and long-awaited addition to 
our jurisprudence promoting the rights of equality, freedom and security of the 
person.”19 A research paper by the African National Congress (A.N.C.) defined the 
DVA as “…a bid to reverse the long history of neglect of domestic violence by law 
enforcement officers…”20  
 
The preamble to the DVA states that its purpose is to afford victims of domestic 
violence maximum protection that the law can provide. What is left is to examine 
whether the machinery therein (stated below) fulfils this purpose and consequently 
translates the international and constitutional standard into a reality by combating 
domestic violence.21 Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to set out the core 
machinery for combating domestic violence and then to critically examine the 
advances made in the implementation of the same machinery, focussing primarily on 
the criminal justice system and the challenges they face while implementing the DVA 
and providing possible solutions. 
 
1.2. METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
 
This dissertation is entirely desktop based. It is a consolidation of existing research in 
the field. Where there are gaps, an attempt is made to identify these gaps and provide 
a possible solution. Some of the solutions will be based on practical experience in the 
field. An attempt is made to refer to statistics and published findings of empirical 
studies in the form of reports. However the dissertation does not attempt to be 
empirical in any manner.  
 
 
                                                          
17 K. Gadinabokao ‘Shortcomings of the South African Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 in 
comparative perspective’ (Unpublished LLM dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2016) 2.  
18 Seria v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (5) SA 130 (C). 
19 Ibid 148D. 
20 African National Congress Discussion paper on gender based violence (2012) 5.  
21 The National Department of Social Development South African Integrated Programme of Action: 





Domestic violence is an umbrella concept used to define a collection of offences that 
occur in family settings.22 However it is worth noting that the concept of ‘domestic 
violence’ is relatively new. In South Africa it was presumably adopted because of its 
definitional capacity which extends even to conduct which would ordinarily not be 
regarded as ‘violence’ for example, stalking. Further, it is gender-neutral thus 
recognising that anyone can be a victim of domestic violence regardless of gender or 
sexual orientation. Furthermore the concept agrees with a wider definition of a family. 
As it will be seen below, the focus is on the closeness of the relationship and not the 
traditional family.  
 
Nonetheless, concepts such as wife-battering, wife-beating, marital violence, family 
violence, gender-based violence, intimate partner abuse, violence against women, 
intimate terrorism23 and women or child abuse had previously and continue to be used 
to denote domestic violence. These concepts cannot be divorced from a study on 
domestic violence and therefore any subsequent use in this dissertation is for 
contextual convenience and shall not be seen as bringing something new; or as a 
departure from the focus of this dissertation.  
 
1.4. THE BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY  
 
1.4.1. General remarks 
 
Before carrying out any critical discussions of the machinery of the DVA, it is critical to 
set out the background against which the study emanates. What follows below is a 
discussion of the reality of domestic violence in South Africa; tracing it legal origins 
from different legal systems such as Roman law, Roman Dutch law, Germanic law, 
English law and indigenous practices where woman were treated as possessions and 
                                                          
22 M.Carnelley ‘Domestic Violence’ in Hoctor South African Criminal Law and Procedure: statutory 
offences vol 3 2nd Ed (2012), 1. 
23 A.C. Madzivhandila ‘The Policing Of Domestic Violence In The Tshwane Policing Presinct’ 
(Unpublished MTech dissertation, University of South Africa, 2015) 25. 
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inferior to men. The aim is to show how these ancient practices were carried over to 
the modern world and that despite the formidable presence, the state had kept mum 
on the issue. 
 
This background will discuss the key causes and the consequences of domestic 
violence. This is a critical thing to do because from this, one gets an idea of the type 
of machineries that are necessary to gauge it out. Further, a clear understanding of 
the causes and the consequences places one in a better and fair position to critically 
assess the suitability of the current machineries in the DVA. The detrimental effects on 
woman and children are also looked at. 
 
Since this study is about critically evaluating the machinery in the DVA for combating 
domestic violence, it is contextually compelling to discuss the common law and 
statutory backdrop of the DVA. Below the common law remedies that were used to 
countenance violence against women, which are arguably still in usage, such as 
prosecution, interdicts and a claim for maintenance, which has now been codified, are 
discussed. These common law remedies were used at a time where there was no 
statutory measure. The Prevention of Family Violence Act, which precedes the DVA, 
was an attempt to close the statute vacuum by providing speedy remedies to victims 
of ‘family violence’. This Act is extensively discussed below leading to the end of the 
chapter.  
 
1.4.2. A brief diagnosis of domestic violence in South Africa  
 
Throughout the years women and children have been victims of domestic violence. 
This is not the case just for South Africa, but across the globe. The society has at all 
times been aware of the incidence of domestic violence as they often resulted in   
casualties such as death.24 Studies indicate that there is a high rate of murders 
between family members and this has been the case over many years.25 Studies 
further show that some societal attitudes towards domestic violence have instead been 
                                                          
24 See generally T. Deane ‘Violence against women and children in South Africa’ (2002) 43 (2) Codicillus 
14.   
25 A.E. van der Hoven ‘Social factors conducive to family violence’ 1988 Acta Criminologica 34. 
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conducive to the continuation of the battering of women.26 Despite the knowledge of 
this prevailing social evil, a majority of jurisdictions around the world have kept mum 
about it. However in recent years various countries are taking active steps to fight 
domestic violence; whether these steps are adequate is a subject of many studies and 
debates from which South Africa is also not exempt. 
 
The South African jurisprudence draws from various legal systems including Roman 
law27, Roman-Dutch law, Germanic law28 and English law29. In these legal systems it 
was accepted that a husband could enforce discipline on his wife just as he could do 
with his children through disciplinary chastisement. While it is acceptable to say that 
these legal systems brought with them the legal sanctioning of disciplinary 
chastisement with respect to a wife, it will be naïve to assert that the practice of wife 
beating did not exist within the indigenous South Africans prior to the reception of these 
western legal systems.30 Therefore, instead of singling out a certain legal system, it is 
competent to say that the law had sanctioned domestic violence.31  
 
Acts which would otherwise be regarded as domestic violence were not regarded as 
such, no prosecution could follow and the law developed as such. Prior to 1993 the 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 
27 Under Roman law the wife was totally under her husband’s authority or marital power. This was 
codified and proclaimed by the founder of Rome, Romulus, in 753 BC.  Initially the husband had an 
absolute right over her life. This means that he could kill her for her transgressions. She had a duty of 
absolute obedience to her husband. See D. Singh ‘Self-defence as a ground of justification in cases of 
battered women who kill their abusive partners’ (unpublished LLD thesis, University of South Africa, 
2007) 13. However these extreme rights of the husband were later significantly reduced to a husband’s 
right to disciplinary chastise his wife. See Carnelley (note 22 above; 2). 
28 Under Germanic law the husband had absolute rights over his wife’s body. He could do no wrong to 
it. He could kill her for her transgressions. However as the Germanic law evolved, wife killing was 
outlawed. The wife could divorce her husband if he maltreated her. See Carnelley (note 22 above; 2). 
See also Singh (note 27 above; 15).  
29 Under English law the husband was accountable for the conduct of his wife and as such he was 
entitled to chastise her in order to control her. The husband had a ‘sexual-title’ on his wife’s body and 
he could not be charged for a sexual crime on his wife. In the 19th century English law abolished wife 
beating. Laws to that effect were passed, however they were rarely enforced. If a wife killed her 
husband, she was charged with ‘petit-treason’ which was a form of treason where a subordinate killed 
a superior. The sentence for petit treason was death by burning. See generally Singh (note 27 above; 
16 – 19).  
30 M. Slabbert ‘Explaining domestic violence in aboriginal communities: the relevance of the 
public/private dichotomy’ 2003 (9) Fundamina 177, 197 submits that the remnants of the legal 
sanctioning of wife beating were arguably passed to different system through the European invasions. 
31 Ibid197 and 185.Slabbert focuses on rural communities in South Africa and other jurisdictions such 
as Australia. Whilst this research has a limited focus, the content speaks of the experiences of society 
at large.  
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South African law allowing a husband to disciplinary chastise his wife had long become 
obsolete.32 Prosecution could follow from a husband’s criminal conduct towards his 
wife. However, this was not effective in dealing with domestic violence as the criminal 
justice system was designed to deal with criminal conduct as a public concern and 
could not interfere with the privacy of the family which the law had strongly 
protected.33The victims of domestic violence, nonetheless still turned to the police to 
report incidents of domestic violence and the police often did not know how to respond 
or what relief to provide.34 They often turned to mediating the matter.35 Some victims 
reported secondary victimisation at the hands of the police where police officers were 
reluctant to believe complainants in domestic violence matters or were insensitive to 
their plight.36 For many years the police force was dominated by men; some who held 
the ill-conceived view that women were subordinate to men and those men could do 
as they pleased with their women.  
 
Despite such compelling presence, there were no discernible statistics on the extent 
of domestic violence.37 This is still the case today, after 19 years of the passing of the 
DVA. However it is estimated that at least 40% of the women have suffered from some 
act of domestic violence in their lifetime. This is alarming especially considering that 
women make up more than half of the population. Recent crime statistics (2014/2015) 
show that the crime of assault is the most prevalent.38 This has always been the case 
                                                          
32 J. Church and S.K. Parmanand ‘Towards the recognition of filial consortium’ XX 1987 Comparative 
and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 230, 231.  
33 During the 18th century there was emphasis on the privacy of the family. See J.M. Quinn ‘Wife Beating 
or Chastisement?: An Approach to Generating New Theoretical Concepts for Understanding the 
Changing Frames and Discourses of Domestic Violence’ (unpublished Master of Arts thesis, University 
of North Carolina, 2007) 10. Life was divided into the public sphere as well as the private sphere. See 
R.B. Siegel ‘’The Rule of Love’: Wife Beating as a Prerogative and Privacy’ 105 (1996) The Yale Law 
Journal 2117, 2121. Consequently the family was regarded as a private institution with which the law 
had very little say. The husband as the head of the institution enjoyed the right to decided which aspects 
of family life is publicised. In this way the wife could not speak out.  
34 Madzivhandila (note 23 above; 2). 
35 A.E. van der Hoven ‘The community’s attitude towards wife battering’ (1989) 2 (2) Acta Criminologica 
54, 56. 
36 Ibid. 
37 It is submitted that available statistics show that at least 40% of women have suffered a form of 
domestic violence. see L. Moodley ‘Battered women who kill abusive partners in non-confrontational 
circumstances…can South Africa legislation do more to protect them? (unpublished LLM dissertation, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2015) 1; A.B. Njezula ‘Investigating Domestic Violence Against Women in 
South Africa’ (unpublished MPhil dissertation, University of the Western Cape, 2006) at 1 notes that 
domestic violence is between 10 – 60%. 
38 Statistics South Africa Crime Statistics Series Volume III: Exploration of selected contact crimes in 
South Africa in depth analysis of the victims of crime survey data 2011 – 2014/2015 (2016) 9. 
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over the years.39 What is interesting to note about these general crime statistics is that 
the crime of assault is perpetrated mostly against women, children and the elderly; and 
the place where it usually occurs is at home.40 Assaults against males usually takes 
place on the streets.41 Females also get assaulted on the streets, but the chances of 
this happening are much lower; and even then, the perpetrator is usually a male.42 
Although these statistics do not deal specifically with domestic violence, however they 
do provide some insight into the extent of domestic violence in South Africa.  
 
The reasons for the absence of statistics specific to domestic violence have not 
changed. Various writers submit that because domestic violence occurs within the 
‘family’, many women elect not to disturb the fabric of the family. Bendall argues that 
married women keep quiet because they want to ‘maintain the appearance of a happy 
family’.43 Singh argues that some women have condoned domestic violence ‘under the 
pretence of protecting and promoting integrity and privacy of family life’44. 
Madzivhandila notes that some victims do not report incidents of domestic violence 
because they are afraid of retaliation, that they are ashamed and they tend to blame 
themselves for the conduct of their abusers.45 Van der Hoven points out that negative 
societal attitude towards women in abusive relationships could cause women to elect 
to suffer in silence.46 
 
In modern society, a marriage is no longer the basis for the formation of a family. 
Nuclear families have emerged. Whatever the formation of the family, the relations as 
far as domestic violence is concerned remains the same. Furthermore, it is common 
these days for men and women do elect to live together as though they are married. 
Society has accepted what in South African society is termed ‘vat-en-sat’ relationships. 
                                                          
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid 12 – 13. These statistics accept that assault can take on many forms such as common assault; 
assault GBH or sexual assault. The report indicates that the general statistics for the crime of assault 
were as follows: 2011 (50%); 2013/14 (65%) and 2014/2015 (55.1%). It also shows the instances where 
the assault was perpetrated against a female at home: 2011 (50%); 2013/14 (44%) and 2014/15 (57%). 
41 The reports indicates the follows. During year 2011 38% of the assaults against men occurred on the 
streets; during 2013/14 instances grew to 67.5% and during 2014/15 at 45.1%.  
42 Ibid 14. 
43 Bendall (note 2 above; 100). 
44 Singh (note 27 above; 9). Singh further says that society in general has condoned domestic violence 
by not mentioning it in public over centuries.  
45 Madzivhandila (note 23 above; 4). 
46 A. E. van der Hoven (note 35 above; 54). 
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Therefore when one speaks of a family, a marriage is not necessarily implied. In 
indigenous African societies it is possible to speak of a ‘wife’ or a ‘husband’ without 
there being a complete customary law celebration. This is largely because in 
indigenous African societies a marriage is more than the solemnisation. It passes 
through various stages and ends in solemnisation. As such it is more common in 
indigenous societies to find that a formal family has settled without there being any 
solemnisation of a marriage.  
 
1.4.3. The common causes of domestic violence 
 
Before one can craft a suitable tool to eradicate domestic violence, it is very useful to 
bear in mind the common causes of this social evil. Dealing with the cause means that 
one deals with the root from which the problem shoots out.47 Identifying the likely 
causes of domestic violence is in itself machinery with which we can fight this scourge. 
Further, appreciating the causes of domestic violence enables the state to take 
preventive measures. By responding to the causes, the law is enabled to intervene at 
the earliest stage. This may have the effect of deterring and rehabilitating the ‘would 
be’ perpetrators of domestic violence.  
 
The causes of domestic violence are many. It is difficult to attribute domestic violence 
to a specific cause due to various factors such as, for example, its discreet nature and 
victim reaction, to name a few. It cannot be said that it is caused by being destitute 
because it also occurs among the rich. Unemployment is not the sole cause as even 
those who are securely employed may be perpetrators or victims of domestic 
violence.48 It is not a racial issue as it affects all people, whether white, black, Indian or 
coloured. As Carnelley points out, domestic violence is a societal problem.49 Research 
conducted prior to this study, through practical experience shows that domestic 
violence is racially blind. It is neither a reserve for the drunkards or occasional drinkers 
as even those of sober habits do perpetrate domestic violence. Madzivhandila notes 
                                                          
47 The National Department of Social Development (note 21 above).  
48 M.E. Baloyi ‘Wife beating amongst Africans as a challenge to pastoral care’ 2013, 2 available at 
www.indieskriflig.org.za accessed on 5 February 2017.  
49 Carnelley (note 22 above; 1). 
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that ‘the causes of domestic violence are far more rooted than simply being an effect 
of intoxication or alcohol and drug dependency’.50 
 
It is more acceptable to say that domestic violence is caused by a multiplicity of factors 
including some of these above. This antecedent statement is qualified because race 
can never be the cause of domestic violence. Baloyi shares his experiences while 
attending to his ministry as a pastor. He mentions a woman who was a primary school 
teacher but endured violence from her husband who was also a teacher at a high 
school.51 He further shares the plight of a woman who had chosen a life of escaping 
through the window whenever her husband was drunk.52 There is no specific trigger 
for domestic violence. A woman may be forced to endure violence by earning more 
than the man.53 Refusal to have sex,54 the inability to procreate,55 dinner not cooked 
on time,56 and children misbehaving are amongst many things that may lead a woman 
to being battered.  
 
Among the above alcohol seems to be the greatest contributor to domestic violence. 
Abusers tend to react when they are under the influence of alcohol. As it will be seen 
below, discussions of cases on domestic violence will indicate that alcohol can be a 
stand-alone cause of domestic violence. This explains why women lay assault charges 
or execute warrants of arrest in terms of the DVA and subsequently withdraw the 
charges once reconciliation has taken place or once the abuser has returned to his 
sober senses. It must be indicated, however, that the above view that alcohol might be 
a cause of domestic violence is disputed. There are some who submit that alcohol is 
used as an excuse to justify premeditated conduct.57 
 
Unemployment on the part of the victims of domestic violence may not necessarily 
initiate domestic violence; however it places the woman in a less favourable position 
                                                          
50 Madzivhandila (note 23 above; 48). 
51 Carnelley (note 22 above; 2). 
52 Ibid 1. 
53 Ibid 6. 
54 Ibid 7. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid 6. See Njezula (note 37 above; 3) who shares similar views.  
57 Madzivhandila (note 23 above; 49). 
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thus making her vulnerable and dependant on her abuser. She is unable to speak out 
or take steps against the abuser because she depends on him. Therefore 
unemployment is a great contributor to the continued violence that a woman may 
endure, tolerate and keep up with due to her weak economic position. Women also 
endure domestic violence so that their children continue to receive maintenance from 
their abusive fathers. 
 
Some cultural values and upbringing could be a catalyst for domestic violence. For 
example in African cultures young boys are taught that they are above young girls and 
that the latter should submit to them. It does not end here, they are even taught to take 
positive steps to subvert young girls.58 Boys grow up to be men believing these ill views 
and they enforce them and then pass to the next generation. Girls grow up to be women 
who believe that they are subordinate to men and that men can do as they please with 
them simply because they are women. Women may pass these misconceptions in the 
form of ‘advice’ to their daughters.59 ‘African cultures’ in this context is merely used as 
an example and should not be understood to say that only indigenous African people 
engage is such indoctrinating practices.  
 
1.4.4. The consequences of domestic violence 
 
Appreciating the consequences of domestic violence is just as important as 
appreciating the causes thereof. Each consequence will dictate the nature of the 
remedy that is required. For instance, economic abuse requires an economic remedy. 
It is impossible to prescribe a suitable remedy without knowing what different 
consequences may result from domestic violence. It is also impossible to critically 
evaluate the effectiveness of the DVA in the midst of ignorance about the situation 
which the DVA has to respond to. 
 
                                                          
58 N. Morei ‘Domestic Violence in South Africa: Women and children under siege?’ (2014) 5 (20) 
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 928, 929. 
59 Madzivhandila (note 23 above; 84) submits that children are more likely to emulate the behaviour of 
the parent they associate with in terms of gender. 
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To clearly understand the consequences of domestic violence, one has to first 
understand its private, silent and repetitive characters. In most instances domestic 
violence is not just a one-time event; it usually escalates in form and severity.60 From 
verbal abuse a man graduates to making threats of physically assault, then a slap and 
from there a fist, sjambok or hard object resulting in broken bones or death. As a result 
of the foregoing, domestic violence affects all areas of life of the victims. Since women 
and children are usually at the receiving end, below is a discussion of how domestic 




There are two ways in which children may be victims of domestic violence: Firstly, by 
witnessing their weaker parent being abused by the stronger of the two or any 
incidence of domestic violence. Secondly, by being direct victims. In Baloyi Sachs J 
noted the very ‘devastating’ effects that domestic violence can have against children 
as they run the risk of accepting violence as the correct way to deal with problems or 
to gain an advantage over others.61 Witnessing domestic violence can have far-
reaching psychological and physical consequences. It is submitted that witnessing is 
more destructive than experiencing domestic violence.62 
 
A five-year plan by the National Department of Social Development noted that 
exposure to domestic violence may affect the ‘maturing brain’ either socially, mentally 
(memory loss), emotionally (depression), behaviourally (violence towards other 
children) or cognitively (identifying with violence as a correct way to do things).63 The 
department further indicates that domestic violence has health risks as children often 
turn to drugs and early sexual activity for comfort thus exposing them to sexually related 
infection/diseases.64 
 
                                                          
60 Madzivhandila (note 23 above; 27) 
61 S v Baloyi (note 6 above; 441). 
62 Madzivhandila (note 23 above; 40). 
63 The National Department of Social Development (note 21 above; 17).  
64 Ibid 18. 
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Further, as a result of the absence of a conducive-to-study environment, children are 
likely to neglect their school work such as homework. This leads to poor performance 
at school which eventually results in lack of interest in school. It is also conceivable 
that these children cause disruptions in class by disrespecting their teachers and their 
fellow classmates.  
 
Verbal abuse may harm the child’s self-esteem and consequently the way in which the 
child reacts to other children. Things such as bullying at school or in the community are 
best dealt with through parental support. An abused woman is in a worse position than 
a single parent. Her ability to support her children in such instances is greatly 
diminished. Her self-esteem is eroded upon and as will be seen immediately below, 
she may pass this to her child.  
 
Artz identifies with the following consequences on the children as a result of witnessing 
domestic violence: insomnia; restlessness; acute anxiety; diarrhoea and vomiting; 
abdominal pain; eating problems; notable problems as school when the violence 
intensifies; depression; sadness; bed-wetting; running away from home or staying with 
other family members; refusing to come home; poor general health like chronic flu 
symptoms.65  
 
(b) Women and the battered women syndrome 
 
Women are usually the primary and direct victims of domestic violence. The effect of 
domestic violence depends largely on the type of violence inflicted upon them; due to 
poor reporting patterns, a bulk of the consequences form part of untold miseries of 
women in South Africa. The five-year plan by the National Department of Social 
Development noted that the consequences of domestic violence on women can be 
psychologically, physically, reproductively and economically;66 a single act of domestic 
                                                          
65 L. Artz ‘Tough Choices: difficulties facing magistrates in applying Protection Orders’ (2004) 8 SA 
Crime Quarterly 25, 29.  
66 The National Department of Social Development (note 21 above; 17).The study further states that 
domestic violence may result in broken bones, unplanned pregnancies, STI infections. 
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violence, like rape for instance, can be so drastic that it results in all these 
consequences.  
 
Research highlights that physical abuse is a prevalent form of domestic violence. 
Madzivhandila describes physically abuse as ‘any act or threat of physical violence 
intended to cause physical pain, injury, suffering or bodily harm’.67 He adds that it 
includes, amongst others, hitting, punching, slapping, choking and pushing.68 Physical 
abuse is the centre of domestic violence in that it has the ability to bring about all 
consequences of domestic violence. For instance, the uttering of insults which usually 
results in psychological harm cannot bring about physical harm. On the other hand 
physical harm can result in psychological harm. Sexual abuse is a form of physical 
abuse. Sexual abuse is defined as any conduct that humiliates, degrades or violates a 
person’s sexual integrity. The problem with sexual abuse in a domestic situation is that 
it often goes unreported and unpunished due to the marriage or intimate relationship.69 
 
Conceivably, abused women are highly likely to neglect their children emotionally as a 
result of fear. It is accepted that children can pick up stress from their caregivers – 
usually the mothers.70 The abused women may turn to alcohol and lose focus and the 
whole family drifts. Due to the absence of unity between parents children do not know 
who to turn to. It has been stated above that women are often financially dependent on 
the perpetrator and as such they stay in abusive relationships for their sake and that of 
their children. Economic deprivation results in poor nutrition. Meanwhile the abuse 
                                                          
67 Madzivhandila (note 23 above; 28). 
68 Ibid. Madzivhandila also points out that physical abuse can include other conduct such as isolating 
the victim from her friends and family, stalking or following her around wherever she goes, assaulting 
children or any other third just to get the attention of the woman, making threats of physical assault and 
denial by the perpetrator of the abusive behaviour including charming in public but abusive in private. 
69 Ibid 29. 
70 Madzivhandila (note 23 above; 82) explains the attachment theory of domestic violence. She states 
that a child is emotionally attached to its caregiver. She notes that domestic violence disconnects the 
child leaving the child neglected emotionally. She adds that the child is likely to be a perpetrator of 
domestic violence. As much as I agree with this theory as far as children’s emotional connection is 
concerned, however I disagree with that children learn to be violent this way. If this is accepted to be 
the case, then domestic violence may be treated as a biological issue. In law people with biological 
impairment are given special treatment or sometimes afforded complete immunity from criminal liability. 
This is not how domestic violence ought to be treated. What appears to be a more acceptable theory is 
stated at 84, the social learning theory which states that we are not born as aggressive creatures, 
instead we acquire these aggressive patterns through observation and personal experiences.  
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continues in pieces. Each day is different from the other. Some of them fruitlessly seek 
assistance.71 While some of them just endure the pattern of abuse.  
 
Economic deprivation or economic abuse means depriving the victim of economic 
benefits which they are entitled to in law. It includes failing to provide the victim with 
food, failing to make rental or bond payment, or limiting the resources available to the 
victim thereby forcing the victim to a position where she is dependent on the 
perpetrator.72 For instance, taking the victim’s name out of the medical aid scheme 
simply to render her redundant and vulnerable is some form of economic deprivation. 
In addition to deprivation, perpetrators can go as far as taking away whatever personal 
income the victim gets such as her earnings from piece jobs or the child support grant.      
 
Most of all, violence against women takes away their autonomy leaving them as 
undecided beings. This has vast effects on them as they do not even get to decide on 
their own re-productivity since they are sometimes forced to have unprotected sex 
which may result in unplanned pregnancies thus taking away their human dignity and 
impairing them from enjoying many of their constitutional rights. The living in constant 
fear while pregnant could be a catalyst for a miscarriage73 or premature births.74 
Further, forced sexual intercourse places women at a risk of contracting sexually 
transmitted diseases. Govender75 notes the following consequences of domestic 
violence: minor bruises, organ damage, chronic disabilities, mental disorders, 
depression….’76 Goosen points out that various rights are effected, the right to life (as 
there is a high rate of intimate partner killings in South Africa), the right to dignity, the 
right to bodily integrity and the right to freedom and security of the person.77 
 
                                                          
71 Ibid 2. 
72 Ibid 31. 
73 M. Govender ‘Domestic violence: Is South Africa meeting its obligations in terms of the women’s 
convention?’ 2003 South African Journal on Human Rights 663; 665) notes that domestic violence can 
have economic consequences on the state because it has to take care of health costs for instance.  
74 Madzivhandila (note 23 above; 37). 
75 Govender (note 73 above; 666). 
76 Ibid 665. 
77 S. Goosen ‘Battered women and the requirement of imminence in self-defence’ (2013) 16 (1) 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 71, 82 – 83; see also Govender (note 73 above; 666).  
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These abused or battered women eventually respond by killing their abusive partners. 
This behaviour has culminated to what is called the ‘battered woman syndrome’ (BWS). 
BWS is not a mental illness per se, but it is a way of explaining the circumstances under 
which the killing takes place. Reddi indicates that it is used to describe a ‘pattern of 
psychological and behavioural symptoms’ displayed by women who are being abused 
by their intimate partners.78 
 
The burning issues are whether the battered woman syndrome should afford a woman 
a complete defence in criminal prosecution for the murder of the intimate partner, 
especially when the murder occurs during the passive stage of the violence;79 or it 
should be used as evidence to bolster the established grounds of justification such as 
private defence, putative private defence, diminished capacity or whether it should be 
used as evidence at the sentencing stage.80 As the law stands in South Africa and 
various other jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada and the United States, BWS does 
not afford a complete defence.81 In the United States it has been suggested that the 
term ‘evidence on battering and its effects’ should be used to refer to the battered 
woman syndrome.82 
 
The implication is that women who find themselves trapped in abusive relationships 
cannot look to the criminal justice system for relief. At the same time they cannot resort 
to self-help by killing their abusers especially during the passive stage of the abuse 





                                                          
78 M. Reddi ‘Domestic violence and abused women who kill: Private defence or private vengeance?’ 
2007 South African Law Journal 22. See Moodley (note 37 above; 11 – 12) who points out that BWS 
was developed in American jurisprudence by Dr L Walker.  
79 Reddi (note 78 above; 23). 
80 Ibid 26. 
81 Ibid 23 – 32. 
82 Ibid 27. See generally M. Reddi ‘Battered Woman Syndrome: Some Reflections on the Utility of this 
'Syndrome' to South African Women Who Kill Their Abusers’ 2005 South African Journal of Criminal 
Justice 259 in this regard.  
17 
1.4.5. Statutory and common law remedies for domestic violence in South 
Africa 
 
South Africa’s legal history is usually divided into two eras namely apartheid era and 
post 1994. However in the context of domestic violence, we usually look at the year 
1998 as a defining year because the incumbent Domestic Violence Act was passed 
during this year. This section looks at the pre-1998 innovations for combat domestic 
violence. From the foregoing, it is clear that domestic violence is deeply rooted in our 
society and this has been the case over many years. This begs the question of whether 
the pre-1998 attempts to overhaul domestic violence worked. 
 
It appears that the apartheid government had done virtually nothing about domestic 
violence. This is despite the calls by the United Nations through, amongst others, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Convention on the Elimination 
of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). There are a few possible 
explanations for the apartheid government’s failure to heed the rights of victims of 
domestic violence. Perhaps, the country was at the time locked in the struggle for basic 
human rights in general and not specific rights such as the right to be free from 
domestic violence.83 Paying attention to specific rights was more difficult especially for 
a government whose policy was based on racial inequalities and favouritism. It goes 
without saying that any framework regarding domestic violence was first going to try 
and protect the rights of the minority while relegating those of the majority. This is an 
approach that was bound to fail because in its nature, domestic violence is a display 
of inequality and any interventions involve invoking the right to equality, which the 
apartheid regime was determine to keep away.  
 
Another way to explain the apartheid government’s silence on domestic violence is 
that parliament, the institution tasked with bringing legal reform, was dominated by 
men. While accepting that females may perpetrate domestic violence, however it is 
widely acceptable that a majority of the perpetrators are males. Therefore it was 
virtually impossible for an institution dominated by men to engineer interventions that 
                                                          
83 Njezula (note 37 above; 2). 
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would limit their common law ‘rights’ to exercise ‘authority’ over their wives and thus 
restrain patriarchy or male dominance.  
 
Because of the apartheid policy that was made into law in 1948, South Africa’s 
relationship with the United Nations was turbulent from as early as the 1940s and had 
heightened in the 1960’s following the 1961 Sharpeville Massacre84  and as a result it 
could not benefit from the innovations that states were making towards the protection 
of the rights of the vulnerable such as victims of domestic violence. It is therefore 
arguable that this ejectment played a role in blinding the apartheid government against 
serious issues affecting vulnerable groups such as woman and children as well as the 
rest of the world.  
 
During apartheid years, only a few remedies were available to victims of domestic 
violence.85 These are common law and statutory. However, as will be seen below, 
some of the remedies were designed to deal with issues as a public concern and they 
failed to deal with the domestic or private character of domestic violence. These 




A victim of domestic violence could elect a divorce if he or she were married to the 
abuser. This remedy has its inherent shortcomings. First it is only available to a select 
class of persons, that is, spouses. Further, it was not a ready response to domestic 






                                                          
84 See www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-africa-and-united-nations-1946 – 1990 accessed on 26 
August 2017.  
85 See Madzivhandila (note 23 above; 2) who prefers the view that the remedies available to abused 
women and children were unknown to the criminal justice system and whenever they approached the 




Domestic violence has many facets; in particular, it can take the form of economic 
deprivation. Economic deprivation is a severe form of domestic violence. Historically, 
it has been gender-biased in that woman often find themselves making a home instead 
of finding employment. They rely on their partner to provide for them as well as for the 
children. However, just like divorce, this remedy was limited by the requirement of a 
duty to maintain on the part of the abuser. Women who cohabited could not invoke this 
remedy because no such duty existed as between them and their partners and as a 
result they were exposed to economic deprivation. At the same time the option of 
leaving an abusive relationship was not readily exercised because they had to care for 
the children, further, the children were a gateway to livelihood because they depended 
on the provision that their partner made for the children.  
 
It is worth noting that prior to the Maintenance Act86, the maintenance system was 
facing challenges; this made it unable to cater for the special characteristics of 
domestic violence. While some of the challenges have been allayed by the 
Maintenance Act, finality is still pending. These challenges are excessive when 
approached from the domestic violence perspective. Maintenance in the context of 




In theory it was open to women – married or unmarried - to file criminal charges against 
their abusers for acts such as assault, assault with intent to cause grievous bodily 
harm, crimeninuria, attempted murder, malicious injury to property or rape.87 Woman 
were not always comfortable with instituting prosecution due to the fear that their 
partner will be arrested leaving the family destitute. Sometimes, if they finally laid 
charges, they were vilified by the police who either did not take the issue seriously or 
regarded it as a private matter not worthy of public resources. It was worse for married 
                                                          
86 Maintenance Act 99 of 1998. 
87 H.B. Kruger ‘Addressing domestic violence: to what extent does the law provide effective measures?’ 
(2004) 29 (1) Journal for Juridical Sciences 152, 155. 
20 
women who suffered sexual violence in the hands of their husbands because the latter 
could not be convicted for the rape of his wife.  
 
Prosecution was insufficient because it was largely premised on the common law. The 
common law did not criminalise a wide range of conduct. For instance stalking is not 
an offence under the common law.  
 
(d) Common law interdicts and peace orders 
 
A victim of domestic violence could obtain a common law interdict or a peace order 
warning the respondent to desist from abusive conduct. While this remedy was 
available to everyone, it was dependent on the financial standing of a person. The 
result was that poor victims who did not have access to courts could not obtain relief.88 
Even if they tried to obtain one, there was always a chance that the partner, who often 
occupied a financially stronger position, would drag the proceedings and in turn drain 
the victim financially and the latter had no choice but to abandon proceedings.89 
Further, the law had placed a negligible value to domestic violence as something that 
warrants an interdict or peace order.90 
 
It should be recalled that during this time services such as legal-aid were not readily 
available. State funding was still an issue. Even now it is doubtful whether the 
overburdened services of the legal-aid board are able to meet the immediacy of an 




It was permissible in law for a victim of domestic violence to approach a high court and 
obtain an order evicting the respondent from the property provided that all the 
requirements for an eviction were met. One of the requirements for this remedy is 
                                                          
88 Gadinabokao (note 17 above; 10). 
89 See M v B 2015 (1) SA 270 (KZP) at para 22 where the court highlights the inherent historical 
difficulties in obtaining a common law interdict in the context of domestic violence.  
90 Gadinabokao (note 17 above; 11). 
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ownership. In domestic violence cases the respondent is usually the owner of the 
property and as a result, this remedy was ineffective in the context of domestic 
violence. Further, just like an interdict, this remedy was available to a select few who 
had property and who could afford the cost of litigation.  
 
1.4.6. The Prevention of Family Violence Act 
 
The Prevention of Family Violence Act91 was passed towards the end of apartheid rule. 
The Act enabled the victims of ‘family violence’, as it was then called, to obtain ‘family 
violence interdicts’ against their abusers.92 This was the first of its kind in the area of 
domestic violence. While some saw it as the disgraced government’s attempt to save 
face in view of the first democratic elections93, this Act had some good in it. For 
instance it upheld married women’s right to sexual autonomy by providing that a 
husband may be convicted for the rape of his wife.94 It is also difficult to understand 
the view that the Act was an attempt by the nationalist government to rake votes 
because at the time the Act was passed, it was clear that they had lost power and 
there was no way that a majority of the recipients of the protection in the Act, which 
were black woman, were going to vote for a government under which they endured 
years of brutality. However, it is true that this Act had more shortcomings than good. 
The Act is substantially discussed below.  
 
(a) Application for a family violence interdict  
 
Any ‘party to a marriage’ could approach a judge or a magistrate in chambers and 
apply for an interdict against the ‘other party to the marriage’ (the respondent) in a 
‘prescribed manner’ or by way of affidavit.95 A third party with a ‘material interest’ could 
bring an application on behalf of the applicant. The Act extended the definition of a 
marriage to include heterosexual couples who were married under customary law and 
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94 Section 5. 
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to those who live together like husband and wife, although they are not married.96 It is 
arguable that couples who were married under religious rights also received protection 
through the use of the words ‘any law’.  
 
The interdict could enjoin the respondent not to assault or threaten to assault the 
applicant or a child living with either of the parties,97 not to enter the matrimonial home, 
the applicant’s residence or a specified part thereof,98 not to prevent the applicant or a 
child living with either of them from entering the matrimonial home99 and not to commit 
any other act specified in the interdict.100 
 
The Act compelled a presiding officer issuing a family violence interdict to issue a 
warrant of arrest101 and suspend it pending the respondent’s compliance with the 
interdict.102 The interdict and the warrant of arrest had no force and effect until it was 
served on the respondent.103 The warrant of arrested was activated by non-compliance 
or a breach of the interdict. A breach of the interdict was an offence for which, on 
conviction, the abuser could be sentenced to a fine of R300 or imprisonment; or both 
such fine and imprisonment. The procedural aspects of obtaining a family violence 
interdict were a flaw, and these flaws are considered below.104 
 
(b) Shortcomings of the Prevention of Family Violence Act  
 
The drafters of this Act failed to consider the sexual diversity of the South African 
communities and, as a result, some classes of people could not access family violence 
interdicts. The Act specifically provided protection to a couple consisting of ‘a man and 
a woman’. Clearly same sex couples were specifically excluded and they could not 
                                                          
96 Section 1 (2). 
97 Section 2 (1) (a). 
98 Section 2 (1) (b). 
99 Section 2 (1) (c). 
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104 See South African Law Commission Research Paper on Domestic Violence (1999); P. Andrews ‘The 
Constitutional Court provides succour for victims of domestic violence: S v Baloyi’ 2000 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 337, 341.  
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benefit from the protection in the Act. The Act provided protection to couples who were 
not married provided that they lived together as if they are married. This excluded 
heterosexual couples who did not live together.105 It also excluded siblings and 
extended family members regardless of the fact that they lived together.106 
 
While the exclusion of same sex couples in the Act was regretted, one should guard 
against blindly attributing this omission solely to the Act. This is because the entire 
legal system and society at large had not accepted same sex couples as worthy of 
legal recognition and protection. This being the case it went without saying the Act 
would follow the legal trend. Nonetheless, this omission cannot be pardoned because 
anyone, regardless of sexual preference, could be a victim of family violence.  
 
Critical concepts such as ‘family violence’ or ‘violence’ were not defined, leaving it to 
the judge or magistrate to decide. This was problematic because it was unclear under 
what circumstances a presiding officer could issue an interdict. This led to inconsistent 
approaches to the same issues by the judiciary.107 In essence the fullness of the relief 
that the victim could obtain was largely defined by the presiding officer’s subjective 
interpretation of concepts in the Act. Further, since the application for a family violence 
interdict was done in chambers, the presiding officer was deprived of the benefit of 
arguments thereby narrowing the sources of his wisdom.  
 
The Act simply provided that the application must be in the ‘prescribed manner’.108 The 
usual manner for applications is by way of affidavit. In doing this the Act might have 
supressed viva voce evidence in that the presiding officer could leave it out. This might 
not appear as a problem because it was the case with most applications. However 
there are two major differences to take into account. Normally; with application 
proceedings the respondent has a natural right to be heard, and secondly, in the 
absence of the respondent’s input, the interdict has an interim effect. This was not the 
case with family violence interdicts. The respondent did not have a natural right to be 
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heard. If he wanted his say so to be considered, he had to make a separate application. 
Secondly the interdict, once granted, was final.  
 
In view of the above, the Act was criticised for its disregard for the audi alteram partem 
principle since the applicant could obtain a final interdict without the respondent’s 
knowledge. The South African Law Commission noted that this was ‘radical and 
unjustified’ departure from the rules of natural justice. A spiteful applicant could use it 
to get an upper-hand in matrimonial disputes.109 In light of the rules of service, such as 
substituted service, it was possible for the respondent to learn about the existence of 
an interdict for the first time during his arrest. While the respondent had an option to 
apply to the court, on 24 hours’ notice, for an amendment or setting aside of the 
interdict, this was ineffective as the evidential burden of proof was heavier on the 
respondent then it had been on the applicant. The difficulty was compounded by the 
fact that the respondent had to reverse facts which had already been accepted by the 
presiding officer to be true.110  
 
Victims were expected to shoulder the costs of serving the interdict and the warrant of 
arrest to the respondent. If the victim was unable to pay, the court could order the state 
to do so.111 However it is reported that the Department of Justice took long to process 
payment and, as such, sheriffs did not affect service pending the payment.112 Police 
did not serve interdicts because it was thought that this would have a chilling effect on 
their work.113 This was self-defeating in two ways. First, the Act was meant to provide 
for a cheaper and faster option to obtain an interdict. Second, this easily resulted in the 
applicant carrying an ineffective interdict and warrant of arrest.  
 
While the innovations brought by the Act (stated above) are noted, it is arguable that 
due to the shortness of the Act and the over reliance on existing law and procedure, 
the Act did not really deal with domestic violence. As it is indicated above, the Act relied 
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on the family law definition of a family which is constituted by a marriage. By leaving 
many concepts undefined, the legislator left a gate opened for the common law to 
make its way in. It is also clear that the Act invoked the law of civil procedure without 
having due regard to the unique nature and character of domestic violence. Below it is 
also clear that the Act invoked the law of criminal procedure. The effect of the Criminal 
Procedure Act114 on the Act is discussed in detail below.  
 
(c) Offences and prosecution  
 
The Act created two offences. It criminalised the violation of a family violence 
interdict115 for which the respondent could be sentenced to fine or imprisonment not 
exceeding 12 months.116 It also criminalised failure to report child abuse and the 
sentence was the same.117 
 
An applicant who alleged that any of the conditions of a family violence interdict had 
been breached could approach the police and depose to an affidavit stating the nature 
of the breach.118 Following this a respondent could be arrested on the discretion of a 
police officer.119 Once arrested he could not get bail until he appeared before a 
presiding officer for an enquiry into the breach. At the enquiry the respondent could 
either be acquitted or convicted.120 Section 3 (5) of the Act provided that the procedure 
at the enquiry was that in terms of section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Act. This is a 
summary procedure which is used when an accused person fails to appear in court 
after an order to do so. It basically allows a presiding officer to convict the accused if 
he fails to provide an acceptable reason justifying his failure to appear in court. In other 
words section 170 presumes an accused person guilty unless he can provide an 
acceptable reason for his failure to appear in court. All that the state has to show is 
that the accused person failed to appear in court. 
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The practical effect of this section was that the respondent was presumed guilty of 
breaching a family violence interdict unless he could prove that he had not. All that the 
state had to show is that there was an interdict accompanied by warrant of arrest and 
the latter has been duly executed pursuant to a statement made by the applicant in 
terms of section 3 (1).  
 
(d) Legal challenges to the Prevention of Family Violence Act  
 
The most notable challenge of the Act was S v Baloyi121 held at the Constitutional 
Court. In this case, the respondent challenged the constitutionality of section 3 (5) of 
the Act as it invoked section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Act.  The section was 
challenged on three grounds: first, it placed a reverse onus burden of proving absence 
of guilt of breaching the family violence interdict, secondly, it interfered with the 
presumption of innocence, and thirdly, it offended the constitutional right to be 
presumed innocent.122 
 
The court held that the first question was whether a violator of a family violence interdict 
was an accused person. The presumption of innocence is available to an accused 
person. This question was answered in the affirmative. Therefore the violator of a 
family violence interdict was entitled to all the rights of an accused person in terms of 
section 35 of the constitution.123  Therefore, the respondent is presumed innocent until 
proven guilty. The reverse onus burden created by section 3 (5) ignored this. 
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(e) Did the Act create a reverse onus? 
 
In answering this question the court provided three possible interpretations of section 
3 (5). Interpretation A was that section 3 (5) merely inferred a summary trial procedure 
evinced by the use of the word ‘procedure’.124 Interpretation B was that section 3 (5) 
incorporates section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Act which in effect creates a 
reverse onus.125 Interpretation C was that section 3 (5) provided a process in terms of 
which a judge or magistrate must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
interdict has been breached, and thereafter a reverse onus rest on the accused to 
prove his innocence.126 The court held that interpretation A was the correct one and 
that section 3 (5) did not create a reverse onus. It was therefore unnecessary to answer 
questions two and three.  
 
Although the Act survived constitutional scrutiny, it is doubtful whether it would have 
held the fort for any longer. The inherent short comings were enough to send it to its 
early grave if tested against the final constitution centred on fundamental rights such 
as equality regardless of, amongst many, marriage, race or sexual orientation.127  
 
1.4.7. Other post-1994 attempts to overhaul domestic violence. 
 
The dawn of democracy gave South Africa the opportunity to focus on specific rights 
such the right to be free from domestic violence. As it has been shown above, this right 
formed part of the constitutionally guaranteed rights. The inherent failure of the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act to address domestic violence was an unequivocal 
invitation to the government to take immediate steps and thus uphold the constitution. 
Such steps resulted in a number of positive benefits even before the DVA was passed.  
 
It is useful to mention the steps preceding the DVA as they form part of this study since 
they were machineries employed at that time to overhaul domestic violence. Given the 
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high levels of crime in general and in particular, crimes against women, the National 
Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) was published in 1996 and came into operations in 
1997. The NCPS prioritised violence against women and children. The NCPS was 
supplemented by the Victim Empowerment Programme which is an ongoing initiative 
by the Department of Justice to provide assistance to victims of crime.128 
 
Certain pieces of legislation were passed to deal with domestic violence and to improve 
the status of women. The Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act129 (1995) and 
the Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act130 (1997) brought about reforms to 
bail provisions to take into account the seriousness of the offence such as crime against 
women and children. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act,131 though it was passed after the DVA, played the role of was to enhancing the 
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THE MACHINERY OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to place the legal framework of the DVA in the context 
of this dissertation by setting out how the Act sought to eradicate domestic violence. 
There are various machineries that flow from this Act. All of these machineries are 
aimed at achieving one goal, which is the eradication of domestic violence. It is 
common knowledge that some of these machineries have either not been fully 
implemented or implemented at all. Therefore this chapter will open by looking at the 
innovation brought by the DVA in response to the shortcomings of the Prevention of 
Family Violence Act which have been extensively discussed in the previous chapter.133 
This will be followed by a discussion on the procedural aspects of obtaining a protection 
order.  
 
It will appear that the bulk of the machineries for combatting domestic violence are 
dependent on obtaining a protection order, being the main machinery of the DVA for 
combatting domestic violence. For this reason, it will seem as though the focus of this 
dissertation is mainly the protection order, but this dissertation will place more 
emphasis on the individual machineries other than the protection order. However these 
machineries flow from a protection order. There are also those machineries that are 
not dependant on a protection order, but can still flow from it, such as giving advice to 
a victim of domestic violence. The machineries that flow from a protection order include 
the following: (a) criminal sanctions for breach of a protection order; (b) giving advice 
to victims; (c) rendering assistance to victims; (d) ejectment of the respondents; and 
(e) rent, mortgages and emergency monetary relief (f) seizure of firearms and 
dangerous weapons  and (g) access to children.  A critical discussion of these appears 
in chapter 3 below.   
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This chapter will also deal with aspects that are pertinent to the success of the DVA 
such as the institution of the Civilian Secretariat for Police and the recent ministerial six 
point plan against gender based violence. The purpose of the Civilian Secretariat for 
Police is to bolster compliance with the DVA. This is required by section 18 (4) of the 
DVA. These instruments should be seen as an extension of the DVA and as such this 
dissertation will treat them as one. 
 
2.2. THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT 116 of 1998 
 
2.2.1. The background of the Act 
 
The DVA was prompted by the inadequacy of the Prevention of Family Violence Act 
and the wake of the Constitution premised on fundamental rights including the right to 
be free from violence from a private source.134 The DVA was an attempt to overhaul 
previous neglect of domestic violence by the lawmakers, the police and society in 
general,135 mainly by affording victims of domestic violence maximum protection that 
the law can provide through the issuing protection orders.136 
 
The DVA deals with ‘domestic violence’ instead of ‘family violence’. In so doing the, 
legislature moved away from the inherently discriminatory approach that afforded more 
protection to married or heterosexual couples to the exclusion of certain groups in 
society, such as those couples who were unmarried and did not live together. The 
protection is no longer afforded only to a traditional family. Instead, the focus is on the 
domestic nature of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim regardless 
of sex, marriage or whether the parties live together or not.137 
 
The concept ‘domestic violence’ is defined in broader terms to include: 
‘physical abuse; sexual abuse; emotional, verbal and psychological abuse; 
economic abuse; intimidation; harassment; stalking; damage to property, entry 
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136 The Preamble of the Act. 
137 A. van der Hoven (note 25 above; 21).  
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into the complainant’s residence without consent, where the parties do not share 
the same residence; or any other controlling or abusive behaviour towards a 
complainant, where such conduct harms, or may cause harm to, the safety, 
health or wellbeing of the complainant.’138 
 
Further, each of these sub-categories of domestic violence is defined individually. By 
doing this the legislature provided clear guidelines as to what constitutes domestic 
violence and who is entitled to protection in terms of the legislation. A single act is 
enough to constitute domestic violence.139 This denotes a shift from the Prevention of 
Family Violence Act which had blurred the criteria for obtaining relief by not defining 
family violence and had narrowed the definition of a family, further limiting access to 
the Act.140 
 
Victims of domestic violence may now approach the family courts section in a 
Magistrates Court and apply for a protection order. The DVA provides that ‘any 
complainant may in the prescribed manner apply to the court for a protection order’.141 
The question of who is a complainant is easily answered by looking at the relationship 
between the applicant and the respondent. The relationship will qualify if it is a 
‘domestic relationship’. The concept of a ‘domestic relationship’ includes:  
 
A relationship between a complainant and a respondent in any of the following 
ways: 
(a) They are or were married to each other, including marriage according to      
any law, custom or religion; 
(b) They (whether they are of the same or of the opposite sex) live or lived 
together in a relationship in the nature of marriage, although they are not, 
or were not, married to each other, or are not able to be married to each 
other; 
(c) They are parents of a child or a persons who have or had parental 
responsibility for that child (whether or not at the same time); 
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(d) They are family members related by consanguinity, affinity or adoption; 
(e) They are or were in an engagement, dating or customary relationship, 
including an actual or perceived romantic, intimate or sexual relationship of 
any duration; or 
(f) They share or recently share the same residence;142 
 
This wide definition of a ‘domestic relationship’ now included same sex partners and 
people who have never stayed together.  For instance, even cousins are now legible 
to protection from domestic violence.143 In Botha v Minister of Police and another144 a 
nephew was able to obtain a protection order against an uncle he did not live with. As 
a result of what has been said above, the DVA has been lauded for its forward looking 
approach. 
 
2.2.2. Applying for a protection order 
 
The protection order is the core machinery in the DVA. Section 4 (1) provides that any 
complainant may apply for a protection order in the ‘prescribed manner’. The 
prescribed manner is by way of an affidavit and oral evidence. This is explicit in the Act 
and the Regulations under the DVA.145 The practical implication is that a presiding 
officer has to consider oral evidence. Oral evidence assists a presiding officer in cases 
where the affidavit does not provide sufficient information. This is a significant 
improvement from the Prevention of Family Violence Act which only made provision 
for ‘prescribed manner’ possibly leading to suppression of oral evidence at the option 
of a presiding officer with a view to saving time.  
 
The application for a protection is completed by deposing to an affidavit detailing the 
nature of the violence suffered and the relief sought. The clerk of the court will assist 
in completing the application.146 The application, (that is, the affidavit and form 2 
                                                          
142 Section 1 definition of ‘domestic relationship’. 
143 S 1 definition of ‘domestic relationship’. 
144 Botha v Minister of Police and another 2014 (2) SACR 601 (GP).  
145 Regulation 4 of the Regulations under the DVA. 
146 Section 4 (2) of the Domestic Violence Act provides that ‘If the complainant is not represented by a 
legal representative, the clerk of the court must inform the complainant, in the prescribed manner –  
33 
(application for a protection order)) are sent to a presiding officer who studies these 
and if he or she is satisfied, based on the affidavit, that (a) the respondent is committing 
or has committed an act of domestic violence and (b) undue hardship may be suffered 
by the applicant if a protection order is not issued immediately, the presiding officer 
must, notwithstanding that the respondent has not been given notice of the application, 
issue an interim protection order.147 The presiding officer may summon oral evidence 
for assistance before granting the interim order.148 The court may not refuse to issue 
an order on the ground that other remedies are available to the complainant.149 The 
application may be heard outside court hours or court days if undue hardship may be 
suffered by the applicant as a result of the delay.150 It is submitted that this is a 
commendable innovation taking into account that domestic violence usually takes 
place after hours and on weekends.151This did not exist under the Prevention of Family 
Violence Act. 
 
The interim order must be served on the respondent calling upon him to provide 
reasons why the order should not be made final on the return date.152 The return date 
may not be less than 10 days after service.153 In practice the courts set the return day 
at least a month after the issue of an interim protection order to allow enough time for 
timeous service to take place. The respondent must be served with enough information 
on the allegations to enable him to make a defence. Pending service, the interim 
protection order is of no force and effect.154 Once served, it has the effect of a final 
protection order. It appears possible to meet the requirement of service by informing 
the respondent via a phone call.155 The respondent may be convicted and sentenced 
                                                          
(a) Of the relief available in terms of this Act; and 
(b) Of the right to also lodge a criminal complaint against the respondent, if a criminal offence has 
been committed by the respondent.’  
 
See also Regulation 5 that imposes a duty on the clerk of the court to assist unrepresented 
applicants in various respect including making the application and explaining the relief available in 
terms of the Act. 
147 Section 5 (2) (a) & (b) of the Domestic Violence Act. The interim protection order is the same as a 
rule nisi. See South African Law Commission (note 104 above; 21).  
148 Section 5 (1). 
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151 A. van der Hoven (note 32 above; 23). 
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155 See overall Botha v Minister of Police and another (note 144 above). 
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as though he had breached a final protection order. Just like the final protection order, 
the interim order may impose certain obligations on the respondent. As it will be seen 
below, this dissertation takes the view that imposing certain obligations on the 
respondent as part of the interim protection order is undesirable.  
 
The court is not obliged to issue an interim protection order. It is clear above that the 
court should only issue an interim protection order if the complainant would suffer an 
undue hardship if one is not issued. If the court does not issue an interim order, it must 
direct the clerk of the court to cause certified copies of the application and any 
supporting documents to be served on the respondent calling upon him to provide 
reasons why the order should not be made final on return day.156 The respondent may 
on 24-hours’ notice anticipate the return date and have the application heard before 
the initial return date set by the court. He must be informed of his right in this regard.157 
The Act and regulations do not prescribe any process or form for anticipating the return 
day. Its only provides that the respondent has to notify the applicant in the prescribed 
manner.158 
 
For procedural reasons, the complainant is not usually armed with the interim 
protection order. It is only once the court is satisfied that the respondent has received 
proper service of the interim protection order that the clerk of the court must cause a 
certified copy of the interim protection order and an original suspended warrant of 
arrest to be served on the applicant.159 The warrant of arrest is suspended on condition 
that the respondent complies with the prohibitions, conditions and obligations on 
interim protection order.160 These prohibitions, conditions and obligations are 
discussed further below.  
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“The respondent is hereby informed of his/her right to appear in the Magistrates Court at Room [room 
number] on the [date] at [time] in order to give reasons why the interim protection order should not be 
confirmed and made final; and of his/her right to have the matter heard on an earlier date at least 24 
hours written notice to the applicant and the aforementioned court.” 
158 Ibid. 
159 Section 5 (7). 
160 Section 8 (1) (b). 
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The requirement of service has both positive and negative aspect. It is good because 
it addressed the imbalance created by the Prevention of Family Violence Act. For the 
sake of coherence, this imbalance is discussed shortly below. On the other hand it is 
bad because the delay in serving the interim protection order may have deadly results 
for the complainant. This negative aspect can be eliminated by ensuring that interim 
orders are served on the day of issue. This way the order becomes effective without 
delay. In a very limited number of cases, the police do attend to service on the same 
day. However it is not uncommon to hear a lay person saying that they went to court 
to apply for a protection order and did not receive one and as a result they were further 
victimised by the respondent.  
 
It is self-defeating for a court to issue an interim protection order if the complainant will 
not receive it immediately. This is because the interim order is issued on the ground 
that the respondent will suffer hardship if it is not issued immediately. It is therefore 
pointless to issue an interim order if it will not be immediately served on the respondent 
and thus validating it. On this basis the interim protection order, if issued, must be 
served immediately and a copy thereof given to the complainant together with a stayed 
warrant of arrest on the same day. 
 
The respondent may be lawfully arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued in 
conjunction with an interim protection order. He cannot interdict the execution of a 
warrant of arrest primarily on the ground that he will oppose confirmation of the interim 
order. In Bent v Ismail-Essop and another161 the applicant sought to obtain an order 
interdicting and restraining the first respondent (complainant in the protection order) 
and the second respondent (all members of the South African Police Services) from 
executing any warrant of arrest issued in conjunction with the interim protection order 
pending final determination of the matter (that is, confirmation or setting aside of the 
interim protection order). The court held that it could not interdict the processes of the 
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DVA. Doing so would be tantamount to depriving a victim of her rights in terms of the 
Act and interfering with statutory powers of the police.162 
 
The process of notifying the respondent is a significant improvement from the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act. While it is possible under the DVA for the applicant 
to obtain an order without notice to the respondent, the effect of this order is subject to 
service of same, and even if it is duly served, the effect will be interim until the return 
date. As it has been shown above, if the respondent really feels aggrieved by the 
interim protection order, he may anticipate the return date and oppose the matter as 
soon as possible. Under the Prevention of Family Violence Act, the applicant could 
simply obtain final relief without notice to the respondent. This process lent itself to 
abuse by unscrupulous applicants. This also shifted the focus from the evil of family 
violence to the injustice permitted by the former Act, thus giving the momentum to the 
false argument that the former Act achieved nothing. Such an argument is fallacious; 
the former Act will be remembered for stating for the first time that a husband may be 
convicted for the rape of his wife. It also made it mandatory to report child abuse and 
failure in this regard was criminal offence. 
 
The improvements brought by the DVA further gives effect to the audi alteram partem 
principle. Now the radical departure from this rule of natural justice has been curtailed. 
The deprivation of the respondent’s procedural right has been lifted. The only departure 
or deprivation that exists has an interim effect. The respondent now has an unqualified 
right to be heard before a drastic decision against him/her may be made.163 
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On the return day the procedure is that of a civil trial. However the proceedings are 
informal in order to accommodate the parties.164 The standard of proof is on a balance 
of probabilities.165 The parties may be legally represented. If the respondent is not 
legally represented, the court may direct that he may not cross-examine the 
complainant directly and that he must do so through the court.166 The respondent is not 
an accused person and therefore he is not entitled to the rights of an accused person 
in terms of section 35 of the Constitution.167 The DVA provides that if the respondent 
appears on the return date to oppose the application, the court ‘must hear the 
matter’.168 Evidence of witnesses may be heard.169 If the applicant makes a prima facie 
case that the respondent is committing or has committed an act of domestic violence, 
the court must confirm the protection order.170 On the other hand, if the respondent 
makes a prima facie case that no act of domestic violence has been committed, the 
court may set aside the interim order. Some have argued that the protection order 
ought to be confirmed even in the absence of the complainant.171  
 
This argument is unsettling for various reasons. First, if the applicant had it to come to 
court and make the initial application, surely she can make it on the return day to 
vindicate her rights. The issue of fear of the respondent does not arise because the 
applicant already enjoys an upper hand in the sense that she has possession of the 
interim order and a suspended warrant of arrest which may be executed at her option. 
Second, if she does not have an interim protection order, it simply means that the court 
was not of the view that she will suffer harm if one is not issued immediately. Third, 
confirming a protection order in the absence of the applicant may result in the court 
making a habit of issuing ineffective orders. Finally, this will take us to a position similar 
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to that under the Prevention of Family Violence Act where the complainant could obtain 
an interdict in disregard of the respondent. 
 
The court cannot confirm a protection order simply because the respondent did not 
appear in court to oppose confirmation. It must be satisfied that the proper service as 
indicated above has taken place172 and the applicant has a prima facie case.173 If the 
respondent had not received proper service of the notice of application, the court will 
not confirm the order; in practice the return date is postponed. If the court confirms the 
protection order notwithstanding that the respondent had not received notice of the 
application, the respondent has a variety of remedies. For instance he may have the 
protection order set aside sorely on these grounds or claim damages against the state 
if he is subsequently arrested on the strength of the order so granted. This is another 
way in which the Act gives vent to natural justice. Both the parties receive the protection 
of the Act.   
 
The warrant of arrest is subsidiary to the protection order. If the order is not confirmed, 
the warrant also falls away.174 If the order is confirmed, the clerk of the court must 
cause a certified copy of the final protection order together with a warrant of arrest to 
be served on the applicant if initial warrant has been executed.175 This subsequent 
warrant of arrest (if issued) must also be suspended on condition that the respondent 
complies with the protection order. Unlike the interim protection order, the validity of a 
final protection order is not dependent on service.176 The court’s powers, which are 
discussed below, with respect to protection orders are provided for in section 7. This 
section will be discussed at length in chapter three as a bulk of the machineries 
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2.2.3. The suspended warrant of arrest 
 
On issuing a protection order, the court must also issue a warrant of arrest; suspend it 
on condition that the respondent complies with the conditions, prohibitions and any 
orders in the protection order. With this machinery, the legislature sought to provide 
an incentive for complying with the protection order. In Omar v Government of the 
Republic of South Africa177 the applicant challenged the issuing of a warrant of arrest. 
He argued that it arbitrarily infringed on his right to freedom without him knowing 
because the complainant could execute it at any time.178 The court held that the issuing 
of a warrant of arrest was not unconstitutional because it was suspended. The 
complainant could not use it provided that the respondent complied. Further, the 
requirement of service reduced the chances of the respondent being arrested on the 
strength of a warrant of arrest that he was unaware of.179 Furthermore, the respondent 
can only be arrested by a police officer if that police officer believes, on reasonable 
grounds, that the complainant will suffer imminent harm if an arrest is not made.180 
This was confirmed in Bent.181 
 
In summary the interim protection order has two functions. The first is to ensure that 
the respondent maintains compliant behaviour.  Second, it is security in the hands of 
the complainant that the respondent will comply with the order and that if he does not 
comply; the complainant may execute the order. As it has been pointed out above, the 
question of arbitrariness does not arise. 
 
2.2.4. Remedies available to the respondent 
 
This dissertation has discussed above that a number of remedies flowing from the 
DVA. In fact the whole dissertation is based on remedies. However some of these 
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remedies should be highlighted because of their uniqueness and the context at this 
stage. 
 
(a) Appeals and review 
 
Any party to the proceedings may appeal against a decision to grant or refuse a final 
protection order. He or she may also have the decision reviewed.182 The respondent 
may not appeal or review an interim protection order. There appears to be two reasons 
for this, first the respondent has other remedies. He may anticipate the return date and 
have the matter heard early. He has a right to appear on the return date and oppose 
confirmation of the order. Second, pending confirmation of the protection order, the 
matter is still pending. In our law an appeal is lodged only once a final decision has 
been made. The same is the case with reviews. On appeal or review of the matter, the 
high court may set aside a protection order.183 
 
(b) Variation and setting aside of the protection order 
 
It is open to any of the parties to apply for variation or setting aside of the protection 
order.184 Variation changes a provision of the order. Setting aside cancels the order 
entirely. The DVA does not say prescribe any process for varying or setting aside a 
protection order. There is a cautionary rule in respect of an application by the complaint 
setting aside or varying a protection order. Section 10 (2) provides that a court shall 
not grant such an application unless it is satisfied that it is made freely and voluntarily. 
A party cannot seek to vary or set aside an interim protection order pending the return 
date. If the respondent is unhappy with a particular term of the interim protection order, 
or with the entire order, he has a right to anticipate the return date instead of making 
an application for variation or setting aside.  
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It must be noted however, that there is no distinction as such between setting aside 
an interim protection order and anticipating the return date. The process of achieving 
either of these is the same, that is, service notice of the application to the other party. 
It is arguable that these are one of the same things. The only reason that a person will 
anticipate the return date is to have the interim protection order set aside. 
 
It would be absurd for the respondent to opt for varying an interim protection order 
unless it would be easier for him to vary than set aside the protection order altogether 
on the return or anticipation date. It will be equally absurd for the complainant to make 
an application to vary an interim protection order unless she seeks to include a 
pressing or onerous term in the order. In all these instances, the parties can wait for 
the return or anticipation date. In all likelihood the court will not entertain an application 
to vary an interim protection order because it is tantamount to wasting the court’s time 
since the matter is already enrolled for another day.  
 
(c) Suing the complainant for malicious application 
 
The respondent may sue a complainant who maliciously obtains a protection order 
against him. He may sue for damages for contumelia, discomfort suffered in the 
process, and defamation of character arising from content of the affidavit applying for 
a protection order.185 This is an indirect remedy arguably provided by the DVA. In Bent 
the court reasoned the position as follow: 
 
‘The very nature of a Domestic Violence Act application brings about the implication 
of unacceptable and anti-social behaviour by the respondent against the 
complainant. Rather like defamatory statements, the institution of such 
proceedings intrinsically impacts injuriously on a respondent’s dignity in the broad 
sense. Any respondent made subject to a protection order in terms of the Act is 
also made subject to a warrant of arrest, for example. The applicant must have 
appreciated this as much, and yet, she proceeded recklessly as to the 
consequences, actuated, as I have pointed out, by improper motives. In my 
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judgment the magistrate correctly found that the alleged injuria has been 
established.’186 
 
(d) Criminal sanctions and a counter-protection order 
 
The purpose of the DVA is to curb domestic violence by issuing effective protection 
orders to those in need. However, with every mechanism of this nature comes 
manipulation. It is widely known that some people use the DVA to gain an advantage 
in matrimonial disputes or gain control over their ‘abusers’. The question that should 
naturally come to mind is how the DVA protects respondents from exploitation through 
the Act.  
 
There are two notable grounds of protection in this regard. One is directly from the 
DVA and the other one is indirect. The respondent receives direct protections from the 
DVA through section 17 (d). This provision criminalises the wilful making of a false 
statement in a material respect. The DVA also indirectly protects the respondent by 
making it possible for him to obtain a protection order termed a ‘counter-protection 
order’. This, again, is a commendable feature marking an improvement from the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act which was so one-sided that it failed to take into 
account the potential abuse of the system.187 
 
However these protective measures are controversial on their own. There is a standing 
question of how these measures should be implemented. For instance courts are not 
unanimous on how to deal with applications for counter protection orders. Some are 
of the view that these ought to be heard with the preceding application while, on the 
other hand, some regard it as a separate application that ought to be considered on 
its own merits.188 The latter view is sound because it gives effect to the respondent’s 
unfettered right to be heard in a court of law. Those magistrates who reject a counter- 
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application solely on the ground that it is a counter-application commit an injustice by 
denying the respondent a right to be heard.  
 
When one considers the subject of counter-protection orders, it is important to 
distinguish between three cases. There are those cases where the respondent does 
not appear in court to oppose confirmation of an order in favour of the complainant; 
cases where the responded does appear in court and counter-applications made 
before the return date. The important question is how courts should respond to 
counter-applications in each of these instances? It is submitted that there should not 
be any marginalisation. The courts ought to hear all application and decide on the 
merits and not procedure.  
 
The offence created by section 17 (d) is hardly enforced. Further, as it will be seen 
below, this provision does not criminalise making of a false statement during 
application for a protection order. It only criminalises the making of a false statement 
with a view to an arrest and subsequent prosecution. Nonetheless the respondent 
does receive some measure of protection from the DVA. 
 
2.2.5. Procedure in case of breach of a protection order 
 
If the respondent breaches the protection order, the applicant must approach any 
police station with the protection order and a suspended warrant of arrest189 whereupon 
a member of the South African Police Services (SAPS) must render such assistance 
as may be required including finding a suitable shelter and obtaining medical 
assistance for the complainant (s),190 if reasonably possible to do so, hand a notice in 
the language that the complainant can understand detailing the remedies at the 
complainant’s disposal as well as the right to lodge a criminal complaint.191 
 
                                                          
189 Section 8 (4) (a); Khanyile v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2012 (2) SACR 238 (KZD) 
244. 
190 Section 2 (a). 
191 Section 2 (b) and (C). 
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The member of the SAPS dealing with the complainant must take a sworn statement 
from the complainant and if it appears to the member concerned that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the complainant may suffer imminent harm as result 
of the breach, he must arrest the respondent forthwith.192 If there are no such grounds, 
the member must hand a notice to the respondent to appear at a specific court on a 
determined date.193 At this stage the respondent becomes an accused person and he 
is entitled to all the rights of an accused person such as the immediate right to bail and 
all the rights of an accused person in terms of section 35 of the Constitution.194 The 
offence of breach of a protection order is dealt with below. 
 
2.5.6. The Offences  
 
Section 17 of the DVA provides for four offences that may be committed under the Act. 
This part of the dissertation will focus more on the offences created by section 17 (a) 
and 17 (d). It is also worth noting that these are arguably novel offences created by 
the DVA, while the other offences (section 17 (b) and (c) are criminalised elsewhere 
in law. Perhaps this could be better illustrated by quoting the section: 
17 Offences 
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, any person who –  
(a) Contravened any prohibition, condition, obligation or order imposed in terms of 
section 7; 
(b) Contravenes the provisions of section 11 (2) (a); 
(c) Fails to comply with any direction in terms of the provision of section 11            (2) 
(b); or 
                                                          
192 Section 8 (4) (b). Subsection 5 provides that in deciding whether or not the complainant may suffer 
imminent harm a member must consider the following grounds: 
(a) The risk of safety, health or wellbeing of the complainant;  
(b) The seriousness of the conduct comprising an alleged breach of the protection order; and 
(c) The length of time since the alleged breach occurred.  
193 Section 8 (4) (c). The notice must: 
(a) Specify the name, residential address and the occupation or status of the respondent; 
(b) Call upon the respondent to appear in court on a specified date and at a specified time on a 
charge of breach of a protection order in terms of section 17 (a). 
(c) Contain a certificate signed by a member concerned to the effect that the member did hand the 
written notice to the accused and that he explained the implications thereof.  
194 Sibisi (note 164 above; 23); Andrews (note 104 above; 341).  
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(d) In an affidavit referred to [in] section 8 (4) (a), wilfully makes a false statement in 
a material respect, 
… 
Section 11 (2) (a) and (b) prohibits the publishing of certain information that might 
reveal the identity of the parties pending proceedings. It is trite in law that publishing 
certain information regarding court proceedings may be an offence. Therefore no 
reference shall be made to these offences. 
 
As mentioned above, the most important offences in the DVA are that in section 17 (a) 
and (b). The offence created by section 17 (a) is also referred to as 
‘breach/contravention/violation of a protection order’. The mere existence of a 
protection order against a person has no criminal consequences provided that a person 
complies with same. It is only once a protection order is breached that the criminal 
aspect will kick in. It is not difficult to see that the legislature had hoped to first deter 
perpetrators from engaging in conduct complained of rather than merely incriminating 
the conduct of the respondent. Below is a discussion of the selected offences and the 
possible defences. This discussion will be followed by the argument for the creation of 
a stand-alone crim of ‘domestic violence’. This argument is gaining momentum lately. 
 
(a) Breach of a protection order 
 
(i) The elements of the offence 
The elements of breach of a protection order are as follows: 
1. A protection order 
2. Breach  
3. Unlawfulness 
4. Mens rea 
 





A protection order 
 
As its name suggests, this offence presupposes a protection order. If there is no 
protection order, no charge in terms of section 17 (a) of the DVA may follow. The 
protection order must be valid. Mere existence of a final protection pre-supposes 
service of the interim order. It is up to the respondent to prove otherwise.195 To 
determine if the protection order is valid, one must study the process under which it 
was obtained and see if the process was the correct one. This necessitates knowledge 
of the procedure for obtaining a protection order. 
 
In summary, the DVA provides that the respondent must be furnished with the 
particulars of the application to enable him to make his case. Further, he must be 
informed of the date of the application, and in case an interim order is issued, the return 
date. The rationale behind this is that the respondent must be given enough information 
and opportunity to answer to the applicant’s case and to construct his own case. If any 
of these processes is not followed, then there is a procedural flaw which in turn affects 
the validity of a subsequent protection order. It cannot then be said that the respondent 
is guilty of contravening an invalid protection order.  
 
A misrepresentation by the complainant may be a ground for challenging the validity of 
a protection order. In Seria196 the parties were spouses with marital problems leading 
to an application in terms of the DVA. The respondent (the husband) became aware of 
the interim protection order and the return date; however in the interim the parties 
‘reconciled’ and the parties agreed that the applicant will cancel the pending 
application. On return date, the parties drove together to court, and the applicant 
convinced the respondent to remain in the car outside court while the applicant went 
inside and obtained confirmation of the order on false information that the respondent 
did not make an appearance. The court held that the respondent was entitled to oppose 
the application.  
 
                                                          
195 Seria (note 18 above; 144D-E). 
196 Ibid 137. 
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The validity of a protection order may be challenged either pre-trial, during trial or post-
trial. Pre-trial measures could by way of an application for setting aside a protection 
order in terms of section 10 of the DVA due to the procedural flaw in obtaining it or 
during pre-trial consultations with the prosecution where the defence can point out the 
procedural flaws hoping that the prosecution might consider withdrawing the charge 
for contravening a protection order. During trial it is possible to raise invalidity of the 
order as a defence and lead evidence to prove same. Section 10 may also be used to 
bring an application for setting aside the protection order post-trial.  
 
This being the case, it is important for those responsible for issuing protection orders 
to ensure that the correct procedure is adhered to in order to ensure the validity of any 
subsequent order. Doing this is also beneficial to victims of domestic violence who 
could do with the assurance that the protection order in their possession is worth the 
paper it is written on and it will go a long way to ensure that perpetrators do not get 
away as a result of procedural flaws other than the merits of the case.  
 
The original protection order must be produced in court during proceedings. However, 
this requirement may be dispensed with if the accused admits that a protection order 
exists and he is aware of it. In S v Bangani197 the accused was convicted for breach of 
a protection order. Although the protection order was not produced during trial, the 
court was satisfied, based on the accused admission, that there was a protection order 




The second requirement is that there must be a breach of a protection order. The 
wording of the order is very important as only conduct expressly mentioned in the 
protection order suffices. The respondent contravenes a protection order if he engages 
in conduct which is prohibited by the order, or fails to engage in conduct ordered by the 
order. It should, however, be borne in mind that certain conduct is obviously prohibited 
                                                          
197 S v Bangani (E) unreported case no 255/07 of 17 October 2007.  
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that it need not be spelled out. For instance, littering on the complainant’s property 




The breach must be unlawful. In other words the respondent’s behaviour must be 
unjustified. Conduct which is unlawful is that which is expressly mentioned in the 
protection order. If the conduct is not express in the protection order, the offence would 
not be committed. 
 
The respondent may raise any of the justification grounds that exclude unlawfulness. 
For instance, if he happens to be at the complainant’s premises in contravention of the 
protection order, he can always raise consent as a defence if the complainant had 




Mens rea in the form of intention is required for a successful conviction. Intention will 
be proved if it can be shown that the respondent despite being aware of the protection 
order engaged in the prohibited conduct – knowledge of unlawfulness. This is because 
in law it cannot be said that someone acted intentionally unless he had the knowledge 
that his behaviour is unlawful. In S v Mazomba198 the court illustrated this as follow: 
 
‘…one  of  the elements that would need to be proved by the state to secure a 
conviction  for  such  contravention  is  intent  on  the  part  of  the accused person, 
it would be incumbent upon the State to prove that the accused person had 
intentionally violated the provisions of  the  protection  order  after  it  had  been  
duly  and  properly served  on  him  and  he  had  been  properly  advised  of,  or  
had become aware of the provisions thereof.  Indeed the certificate in  the  pro  
forma  return  of  service  of  process  in  terms  of Domestic  Violence  Act  no.116  
                                                          
198 S v Mazomba (ECB) unreported case number 08/09 of 31 March 2009.  
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of  1998… provides that the functionary serving  the  order  must  certify  that  
he/she  has  handed  the original  of  the  notice  to  the  respondent  and  that  
he/she  had explained the contents thereof to the third respondent.’199 
 
There is a fallacious argument in practice that if the respondent contravenes a valid 
protection order, there is no excuse. This is incorrect as it presupposes strict liability 
which is clearly not evident in the Act. The Act requires that the respondent must be 
informed of the intended application for a protection order and the allegations against 
him. It cannot then be that he will be found guilty even if he was unaware that his 
conduct is criminally reprehensible.  
 
(ii) The defences 
  
The respondent is entitled any defence that excludes unlawfulness. If the respondent, 
once accused, is able to meet the requirements of a certain defence, then he is entitled 
to an acquittal. In S v Molapo200 the court held that a protection order cannot deny a 
defence that is good in law. In this case the accused had sworn at the complainant (his 
wife) because she had called him an ‘inkwenkwe’ or ‘boy’ which suggested that he was 
not a complete man since he was uncircumcised. The complainant had also made 
reference to the accused’s mother.201 
 
The court held that the complainant had impaired the accused’s dignity and that he 
was justified in swearing back at her. The court found that that the ‘complainant was 
not kind and considerate, she was insultative and demeaning… Physical wounds heal 
but those inflicted by words often last forever.’202 Therefore the accused could rely on 
private defence to defend his dignity.  
 
 
                                                          
199 Mazomba (note 198 above; para  9). 
200 S v Molapo (O) unreported case no 213/2006 of 10 August 2006.  
201 Ibid para 11. 
202 Ibid para 13. 
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(b) Making a false statement 
 
This offence is created by section 17 (d). It shall hereinafter be referred to as ‘making 
of a false statement’. It must be noted that the offence in section 17 (a) can only be 
committed by a respondent in a protection order; whereas this present offence can only 
be committed by a complainant or a holder of a protection order – a spiteful one. As it 
has been argued in chapter two above, this is yet another initiative to balance the scale 
in the DVA by protecting the interests of both the parties. 
 
(i) The elements of the offence 
  
Since little has been said elsewhere about this offence, and no known prosecution has 
been carried out under this offence, perhaps before trying to work out the elements of 
this offence, it might be useful to once again revisit the provision creating it. Section 17 
(d) reads ‘…In an affidavit referred to [in] section 8 (4) (a), wilfully makes a false 
statement in a material respect…’ 
 
The elements on this offence are: 
1. False statement 
2. Wilfulness 
3. Materiality  




The complainant must have made a false statement with respect to section 8 (4) (a). 
This provision deals with arrests and the subsequent prosecution for breach of a 
protection order. In other words, a complainant commits an offence if he or she makes 
a false statement leading to a potential arrest and/or subsequent prosecution of the 
respondent. Reference is made to a potential arrest and/or subsequent prosecution 
51 
because section 8 also makes it possible for prosecution to follow without an arrest; 
that is, following a notice to appear in court. 
 
This offence clearly excludes a false statement made in an affidavit applying for a 
protection order. This is commendable because doing otherwise would have limited 
the number of people applying for protection orders for fear that any error in the 
statement could lead to prosecution. Further, protection orders are granted on merits. 
The respondent is afforded a chance to challenge any false statements before an order 
is granted, and if the application is based largely on false claims, it may be refused.  
 
The fact that no prosecution may follow false accusations in a statement applying for 
a protection order does not necessarily mean a complainant may do as he or she 
pleases. In Bent the following was held. 
 
‘The very nature of a Domestic Violence Act application brings about the implication 
of unacceptable and anti-social behaviour by the respondent against the 
complainant. Rather like defamatory statements, the institution of such 
proceedings intrinsically impacts injuriously on a respondent’s dignity in the broad 
sense. Any respondent made subject to a protection order is [sis] terms of the Act 
is also made subject to a warrant of arrest, for example. The applicant must have 
appreciated this as much, and yet, she proceeded recklessly as to the 
consequences, actuated, as I have pointed out, by improper motives. In my 
judgment the magistrate correctly found that the alleged injuria has been 
established.’203 
 
Wilfulness/ mens rea  
 
The false statement must be made wilfully. Wilfulness suggests intention on the part 
of the complainant. It is trite in law that intention and knowledge of unlawfulness go 
hand in hand. There can never be a finding that a person acted intentionally in the 
                                                          
203 Bent (note 161 above; para 17). 
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absence of knowledge of unlawfulness. An exception to this are a very few statutory 
offences and the statute must specifically state this exception. The DVA does not fall 
within these exceptions. 
 
It therefore follows that the complainant must make the false statement with the 
intention to have the respondent either arrested and/or prosecuted. It is widely known 
that some spiteful ‘complainants’ will try by all means to get a respondent arrested just 
to make his life miserable by ‘arranging’ a weekend in custody. On the face of it, a 




The falsehood in the statement must be material. In other word it must have the 
potential to initiate an arrest or prosecution. It goes without saying that a minor 
misstatement of no consequence would not suffice for this offence. A false statement 
that the complainant was severely assaulted by the respondent, whereas the 
complainant fell and injured herself, would meet the requirement of materiality because 
it has the potential to bring about the respondent’s arrest. 
 
(ii) The Defences  
 
Since there is no known prosecution under this offence, any exposition of available 
defences is merely speculative in light of the elements of the offence. Nonetheless the 
defences are worth exploring. An accused may argue that the statement was true. It 
must be noted that this will be resolved through an analysis of facts. The accused may 
argue that the false element was immaterial. In this regard the court will have to assess 
the foreseeable consequences of the accused’s conduct. If an arrest and subsequent 
prosecution were bound to follow the accused’s false statement, then she may not 
raise immateriality as a defence. If it ought to have been apparent to a reasonable 




The above is only a brief summary of the DVA. It is not surprising that the Act has been 
lauded as a progressive step towards the realisation of the right to be free from 
domestic violence. Some have said that in passing this piece of legislation the South 
African government has to a large extent succeeded to fulfil its obligations in terms of 
CEDAW and the supporting instruments.204 It has been referred to as the long awaited 
addition to the South African Jurisprudence.205 It has also been referred to as ‘the best 
and most progressive piece of legislature in the world’.206 In Seria v Minister of Safety 
and Security207 Meer J described the Act as ‘a commendable and long-awaited addition 
to our jurisprudence promoting the rights of equality, freedom and security of the 
person.’208 Govender209 submits that the DVA must be commended because the 
drafters clearly asked the ‘woman question’. She states further that ‘the woman 
question is a way of looking at issues from a woman’s perspective and recognising that 
many legal questions are gender oriented’.210 
 
On the other hand it has received sceptical comments. Parenzee, Artz and Moult 
submit that the DVA is a positive step but little thought went towards its 
implementation.211 Furusa and Limberg describe it as a progressive legislation facing 
non-progressive attitudes.212 Galgut submits that ‘…further investigations reveal the 
emergence of a disturbing pattern and one that is unwittingly being facilitated by the 
matter in which the DVA is being implemented in our magistrate’s courts.’213 Artz and 
Smythe submit: 
                                                          
204 P. Parenzee, L. Artz and K. Moult ‘Monitoring the Implementation of the DVA: First Research Report’ 
(2012) Institute of Criminology: University of Cape Town 2. 
205 Gadinabokao (note 17 above; 1). 
206 Ibid 2. 
207 Seria (note 18 above). 
208 Ibid 148D. 
209 Govender (note 73 above; 672). 
210 A. van der Hoven (note 132 above; 19) submits that one of the main reasons that the Prevention of 
Family Violence Act failed was the fact that important stakeholders such as woman’s organisations were 
not consulted. The author further submits that it was mainly the judiciary and government, majority of 
whom were white male that were consulted on the process.  
211 Parenzee, Artz and Moult (note 204 above: 22).  
212 R. Furusa and C. Limberg ‘Domestic Violence Act: Does it protect?’: A review of literature 
surrounding the South African Domestic Violence Act focusing on the socio-economic and legal 
consequences of the legislation.’ July 2015, 8 available at www.knowledgeco-op.uct.ac.za accessed on 
February 2016.  
213 H. Galgul Reinforcing reigns of terror: Access to justice denied by the (non)implementation of the 
Domestic Violence Act June 2005 Women’s Legal Centre.  
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After extensive monitoring of the implementation of the DVA, over the first five 
years of its implementation, we still find ourselves reflecting on the real utility of 
the Act. The question of whether it is working is a complex one and naturally 
leads us to more abstract debates about what it means for the DVA to work. 
What we have come to realise is that the DVA brought with it an important 
symbolic message to the criminal justice personnel about how domestic 
violence cases should be treated.214 
 
The legislature has clearly discharged its duty in passing the DVA. It is a mixture of 
civil and criminal remedies. For instance the protection order in terms of the DVA is 
civil in nature, but non-compliance with such by the defendant is a criminal act on his 
part. The civil remedies have an interdictory function; while the criminal remedies have 
a punitive function. This being the case, much is expected of the DVA. A bulk of the 
work now rests with the executive and the law enforcement to oversee the proper 
execution of the machinery of the DVA to combat domestic violence.215 
 
 
Nonetheless there still remain concerns about the implementation of the DVA. These 
concerns stem from some provisions of the Act itself and the failure of law enforcement 
(police) and other stakeholders to implement these provisions. There are concerns 
about how to interpret and apply some of the provisions of the DVA namely, provisions 
ejecting the respondent from his residence216, seizure of firearms and dangerous 
weapons217, payment of emergency monetary relief (E.M.R.)218, access/custody of 
children219 and counter applications for a protection order. The courts differ in their 
interpretation and application of these provisions.220 This causes inconsistencies in the 
application of the law. Chapter three below is a critical discussion of these provisions. 
The offences created by the DVA have been discussed above; however, there is an 
                                                          
214 Artz and Smythe (note 187 above; 202). 
215 Govender (note 73 above; 664) notes that ‘…while the state has introduced many tools for the 
elimination of discrimination against women, it has not been adequately and effectively used these tools 
to make a difference to the lives of women.’ 
216 Section 7 (1) (c). 
217 Section 7 (2) (a). 
218 Section 7 (3) and (4). 
219 Section 7 (6). 
220 Artz (note 65 above).  
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emerging argument for the creation of a stand-alone offence of domestic violence. This 
argument is assessed in chapter three.  
 
2.3. THE INSTITUTION OF CIVILIAN SECRETARIAT FOR POLICE SERVICES 
 
The success of the DVA is dependent on the compliance of those who are responsible 
for implementing it such as the police. The function of the Civilian Secretariat for Police 
(CSP) is to monitor police compliance with the DVA and deal with cases of non-
compliance. For this reason this reason the CSP is discussed alongside the DVA. As 
it will be seen below, there are numerous instances of police non-compliance with their 
duties in terms of the DVA. In addition to this, police negative attitude toward domestic 
violence matters has been on the discussion table for many years prior to any 
legislative measure. With this in mind the legislature included section 18 of the DVA 
reflects to try and deal with this. This section provides, inter alia, that cases of police 
non-compliance must be referred to the CSP.221 This is in line with a certain portion of 
the preamble of the DVA which reads ‘…to introduce measures which seek to ensure 
that the relevant organs of state give full effect to the provisions of this Act…’ Perhaps 
before one gets deeper into a discussion on the CSP, it is worthwhile to reveal the 
institutional history of the CSP below. 
 
2.3.1. The institutional history of the CSP 
 
The Civilian Secretariat for Police (CSP) was established by the Civilian Secretariat 
for Police Services Act222. The CSP is headed by the national Secretary (the Secretary) 
and the various provincial secretaries. For present purposes, the primary functions of 
the CSP are to monitor and evaluate compliance with the DVA223 and to make 
recommendations to the SAPS on disciplinary processes and measures following non-
compliance with the DVA.224 The secretary is tasked with submitting quarterly reports 
                                                          
221 Section 18 (4) of the Domestic Violence Act. 
222 Civilian Secretariat for Police Service Act 2 of 2011. 
223 Section 6 (1) (c). 
224 Section 6 (1) (d). 
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to the Minister for Police and to Parliament on complaints that have been brought to 
the CSP.225 
 
This noble function of the CSP was previously carried out by the Independent 
Complaints Directorate (the ICD). The ICD was established by the South African Police 
Service Act226. The ICD was empowered to receive complaints directly from the public, 
and like the CSP, the ICD had to report to parliament every six months. However 
research points out that the ICD only made one report to parliament, and this was 
during the 2006/2007 financial year.227 During 2011 the ICD was replaced by the 
Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) which was created by the 
Independent Police Investigative Directorate Act228 and the function that relates to 
monitoring compliance with the DVA was transferred to the newly formed CSP.229 
 
2.3.2. The Independent Complaints Directorate  
 
It would be unfair to state that the ICD was non-functional. While it neglected to report 
to parliament, it did compile reports on its work. Fortunately this dissertation has 
benefited from at least two reports (2009 and 2010) complied by the ICD.230 Both these 
reports agree that the year 2006/2007 was infested with police non-compliance with 
the DVA.  
 
                                                          
225 Section 13. 
226 South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995. 
227 See Bendall (note 2 above; 111); Vetten, L ‘Gendering state accountability in South Africa: Police 
accountability and the Domestic Violence Act’ (2014) 11 APCOP Policy Brief 5 available at 
http://apcof.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/No-11-Gendering-StateAccountability-in-South-Africa_-
Police-Accountability-and-Domestic-Violence-Act-Lisa-Vetten-.pdf accessed on 11 May 2017. 
228 Independent Police Investigative Directorate Act 1 of 2011. 
229 L. Vetten ‘Aluta continua: Police accountability and the Domestic Violence Act 1998’ 2017 (59) SA 
Crime Quarterly 7, 9.  
230 These are: Independent Complaints Directorate: Proactive Research Unit DVA non-compliance 
report: A study of the factors contributing to SAPS non-compliance with the DVA (2009) (ICD 2009) and 
Independent Complaints Directorate Non-Compliance to Domestic Violence Act (2010) (ICD 2010). 
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The 2009 report identified the following heads of complaint against the police: failure 
to execute warrant of arrest,231 failure to give proper advice to complainants,232 failure 
to assist complainants to find a suitable shelter233 and failure to open criminal docket 
or to refer same for prosecution.234 These are the most common amongst many 
complaints. Further, the 2009 report also pointed out that during year 2006, the 
Western Cape, the Free State and Gauteng had the highest number complainants 
against the police at 31, 26 and 24 respectively.235 Furthermore this report showed 
that most complaints were against male police officers of all ranks.236 
 
It is worth mentioning that this report took into consideration the views and the 
difficulties that the police face. The police indicated that the definition of domestic was 
very wide to such an extent that different interpretations could lead to a discrepancy in 
the implementation of the Act.237 Most police officers are concerned with the level of 
misuse of protection orders which in turn makes it difficult to identify a legitimate case 
of domestic violence.238 Further, the police are discouraged by complainants who open 
cases only to withdraw them.239 This is a clear waste of police resources and the work 
already put in the investigations. As a result of this, some police officers prefer to halt 
investigations until they are certain about the victim’s intentions in laying a charge.  
 
Reacting out of frustration, the then KwaZulu-Natal MEC for Safety and Security Bheki 
Cele, made the infamous statement that the police charge all complainant’s who 
withdraw cases of domestic violence with defeating the ends of justice.240 It is clear 
that these words were uttered out of frustration and not knowing what to do. It is also 
                                                          
231 Ibid (ICD 2009), 7 and 22. This report shows that during 2006, 69.7% of the complainants arose from 
failure to execute a protection order; Lopes, Massawe and Mangwiro (note 171 above; 46 – 51). 
232 Ibid. The report indicates that during 2006, only 15.2% of the complaints related to failing to give 
proper advice to complainants.  
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid 8. 
236 Ibid 26. 
237 Ibid 29. 
238 Ibid 30. 
239 Ibid 31 – 32. Some victims will approach the police uncertain of what they want. It is also reported 
that some of the victims do not want perpetrators to be arrested; they simply want the police to warn 
them. There is nothing sinister about this. In fact it should be recommended to victims and the police 
should be enticed to intervene in such cases as this limits the possibility of opening and withdrawing 
charges. It is more in line with the main function of the DVA, that is, to instil order in a domestic setting.  
240 ‘Abused women warned not to withdraw charges’ Independent Online 10 December 2004 available 
at https://iol.co.za, accessed on 29 July 2017. 
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doubtful if defeating the ends of justice was a correct charge in the circumstance. It is 
correct that the unceremonious withdrawal of charges is demoralising. However 
charging the complainant only for withdrawing a charge will be catastrophic. It is a 
difference issue if the initial charge by the complainant has been without substance 
and malicious. Here the police are justified in charging the complainant in terms of 
section 17 (d) of the DVA.  
 
2.3.3. The Civilian Secretariat for Police  
 
The CSP has been at work for approximately five years and there are reports of a 
strained working relationship between the CSP, the SAPS and Parliament.241 However 
research shows that fairly recent, there have been improvements in the working 
relationship.242 The CSP is a good measure for checks and balances. The major 
challenge to the functionality of the CSP is that, unlike the ICD, they are unable to 
receive complaints directly from the public.243 Victims of secondary victimisation at the 
hands of the police have to lodge a complaint at the same police station where they 
were victimised and hope that the complaint will be forwarded to the CSP for 
consideration.244  
 
It is submitted that it is less likely that a victim will go back to the same police station 
where they were abused.245 Further, a 2012 audit found that the SAPS had failed to 
forward some complaints to the CSP.246 The public should be able to forward their 
complaints to the CSP and they should be informed about this noble function of the 
CSP.  
 
Allowing victims to complain directly to the CSP has various advantages. This will 
enhance proper compliance with the DVA. It will encourage police officers to take 
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complaints against them seriously and improve their conduct without a possible 
intervention of the CSP in this regard. Victims should be encouraged to make police 
aware of the complaints before proceeding to the CSP. However all of this will be futile 
if victims do not have direct access to a fully functioning CSP. 
 
2.4. THE MINISTERIAL SIX POINT PLAN 
 
During August 2017, women’s month, the minister of police Honourable Fikile Mbalula 
announced the Ministerial Six Point Plan247. The purpose of this plan is to promote and 
protect the rights of women, children and vulnerable groups. The plan is a single page 
document with six points on how victims should be treated. This plan forms part of this 
chapter because it was introduced as an extension of existing measures. However it 
has instantly drawn some criticism.  
The plan states: 
‘“AYIHLOME AGAINST GENDER BASED VIOLENCE” 
POINT 1: All victims should be treated with respect, dignity and interviewed by 
trained police officials in a victim sensitive manner. 
POINT 2: Victims should be assisted at the Victim Friendly Rooms (VFR) or an 
alternative room where the statement will be taken in private at the police station 
or other location providing victim support services. 
POINT 3: Victims will be referred/ taken for medical examination by a healthcare 
by a healthcare professional to obtain medical evidence and complete a medical 
report. 
POINT 4: The investigation should be conducted by a Family Violence, Child 
Protection and Sexual Offence Investigation Unit (FCS) or a detective with relevant 
training.  
POINT 5: The families and victims of sexual offences, femicide and infanticide, 
should be referred to the victim support services that are available within the 
precinct for legal, medical, social and psychological help. 
POINT 6: Victims should be proactively provided with feedback on the progress of 
their cases on a continuous basis.’ 
 
This plan will form part of the discussions in chapter 3.  
                                                          




A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE MACHINERIES OF THE DVA 
 
3.1.  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
Now that the DVA has been placed in the context of this study as stated in the 
preceding chapter, it is now competent to focus the discussion on the topic of this 
dissertation. What follows in this chapter is a critical evaluation/examination of the 
various machineries in the DVA for combating domestic violence. This will be achieved 
by putting forward arguments, consolidating existing arguments and possibly providing 
solutions moving forward. The machineries in the DVA can be categorised into two 
groups. There are those that are outside of the protection and those that flow from the 
protection order. A further critique of the DVA will be that it is not designed to function 
and protect the victims of domestic violence in rural areas.   
 
3.2. MACHINERIES OUTSIDE THE PROTECTION ORDER 
 
A careful study of the DVA reveals that a victim of domestic violence may enjoy 
protection from the machineries of the Act even if they do not have a protection order. 
Few as the machineries of this kind may be, they are nonetheless powerful and 
commendable because victims do not always have the resources to obtain a protection 
order in advance. Further, it is not a protection order but the nature of the conduct 
complained of that categorises a matter as domestic violence.248 There are three types 
of machineries that may be accessed outside the DVA. These are: (a) section 2 of the 
DVA which provides that a police officer must advise the victims of their rights under 
the DVA and render such assistance as the victim may require including finding a 
suitable shelter and obtaining medical assistance, (b) civil action against the police for 
breach of duty in terms of section 2 (c) The arrest of perpetrators and the possible 
opening of a docket. Below is a discussion of these machineries. 
 
                                                          
248 Langa v Minister of Police and others (GP) unreported case no 30355/2010 of 25 July 2014. 
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3.2.1. Section 2 of the DVA 
 
The first machinery that may be exercised outside the DVA is section 2 of the DVA. 
This section imposes a duty on the police to give advice and render such assistance 
as victims of domestic violence may require. Victims of domestic violence often do not 
know about the various remedies available to them. Even if they are, they may not 
know how to go about obtaining such remedies. Victims will intuitively turn to the police 
in this regard. Thus, in such cases, two things must happen: the victim must be 
empowered with the necessary information, and secondly, there must be a speedy 
machinery to respond to the emergency facing the victim.  
 
The case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and another249 accurately 
captures this as follows: 
 
‘South Africa has a duty under international law to prohibit all gender-based 
discrimination that has the effect or purpose of impairing the enjoyment by women 
of fundamental rights and freedoms, and to take reasonable and appropriate 
measures to prevent the violation of these rights. The police is one of the primary 
agencies of the state responsible for the protection of the public in general, and 
women and children in particular, against the invasion of their fundamental rights 
by perpetrators of violent crimes.’250 
 
As it has been stated above, section 2 imposes a dual duty on the police, that is, to 
give advice and to render such assistance that the victim may require. This is further 
enhanced by the National Instructions251 read in conjunction with section 18 of the 
DVA. Section 18 places a duty on the National Commissioner for Police to pass 
national instructions on the implementation of the DVA. It is submitted that the 
imposition of duties on the police is ‘an attempt to undo the long-standing neglect of 
domestic violence.’252 It is clear that the police bear certain duties, but the extent of 
                                                          
249 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). 
250 Ibid 965A. 
251 National Instructions 7 of 1999. 
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such duties require unpacking, which follows shortly below, more especially in cases 
where there is no protection order.  
 
(a) The duty to give advice 
 
The first leg of the duty is to give advice. The police must advise the victims of domestic 
violence of their rights in terms of the Act.253 These rights are, (a) to apply for a 
protection order and/or (b) to lay a criminal charge. The police must explain to the 
victim that he or she may elect to exercise one or both these rights. It must be 
emphasised, however, that a complainant may only lay a criminal charge if the conduct 
complained of will also constitute an offence in terms of the common law or other piece 
of statute. It is possible for the conduct complained of to only constitute an act of 
domestic violence but not an offence in terms of the common law. For instance, 
depending on the circumstances of each case stalking and harassment may not 
necessarily constitute offences in terms of the common law.254 It is submitted that 
these are usually a precursor to the commission of an offence. Viewed in isolation, 
stalking and harassment do not usually constitute a crime. Nonetheless such conduct 
is an act of domestic violence for which the complainant may obtain a protection order.  
 
Conduct such as assault or assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm is both 
an act of domestic violence and an offence in terms of the common law. Given this, a 
complainant may, pursuant to a domestic assault, obtain a protection order and lay a 
criminal charge in terms of the common law. The myth that complainants of domestic 
violence may only file a criminal charge provided that they first obtain a protection 
order is incorrect. The South African Law Commission noted that the police were 
refusing to accept a criminal charge until a family violence interdict was obtained.255 
An attempt has been made to address this negative attitude over the years. However 
there are those cases that persist. In Minister of Safety and Security v Venter and 
                                                          
253 IDC 2009 (note 230 above; 8).  
254 Department of Justice ‘Stalking’ at 18 – 19 available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers/ip22_prj130_2003_quest.pdf accessed on 11 November 2017.  
255 South African Law Commission (note 104 above; 89). 
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others256 the court specifically held that victims must be informed that ‘it is not 
necessary to lay a charge before applying for a protection order’257. 
 
The practice of simultaneously obtaining a protection order and laying a criminal 
charge does not amount to splitting of charges. In Botha v Minister of Police and 
another258 the court was not persuaded by the argument that an interim order ought 
not to have been issued because the respondent had already been convicted under 
the common law for the same conduct. However, the complainant cannot 
simultaneously lay a criminal charge in terms of the common law and then lay a charge 
for breach of a protection order for the same event unless there is an alternative 
charge. Otherwise such would be a clear case of splitting of charges.  
 
The rationale behind allowing a complainant to both obtain a protection order and file 
a criminal charge is to ensure that the criminal conduct complained of does not go 
unpunished. Mere existence of a protection order does not have any punitive 
consequences; if a complainant only obtains a protection order for criminal conduct 
such as assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, the crime will inevitably go 
unpunished. Further, a protection order only applies from the date of service, which is 
obviously after the incident giving rise to the application, and it cannot be back-dated 
to punish conduct which occurred prior to its existence. In Venter this was illustrated 
as follows: 
 
The difference between the remedies must be explained. A charge is aimed at 
securing a conviction of an accused, whereas the purpose of a protection order is 
to prevent future misconduct.259 
 
The National Instructions are informative on how the advisory machinery of the DVA 
may be effectively implemented. Paragraph 10 (4) (a) provides that the police must 
                                                          
256 Minister of Safety and Security v Venter 2011 (2) SACR 67 (SCA). 
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he could apply for an interdict.  
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explain the rights to the complainant in an official language that he or she understands. 
In addition to explaining, the police officer must hand a notice stating the explained 
rights. What is interesting to note is that the National Instructions do not require that 
the rights be explained in the complainant’s vernacular, they simply require that they 
be explained in an official language that the complainant can understand. Further, they 
do not require the police officer to personally do the explaining. They are flexible to 
allow the police officer to use anyone who can explain the rights to the complainant in 
an official language that he or she can understand. This reflects that the legislature 
and the police ministry were aware of the budget constraints of requiring vernacular to 
be the medium of instructions. The instruction also allows the use of a foreign language 
by the police officer or a third party to explain to the victim.260 However, the written 
notice can only be in one of the official South African languages.261 
 
(i) The standard of care when giving advice 
 
The standard of care when giving advice is that of a reasonable person in the same 
position as the member of the SAPS.262 The Minister of Police may be held vicariously 
liable in delict for a negligent failure by the police to advise a complainant of his or her 
rights in terms of the DVA. The minister may also be held liable if the police give wrong 
advice.263 In the Venter264 case, the police officer had failed to explain the process of 
obtaining a protection order to the complainants. The police also went a step further 
by giving them wrong advice. They told the plaintiff that he required a case number 
before he could obtain an ‘interdict’ (protection order). As it has been stated above, 
this is incorrect. The court held that in so doing, the police had aborted their duty 




                                                          
260 Paragraph 10 (4) (b). 
261 The notice is form 1 of the Regulations in terms of the Domestic Violence Act. 
262 Naidoo v Minister of Police and others 2016 (1) SACR 468 (SCA). 
263 See Kruger (note 87 above; 166) on the police giving wrong advice.  
264 Minister of Safety and Security v Venter and another (note 256 above). 
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(ii) Challenges to the duty to give advice 
 
Advice presupposes knowledge or experience on a particular subject. The execution 
of this machinery is hampered by lack of knowledge about the DVA on the part of the 
police. Research266 indicates that a large number of police officers have not received 
adequate training and are unsure of what is required of them. In 2012 the CSP reported 
that even those who receive some training do not show positive results.267 In 
Naidoo,268 a senior police officer did not hesitate to state that he did not understand 
some of the provisions of the National Instructions during trial. An earlier report by the 
Independent Complaints Directorate highlighted that during the 2006/2007 financial 
year there was a very large number of police officers who were not even aware of the 
existence of the National Instructions.269 The 2012 CSP report indicates that the same 
is still the issue.270  
 
Lack of knowledge of the DVA and the national instructions on the part of the police 
cannot be sustained and it must be counter-nuanced. It is strongly suggested below 
that the police curriculum must be reviewed. Domestic violence is a serious issue that 
affects the fabric of society; those responsible for combating it should regard it with 
utmost decorum. Knowledge of the DVA must be administered at entry level. Having 
a police officer who is simply there to complement the SAPS staff has negative 
consequences as it results in civil claims against the state. It is equally absurd and 
risky to recruit a candidate on the hope that he or she will learn along the way. The 
chances are, once recruited, the candidate will be saddled with other work that any 
subsequent training of the DVA will be regarded as time off work. 
 
                                                          
266 Vetten (note 229 above; 5). 
267 Civilian Secretariat for Police Service Report on the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act 
(2012) 16.  
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In Seria v Minister of Safety and Security271 the arresting officer was of the negligent 
view that an arrest follows every instance of domestic violence.272 This is a dangerous 
view. As it will be seen below, a decision to arrest is taken with caution and if it is taken 
negligently, the minister of police could face delictual liability for unlawful arrest. Case 
law and research paints a picture that those police officers who are unaware of what 
to do often resort to secondary victimisation.273 There are reports of police officers who 
simply refused to deal with domestic violence matters indicating that they cannot assist 
in the absence of a protection order. It is also reported that some police officer do not 
take domestic violence matters seriously simply because they believe they should not 
be preoccupied with these matters and they just mediate the matter.274 In Naidoo the 
police officer arrested the complainant for refusing to consent to mediation.275 In this 
case the police officer had fruitlessly tried to mediate a domestic violence matter 
between the plaintiff and her husband. When he realised that he was not succeeding, 
he advised the husband to depose to an affidavit laying a charge against the plaintiff. 
He then placed the two of them under arrest. 
 
The Naidoo case is a clear case of how lack of knowledge easily results in secondary 
victimisation. It is submitted that secondary victimisation in the hands of the police is 
similar, if not worse, than domestic violence. Just like the latter, it occurs at a place 
where victims expect safety and relief. What should be borne in mind about the Naidoo 
case is that it is fairly recent. In the past, the police did not know what remedies to 
prescribe for victims of domestic violence since it was regarded as something falling 
outside the law. Giving victims a go about was a given or a patriarch response to the 
cause of women. Section 2 of the DVA was an acknowledgment that this had indeed 
been happening. It was further a plan of action. Had this section been carefully 
adhered to by the police, the issues in Naidoo and Venter could have been avoided.  
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Compliance with section 2, as far as the advisory duty is concerned, does not rest 
solely with the police. It is incumbent upon the state to take all the necessary steps 
towards placing police officers in a position where they will be able to properly comply 
with the section.276 This can only be done through the training of police officers, a 
process which has been either at a snail’s pace or not yielding positive results over the 
years since the passing of the DVA. It is interesting to note that the DVA does not 
provide for the training of officials. The fairly recent ministerial six point plan does not 
regard the training of officers as part of the plan. However, it does provide that 
investigations in gender based violence matters should be conducted by a special unit 
or an investigating officer with the relevant experience. This is startling because 
experience in the police force is meaningless in the absence of knowledge of the DVA.  
 
The imposition of positive duties on the police is nonetheless a commendable progress 
in light of the history of police neglect and attitudes towards victims of domestic 
violence. At least now the victims may turn to the police with much ease. If they do not 
obtain the assistance they require, or they are subjected to secondary victimisation, 
the matter may be referred to the Civilian Secretariat for Police and the police may be 
held jointly liable together with the minister of police. However, it has been argued that 
to merely legislate is not enough to enhance the role of the police in combating 
domestic violence. Education and training of those responsible for implementing the 
DVA is necessary.277 Nonetheless the strides made so far are a step in the right 
direction.  
 
(b) The duty to render assistance to the victims 
 
The second leg of the duty of the police in terms of section 2 is the duty to render 
assistance to the victim of domestic violence. Like the duty to advise victims, the duty 
to render assistance applies regardless of the absence of a protection order. Section 
2 (a) provides that the police must, at the scene of the incident or soon after the incident 
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is reported, render such assistance as may be required by the complainant including 
finding a suitable shelter and obtaining medical treatment.  
 
(i) The terms of the duty  
 
Pursuant to reading this provision, it is possible to assume that the only assistance 
that the police are obliged to render is finding a suitable shelter and obtaining medical 
treatment. This is not the case. The section requires that the police render such 
assistance ‘as may be required in the circumstances’ including finding a suitable 
shelter and obtaining medical treatment. In other words, if the victim requires other 
assistance as a result of the domestic violence, the police are obliged to assist in terms 
of the Act. Paragraph 7 of the National Instruction describes this as ‘general 
assistance’.  
 
To enhance the provision of assistance to the victims, the DVA278 and the National 
Instruction279 require the station commander to liaise with stakeholders such as health 
and housing and forge a working relationship. In addition to this, the station 
commander is required to maintain a list of all the other service providers at the police 
station. The list must be immediately available to the police to enable them to enlist 
their help as it may be required.280 In the case of housing, there must be a list of all 
those who are willing to provide shelter to victims of domestic violence. A victim must 
be provided with such list to select from.  
 
While maintaining such a list may be very efficient in certain geographical locations, in 
others, such as rural areas and townships, it could be difficult to compile such a list. 
The reason for this is because most of these services are rendered by NGO and there 
are not enough of them to cover all the areas. It is submitted that the department of 
housing should play a leading role in providing shelter to victims of domestic violence. 
A full discussion of the provisions of the DVA in this regard falls below.  
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(ii) Limitations of the duty 
 
There are limitations to the assistance that the police may render to the complainant. 
These limitations are set out in the National Instructions. Paragraph 8 sets out the 
process to be followed when assisting the victim to find a suitable shelter. The 
paragraph provides that the transport expenses to the shelter shall be borne by the 
victim or a willing family member. It is only as a last resort, if a vehicle is available and 
when reasonably possible to do so, that a police officer should provide transport using 
a state vehicle.281 Even then, the victim must be informed that the use of the police 
state vehicle is at his or her own risk. The police may not incur any liability in case of 
a peril.   
 
The same is the case with obtaining medical treatment. Medical treatment is dealt with 
in paragraph 9 of the National Instruction. This paragraph only requires a police officer 
to ask the victim if he or she requires medical treatment282 and if so, to assist or make 
the arrangements for the victim to obtain medical treatment.283 The only arrangement 
envisaged is calling in an ambulance. A police officer is not obliged to use state vehicle 
to transport the victim. He may only do so as a last resort if a vehicle is available and 
there is no other means of transport.284 The risks involved are borne by the victim and 
the police may not incur any liability.285 
 
(iii) Challenges to the duty to render assistance 
 
As it has been stated above, the first step towards compliance with the duty to render 
the assistance requires station commanders to liaise with all the relevant service 
providers. The list must be available to the victim to choose the most convenient 
shelter for herself. Ground research shows that there are police stations that are 
compliant in this respect.286 However, this machinery endures a lot of challenges. For 
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instance, this machinery is scarce in townships and rural areas. This is ironic because 
most cases come from townships. It should be noted that townships are mostly riddled 
with issues that have been identified above as common causes of domestic violence 
such as alcohol, drug abuse and unemployment.  
 
It is not easy to comment fully about rural areas because their situation is difficult to 
assess owing to the remoteness of such areas and absence of courts and police 
stations. Rural areas are a subject on their own that require much ground research 
and probably activism. It is submitted that the plight of women in rural areas is 
dependent on the success of the Traditional Courts Bill and that traditional leaders are 
able to deal with complex issues such as domestic violence because they are easily 
accessible. It is further submitted that such matters are within the ambits of their core 
function which is to maintain peace and order within their respective jurisdictions and 
they have been doing this way before the DVA.  
 
Providing shelter to victims is much needed machinery because most incidents occur 
at times when there is nowhere to go for the victim except the police station. The work 
of non-governmental organisations in providing shelter to victims is commendable 
taking into account that international instruments such as the CEDAW specifically calls 
on, among others, non-governmental organisations to take positive steps towards 
eradicating domestic violence. However, the state should play a leading role in this 
respect. It is submitted that the state should provide these services especially in places 
where non-governmental organisations are yet to reach such as townships and rural 
areas. The state should also alert the community about the availability of these 
services. This will enable victims to approach the shelters without intervention of the 
police more especially in cases where the victim does not wish to lay a criminal charge.  
 
The state should empower women by providing them with housing under the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as this will reduce the number of 
women who are depending on abusive partners for shelter. It is stated in chapter one 
above that part of the reasons that victims do not report domestic violence matters is 
the fear of losing the little support they get from the perpetrators. While it is conceded 
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that merely providing women with RDP housing is not guaranteed to deal with the 
violence, however it is submitted that having shelter in their name will, to a certain 
extent, empower woman to fearlessly take action against their abusers. This way the 
need to look for shelters will be greatly diminished. Further, owning property allows the 
victim to obtain a common law eviction order, thus widening the scope of remedies 
available. Furthermore, this is in line with the objective of the DVA which is to provide 
victims of domestic violence with maximum protection that the law can provide.  
 
There are notable challenges associated with the allocation of RDP houses to victims 
of domestic violence. Married women who have already received a house in 
conjunction with their husbands are not legible as the same person cannot benefit 
more than once.287 It is argued that the allocation system should be reviewed to cater 
for those women who have been forced out of their homes by their husbands. 
However, one finds difficulty in arguing that married women who find themselves out 
of shelters should be allocated RDP housing in their own name in a separate estate 
while the marriage subsists. Such an argument offends established principles of family 
law of joint estate. Perhaps the marriage must have come to an end or broken down 
before a house may be allocated to woman is justified. This way the State can prevent 
false claims of domestic violence just to get access to a second house.  
 
It has been stated above that the police may not, as a general rule, use work vehicles 
to transport victims to clinics or hospitals. This is justified. There are three grounds to 
justify this. First, police vehicles are not designed to carry patients. Second, the police 
are not trained to provide the necessary medical assistance and this could endanger 
the victims. Third, police cannot spend time attending to matters falling within the 
ambits of the health department. This will encroach upon the time dedicated to their 
core functions which is to maintain law and order. 
 
Point 3 of the ministerial six point plan seems to be either oblivious to, or overrides, 
the National Instructions. Point 3 states as follows: 
                                                          
287 Vetten (note 229 above).  
72 
POINT 3: Victims will be referred/ taken for medical examination by a healthcare  
professional to obtain medical evidence and complete a medical report. [My 
emphasis] 
 
The first question that arises is who should refer or take victims for medical 
examination. Given that this plan was divulged by the minister of police, it is safe to 
assume that it is the police. But can we rely on this? 
 
Paragraph 9 (2) (c) of the National Instructions provides as follow. 
 
(c) if a criminal charge has been laid, issue a J88 and SAPS 308 to the  complainant 
for  completion by a registered  medical practitioner. (Where possible and provided 
transport is available, the member must arrange for the complainant to be taken to 
the registered medical practitioner.) A member may, only as a last resort, transport 
a complainant in a police vehicle to receive medical treatment if such a vehicle is 
available and there is no other means of transport. In such an event the 
complainant must be informed that he or she is being transported at his or her own 
risk. 
 
It is clear that there is a clash between the point three (3) of the six point plan and the 
national instruction. It is submitted that the place of the latter is well established in 
domestic violence law and it was a call by the law makers through section 18 of the 
DVA. The six point plan on the other hand seems to be a vocal piece of work of no 
consequences. It is also clear that little thought went into the drafting of the six point 
plan. Strangely so, it purports to be a move to fight gender based violence, but it is 
isolated from the rest.  
 
Medical assistance is necessary machinery. This way a medical report (J88) can be 
completed by a medical officer who examines the victim at the earliest moment. The 
J88 is very important because it operates as prima facie proof of injuries that the 
complainant may have suffered. This is important especially in light of our trial 
turnaround delays. A trial may sit when the victim has recovered from the physical 
effect of the injuries. Given that some people’s bodies heal faster than others, in the 
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absence of the J88, it could be very difficult for the victim to prove that any injuries had 
been inflicted on him/her.  
 
It must be added that in practice doctors are sure to examine victims and complete the 
necessary forms. But this is in cases where victims manage to get to hospitals.  
 
3.2.2. Civil action for breach of duty in terms of section 2 
 
The second machinery available to a victim who does not have a protection order is a 
civil action against the police who fail in their duty in terms of section 2. It is submitted 
that imposing civil liability in this regard is commendable; otherwise in the absence of 
repercussions this section would have been redundant. Before considering the 
question of liability, it is important to highlight the distinctions between the respective 
duties. It has been stated above that the duty of the police in is two-fold, that is, to 
advise the victims and to render assistance. Each of these duties has been elaborated 
upon. The next issue to consider is that of delictual liability for failing to execute these 
duties. The threat of liability is on its own a machinery to bolster compliance with the 
DVA. It inspires diligence on the part of the police.  
 
It is clear from the Venter case above that the police may be held liable for neglecting 
their advisory duties. On the other hand, it does not appear that police may be held 
liable for failing to render assistance to victims, which includes assisting victims to find 
a suitable shelter and obtaining medical assistance. The National Instruction 
specifically exonerate the police by stating that they are not obliged to personally 
render assistance by transporting victims using state vehicles and that even if they do 
so, they may not be held liable if any risk materialises.  
 
Perhaps the rationale behind such a distinction in the imposition of liability is the ability 
of the police to comply. While giving advice to victims is done over the counter or at 
the scene of the incident personally by the police, the same cannot be said of assisting 
victims to find a suitable shelter and to obtain medical treatment. The police may do 
their part by assisting the victims; however the actual provision of these services rests 
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with third parties such as Social Welfare, NGOs and the Department of Health. Clearly 
the police cannot in law be held liable for things that are not within their abilities.  
 
It is interesting to ask if it would be desirable to impose mandatory duties on the police 
to take victims to a shelter or to send them for medical treatment using state vehicles. 
At first glance, this seems to make sense because the victims of domestic violence 
intuitively turn to the police for assistance. However, when one carefully considers this 
point, it will be self-defeating to expect police to stretch themselves this way for a 
number of reasons. First, police vehicles are not designed to carry passengers. 
Second, if police vehicles are used as public transport, the police will fail in their duty 
to police crime and bring perpetrators to book using the same vehicles. Third, police 
vehicles are not designed to carry injured or medically needing people. Finally, the 
police are not trained to assist patients in-transit and this could worsen the health of 
the victim thus placing his or her life in greater danger than it would have been. The 
problem with transportation may be circumvented if the police forge a closer working 
relationship with respective stakeholders such as health or NGOs. These could assist 
will immediate transportation at the request of the police. 
 
3.2.3. Arresting the perpetrator  
 
(a) General  
 
The third machinery available to a victim of domestic violence without a protection 
order is the arrest of the perpetrator. Domestic violence is characterised by the instilling 
of fear, controlling behaviour, threats and infliction of harm of various nature, including 
physical harm and psychological harm. Conduct of this nature harms every member 
of the household. The possible causes of such conduct are discussed in chapter one. 
A speedy solution is to arrest the perpetrator. This brings the question of under what 
circumstances to arrest the perpetrator in the absence of a protection order; and if the 
DVA provides for such machinery.  
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It is trite that a perpetrator may be arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued 
together with a protection order in terms of the DVA. This being the case, may an arrest 
for domestic violence follow in the absence of a protection order? It would not make 
sense to discriminate against victims just because they have not obtained protection 
orders. The absence of a machinery to protect victims in this situation will be self-
defeating and render the provision of speedy relief a tale rather than reality. 
 
(b) Grounds for an arrest without a protection order 
 
Section 3 of the DVA may provide a solution in this regard. It reads: 
‘3 Arrest by peace officer without warrant 
A peace officer may without warrant arrest any respondent at the scene of an 
incident of domestic violence whom he or she reasonably suspects of having 
committed an offence containing an element of violence against a complainant.’ 
This section appears to permit two kinds of arrests. An arrest without a warrant and an 
arrest without a protection order.288 This section is supported by section 40 (1) (q) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act which also permits a peace officer to arrest any person 
without a warrant of arrest whom he reasonably suspects ‘of having committed an act 
of domestic violence...which constitutes an offence in respect of which violence is an 
element’. The requirements for an arrest are an act of domestic violence accompanied 
by an element of violence. Further, an arrest of this nature may only be carried out at 
the scene of the incident. The Criminal Procedure Act does not have this requirement.  
 
The idea that an arrest in the absence of a protection order may be carried out in terms 
of the DVA should not be taken too far for two reasons. First, the underlying reason for 
an arrest in general is to bring the perpetrator to court to answer to allegations against 
him. While the perpetrator may be arrested in terms of DVA, he cannot be brought to 
court under the same Act in the absence of a protection order. Therefore logic dictates 
                                                          
288 That a lawful arrest may follow in the absence of a protection order was stated in Langa v Minister 
of Police and others (note 248 above; para 60) in the these terms: “…where the Supreme Court of 
Appeal dealt with a similar case and held that where a peace-officer without a warrant arrests a person 
on reasonable suspicion that he is committing acts of domestic violence the arrest will not be unlawful 
only because there is no domestic [sic] protection order against that person in place.” 
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that he is arrested in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act to answer to any common 
law offence if any has been committed. Second, section 3 is vague and it is an 
unnecessary addition to the Act because the very same function is served by the 
Criminal Procedure Act. This is illustrated by the dicta of Lewis JA in Minister of Safety 
and Security v Katise289 where he says: 
 
[14] I do not understand the section, on its plain meaning, to require an arrest at 
the scene of the domestic violence only after investigation and analysis. The 
stabbing of Mrs Katise, and threats to injure her with a spade, are self-evidently 
acts of domestic violence. It is true, however, that Katise was arrested only after 
he had been treated in hospital and then brought to the police station. But in any 
event, the conduct of Katise falls within the ambit of s 40(1)(q) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. 
 
The learned Judge adds: 
 
[16] In my view the Domestic Violence Act adds to the protection offered to a victim 
of an offence like assault by the common law and the Criminal Procedure Act. It 
does not detract from it, which would be the effect of not permitting an arrest 
without warrant where the complainant has once sought [but not obtained] 
protection under that Act. The existence or otherwise of the interim protection order 
could not mean that in a clear case of violent abuse of a complainant the police 
could not arrest the perpetrator in order to protect her or him. [My emphasis] 
 
(c) Arguments for the creation of a stand-alone offence. 
 
That the perpetrator cannot be arrested and subsequently trialled under the DVA in 
the absence of a protection order is an anomaly. The DVA was passed to bring 
perpetrators of domestic violence into book. Yet, arguably, the legislature did not make 
provisions for situations where there is no protection order. As it will be seen shortly 
below, some authors have argued for the creation of a stand-alone offence of domestic 
                                                          
289 Minister of Safety and Security v Katise 2015 (1) SACR 181 (SCA). 
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violence. Section 3 provides for the arrest of ‘any respondent’. Section 1 also defines 
a respondent as ‘any person who is or has been in a domestic relationship with a 
complainant and who has committed or allegedly committed an act of domestic 
violence against the complainant’290. Clearly he need not be a party to a protection 
order. This calls for substantive arguments in this respect.  
 
There is an emerging school of thought that argues for the creation of a separate 
offence called ‘domestic violence’. Various writers and activists on the subject of 
domestic violence argue that a stand-alone crime of domestic violence should be 
created.291 Others are of the view that this will merit harsher penalties and deter would-
be perpetrators.292 As things currently stand, domestic violence is not criminalised, 
instead it is the breach of a protection order that is an offence.293 For statistical 
purposes domestic violence offences are recorded under a number of offences such 
as assault, assault GBH, murder, sexual assault, rape, and contempt of court and 
other.294 This in turn makes it difficult to point the extent of domestic violence cases.295 
 
A stand-alone offence of domestic violence cannot be sustained for various reasons. 
The first is regarding protection orders; will they be dispensed with once a stand-alone 
offence has been created? It must be borne in mind that the current offence is termed 
‘breach/violation/contravention of a protection order’ owing to the strength of a 
protection order. It goes without saying that once a stand-alone offence is recognised, 
the former offence will fall away. Further, the protection order seeks to instil peace and 
only non-compliance with the order attracts criminal liability; on the other hand it 
appears that the proposed offence will criminalise the act of domestic violence right 
from the start and thus bloat the work of the police.  
 
                                                          
290 Section 1 (XX). 
291 Parenzee, Artz and Moulk (note 204 above;5 and 11);  
292 Furusa and Limberg (note 211 above; 5).  
293 Njezula (note 37 above; 2); Vetten (note 229 above; 2 – 3). 
294 Bendall (note 2 above; 101); Vetten (note 229 above; 2). 
295 S. Rasool ‘Is the Domestic Violence Act enough? Addressing women’s needs’ 1999 (18) Institute for 
Security Studies 29 argues that while statistics are an important aspects, however the absence thereof 
should not bar any strategizing on domestic violence. This author submits that ‘We do not need to know 
exactly how many women are beaten or raped before we take solid action.’ 
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Another issue is the definition of the proposed offence. Will the offence retain the 
meaning of ‘domestic violence’ or will it require a new definition. It must be borne in 
mind that the current definition seems appropriate because it covers all acts of 
domestic violence and it is well considered especially after the shortcomings of the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act. The current definition of ‘domestic violence’ is 
independent of protection orders; even if they are dispensed with, the definition should 
survive the day.296 However, since the current definition came with a protection order 
in mind, any reworking of the system might demand a different approach in defining 
the new offence. 
 
Defining the new offence might be unworkable especially in circumstances involving 
established offences such as, among others, murder or rape when they occur within a 
domestic relationship. In this instance will we disregard the common law definitions or 
define the offences differently once they occur within a domestic relationship. It will be 
shown below that a differentiation between those convicted under the auspices of 
domestic violence and those convicted under the common law is potentially 
discriminatory.  
 
Sentencing under the proposed crime of domestic violence might present some 
practical problems and therefore requires a careful consideration. The DVA currently 
provides for a maximum sentence of a fine or 5 years imprisonment. There is no fixed 
amount.297 This also marks some improvement from the Prevention of Family Violence 
Act. In terms of the latter Act, the sentence was a fine or a maximum of 12 months 
imprisonment.298  
 
It is trite in law that offences such as rape and murder usually have a higher sentence 
associated with them. The sentence can go as far as life imprisonment depending on 
                                                          
296 Ibid. Rasool submits that the definition of domestic violence is very comprehensive and its covers all 
aspects of abuse mentioned by women in studies.  
297 Section 17. The relevant portion of the section provides: 
 
…liable on conviction…to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years or to both such 
fine and such imprisonment…’ 
298 Section 6 (b) of the Prevention of Family Violence Act.  
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the circumstances of the commission of the respective offence. This means that, as 
the law currently stands, and if the proposed offence of domestic violence goes 
through, a person who is convicted of domestic violence rape and/or murder may only 
receive a maximum sentence of 5 years imprisonment. Whereas others convicted of 
the same offence but outside domestic violence may receive a sentence that exceeds 
5 years imprisonment. Such discriminatory treatment will never survive constitutional 
scrutiny.  
 
Sentencing between the different acts of domestic violence is one issue. Another issue 
is record keeping. If the proposed offence goes through, logic will dictate that the 
perpetrator ought to be convicted of domestic violence and the SAP 69 record should 
reflect this. The SAP 69 is a record of a person’s previous convictions. The practical 
consequence is that two people who are guilty of the same act of rape, for instance, 
but in different contexts (domestic and public) will receive different treatment in as far 
as record keeping and the SAP 69s are concerned. The stigma against those convicted 
of rape is more negative than those convicted of domestic violence. This is another 
example of discrimination.  
 
It is therefore submitted that, if the proposed offence goes through, and in order to 
alleviate discrimination, the offence should read, for example, ‘domestic violence – 
rape’ or ‘domestic violence – murder’ and the record of proceedings and the SAP 69 
must reflect this. The sentence in each circumstance should reflect on the gravity of 
the act of domestic violence in question.  
 
3.2.4. Opening a docket 
 
The fourth machinery is the opening of a criminal docket. Whenever an act of domestic 
violence has been committed against a complainant, a docket must be opened 
irrespective of the fact that the complainant does not have a protection order. Hence 
for presence purposes, opening of a docket is treated as machinery outside a 
protection order. Opening a docket is also referred to as laying of a charge.  
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The opening of a docket is a very important aspect of criminal proceedings. A docket 
means the matter will be tracked. An investigating officer will be allocated and the 
matter will be investigated. The matter is allocated a unique case number and a CAS 
number. The case number is for record keeping in court, and the CAS number is for 
record keeping in the police station. The victim is able to do a follow up on the matter 
in court or at the police station using the relevant number or reference.  
 
Once a docket has been opened, it is not easy to just close it. In practice certain 
processes must be followed. A senior public prosecutor must be made aware and 
approve of the withdrawal, the victim must be interviewed by the public prosecutor in 
charge of the matter and the investigating officer. The victim must depose to a 
withdrawal statement.299 The presiding officer must be informed in open court of the 
withdrawal. All these people act independent of each other. In Langa above, the court 
dealt briefly with these procedural steps.  
 
Lazy police officers will often try to mediate matters so to avoid opening a docket. As 
it was seen in the Naidoo case above, the police officer attempted to mediate the 
matter just to avoid opening a docket. It is also stated above that the police officer even 
suggested that both the complainant and the respondent must open dockets against 
each other just to get them to mediate and avoid opening a docket all together. 
 
It is submitted that there are three notable reasons that police officers will be slow to 
open a docket. These are laziness coupled with negative attitude towards domestic 
violence, the unreasonable withdrawal of charges and spiteful complainants. The last 
two are indeed frustrating especially after the investigating officer has put on a lot of 
effort in investigating a matter. However it is hereby submitted that these are not good 
enough reasons to falter in one’s duty as the DVA is able to deal with all the above 
situations. Laziness is dealt with by imposing liability on the police. The withdrawal of 
charges can be dealt with through public awareness on the seriousness of opening a 
docket and allowing polices processes to be carried through. Victim empowerment is 
                                                          
299 See Langa v Minister of Police and others (note 248 above; para 39) where the issue of withdrawal 
of charges in such a way is briefly discussed.  
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very crucial in this regard so that the victim does not find herself in a position where 
she has to withdraw charges just to get the perpetrator out due to the support she 
receives from him.  
 
Spiteful complainants can be dealt with through section 17 (d) of the DVA, which 
among others criminalises the wilful making of a false statement. In practice this is 
usually brought to the complainant’s attention before she lays a charge. However, as 
it has been pointed out above, there is no known prosecution in this regard. It must 
also be brought to the complainant’s attention that she may face civil liability from the 
complainant as a result of unfounded allegations.  
 
 
3.3. MACHINERIES THAT FLOW FROM A PROTECTION ORDER 
 
3.3.1. General remarks 
 
While a victim of domestic violence does receive some protection in the absence of a 
protection order, a bulk of the protection is perfected by a protection order. This 
dissertation now turns to the much stronger machineries that flow from the protection 
order. A holder of a protection order is in a much stronger position because she is able 
to have access to all the relief that the DVA provides. For purposes of coherence, it is 
important to recap the machineries available to a non-holder of a protection order since 
a holder also benefits from these. The purpose of echoing these machineries is to 
show how the presence of a protection order changes the extent of the protection.  
 
A holder of a protection order also has a right to receive advice from the police. It 
should be recalled that where there is no protection order a police has to advise the 
victims of her right to apply for a protection order and to lay criminal charges if the 
conduct complained of constitutes a crime in terms of the common law. However, in 
the context where there is a protection order, the police officer has to advise the victim 
on the right to simultaneously lay a charge for breach of a protection order and a 
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criminal charge under the common law or other statute.300 The police officer must 
explain to the complainant how to lay the charge.301 The protection order prohibits a 
wider scope of conduct than the common law. It follows that a complainant who is a 
holder of a protection order may lay a charge for breach of a protection order in respect 
of conduct that would otherwise not be a crime under the common law provided that 
the conduct in question is prohibited by the protection order. Therefore the holder of a 
protection order is in a much stronger position.   
 
The extent of the standard of care when advising a victim who is a holder of a 
protection order is the same as above. The victim has a right to receive the advice in 
any official language he understands from the police. The standard of care is that of a 
reasonable police officer in the circumstances and the minister of police may be held 
vicariously liable in the event of a breach in this regard.302 
 
A holder of a protection order also has a right to receive such assistance as she may 
require including obtaining medical assistance and finding a suitable shelter. The 
nature and extent of this machinery is the same in both contexts. However, instead of 
looking for a shelter, a holder of a protection order may simply invoke a provision in 
the order that allows for the ejectment of the respondent, if such a provision exists. 
The limitations remain the same. A police officer is not obliged to use a police vehicle 
to transport the victim to obtain medical assistance or to a suitable shelter.  
 
3.3.2. Section 7 of the DVA 
 
Section 7 of the DVA confers upon a court certain powers when issuing a protection 
order. This section carries an important machinery. It may be argued that this section 
also represents progress from the Prevention of Family Violence Act which conferred 
limited powers upon a presiding officer when issuing a family violence interdict. In 
                                                          
300 Section 8 (6). 
301 Ibid.  
302 Paragraph 10 of the National Instructions.  
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terms of section 2 of the Prevention of Family Violence Act a presiding officer could 
order the respondent:  
 
(a) not to assault or threaten the applicant or a child living with the parties or with 
either of them;303 
(b) not to enter the matrimonial home or other place where the applicant is 
resident, or a specified part of such home or place or a specified area in which 
such home or place is situated;304 
(c) not to prevent the applicant or a child who ordinarily lives in the matrimonial 
home from entering and remaining in the matrimonial home or a specified part of 
the matrimonial home;305 or           
(d) not to commit any other act specified in the interdict.306 
 
It is prima facie clear that this section was destined to be less effective in dealing with 
domestic violence as it was limited. Section 7 of the DVA is a dawn of a new era. Now 
the court is empowered by means of a protection order to prohibit the respondent from: 
 
(i) Committing any act of domestic violence; 
(ii) Enlisting the help of another person to commit any such act; 
(iii) Entering a residence shared by the complainant and the respondent: 
Provided that the court may impose this prohibition only if it appears to be in 
the best interest of the complainant; 
(iv) Entering a specified part of such a shared residence; 
(v) Entering the complainant’s residence; 
(vi) Entering the complainant’s place of employment; 
(vii) Preventing the complainant who ordinarily lives or lived in a shared 
residence…from entering or remaining in the shared residence or a specified 
in the protection order; or 
                                                          
303 Section 2 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Family Violence Act. 
304 Section 2 (1) (b). 
305 Section 2 (1) (c). 
306 Section 2 (1) (d). 
84 
(viii) Committing any other act as specified in the protection order.307 
 
 
It is submitted that the above provides a very wide scope. The court is empowered to 
prohibit the respondent by means of a protection order from committing any act of 
domestic violence.308 At the inception of this chapter it was made clear that the concept 
of an act of domestic violence is very wide. It includes any controlling or abusive 
behaviour by the respondent towards the complainant that harms or has the potential 
to cause imminent harm to the safety, health and wellbeing of the complainant.309 A 
good example of controlling or abusive behaviour is verbal abuse. The DVA has 
succeeded in providing a machinery to refute emotional, verbal and psychological 
abuse. 
 
It was possible for a respondent to bypass a prohibition in the Prevention of Family 
Violence Act by enlisting the services of another person to commit an act prohibited 
by a family violence interdict. This Act did not expressly prohibit such collusive 
behaviour. This was the case unless the presiding officer decided to make use of the 
catch-all provision of section 2 (1) (d) to prohibit the respondent from enlisted the 
services of a third party, which, considering the narrow conceptualisation of domestic 
violence inherent in this Act was a far-fetched possibility. Section 7 (1) (b) of the DVA 
expressly empowers the court to admonish the respondent through the protection 
order from enlisting the help of another person to commit an act of domestic violence. 
The conduct of a third part may be imputed to the responded. 
 
Prohibiting the respondent from enlisting the services of another person is good 
machinery. Chapter one indicated that part of the reasons victims of domestic violence 
refrain from reporting domestic violence to the authorities is the fear of retaliation by 
the family or friends of the respondent. The DVA indirectly makes it mandatory for the 
respondent to tame those who are connected to him to avoid prosecution for breach 
of a protection order as a result of the conduct of a third party.  
                                                          
307 Section 7 (1) (a) – (h) of the Domestic Violence Act. 
308 Section 7 (1) (a). 
309 Section 1 (j) definition of ‘domestic violence’. 
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Section 7 read with section 9 provides a very wide scope of protective machinery. 
Some of the provisions contained in these sections have stood out for various reasons. 
They are rarely sought and if sought, they are rarely granted.310 The courts are not 
unanimous on how to approach them.311 These are provisions relating to ejectment of 
the respondent from his home,312 seizure of firearms and dangerous weapons,313 rent, 
mortgages and emergency monetary relief314 access to children,315 arrests for breach 
of a protection order as well as sentencing for the latter. All of these measures are 
welcome as they provide for the much needed relief. However they also raise 
questions regarding their nature and extent. These are very important aspects to 
consider because they have an impact on the application and effectiveness of these 
provisions. Because of these reasons, these provisions are discussed in detail below.  
 
3.3.3. Ejectment of the respondent from the common home 
 
(a) General remarks  
In South Africa, the court may order the respondent to refrain from entering a shared 
residence or a specified part thereof.316 This provision is not unique to the DVA. 
Section 2 (1) (b) of the Prevention of Family Violence Act made it possible for the 
presiding officer to enjoin the respondent not to enter the matrimonial home or part 
thereof. This section went as far as barring the respondent from entering the area 
where the matrimonial home it situated. The DVA is also able to achieve this by 
prohibiting conduct such as intimidation317, harassment318 and stalking319.  
 
                                                          
310 E. Bonthuys ‘Domestic violence and gendered socio-economic rights: an agenda for research and 
activism’ 2014 (3) South African Journal on Human Rights 111, 126. 
311 Ibid.  
312 Section 7 (1) (c) – (f). 
313 Section 7 (2) (a) read with section 9.  
314 Section 7 (3) and (4). 
315 Section 7 (6). 
316 Section 7 (1) (c) and (d). Paragraphs (e) and (f) goes as far as prohibiting the respondent from 
entering the complainant’s resident as well as the place of employment respectively.  
317 Section 1 (e) of the definition of ‘domestic violence’. 
318 Section 1 (f) of the definition of ‘domestic violence’. 
319 Section 1 (g) of the definition of ‘domestic violence’.    
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This is a significant provision because it purports to deal with a phenomenon of 
domestic violence that it usually takes place behind closed doors within the confines 
of a home. The court is able to remove the abusive respondent thus providing relief to 
victims of domestic violence, particularly those who are unemployed and have no 
means to move out and find accommodation of their own. This is also useful to victims 
who are stuck in abusive relationships because of the children as well as those who 
are co-owners of the home by virtue of marriage to the respondent. This provision is 
also significant because it is a shift from the onerous common law requirements to 
obtain an eviction order or a judicial separation order which is only available to married 
people.320  
 
It is worth noting that in terms of section 7 (1) (c), the court is able to make an order, 
not totally excluding the respondent from the shared residence, but from a specified 
part of the shared residence. Initially one would wonder why such a provision was 
included or what use purpose will it serve especially considering that it allows the 
respondent to remain on the property thus making it likely that the abuse will continue. 
It appears that an order of this nature can succeed in respect of households with more 
than one property. It is also submitted that this order will best suit a rural settlement 
with various properties.  
 
Strictly speaking, if the parties are not married there is no legal duty on the respondent 
to move out of his home to accommodate the complainant. The victim cannot legally 
evict the respondent from his own property. Simply put, a girlfriend has no right to 
occupy the respondent’s premises to his exclusion. However it is submitted that the 
DVA confers a special right of occupation on the complainant.321  This right will only 
be conferred if the parties live together like husband and wife.322 By analogy the courts 
will be more inclined to confer this right in situations where there are children involved. 
                                                          
320 See Ex Parte Cooling 1926 WLD 202 for a brief reference to how a judicial separation order operates. 
A judicial separation order is becoming less popular in recent years; spouses just decide to be estranged 
from each other and so the marriage goes. See Nevhudzholi v Nevhudzholi (V) unreported case no 
180/94 of 22 September 1998 for a voluntary separation.  




However, the courts should arrive at a different conclusion in cases where there are 
no children involved and where the relationship was of a shorter duration.  
 
There are various reservations regarding the provisions ejecting the respondent from 
his residence, some of them albeit controversial. There are four notable reservations 
about this provision. The first is at what stage (interim or final) should an ejectment 
order be made; second, the relation between this provision and an eviction, third, the 
duration of time that the respondent may be kept away from his/her home and fourth, 
whether this provision may be justified when weighed against section 25 (1) of the 
Constitution which provides that no one may be arbitrarily deprived of their property. 
These reservations require an extensive consideration and therefore they are 
discussed next. 
 
(b) At what stage should an ejectment order be made? 
 
It has been stated above that a protection order has two stages, the interim and the 
final stage. The interim protection order is issued without notice to the respondent. The 
question then becomes: can a court make an ejectment order without notice to the 
respondent?323 There is nothing in the DVA against this. When one looks at the 
immediate nature of domestic violence, it would make sense for the court to be able to 
eject an abusive person instantly without delay. On the other hand it is arguable that 
this would be unjust and prejudicial to the respondent because the only time he may 
learn of the order is when he has to move out. There is a counter argument in this 
regard that until service of the interim order is duly effected, it will be legally impossible 
to eject the respondent. On receipt of the service, the respondent can simply anticipate 
the return date and have the matter heard much earlier otherwise the ejectment order 
still stands.  
 
                                                          
323 Artz (note 65 above). 
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The case in point in this regard is Lebaka v Minister of Safety and Security and 
another324. In this case, the court had granted an ejectment order at interim stage 
against the respondent (Appellant) in favour of the complainant (his wife). The interim 
protection order had not been served on the respondent and he was subsequently 
arrested for being in his house unbeknown to him that he was in breach of the order. 
The court in this case appeared to accept that an order of this nature could be made 
at interim stage. The court found, however, that the arrest was unlawful on the ground 
that the respondent had not received service of the interim order.325 In the court’s 
words “…the respondent could not have contravened an order of which he had not 
been aware as it had not been served on him.”326 
 
There is an argument that an ejectment order should only be made at the final stage, 
thus providing the respondent enough opportunity to plan ahead for a worst case 
scenario if he has to move out of the house. On the other hand, it can also be argued 
that the delay until the return date could allow further harm to the victim and this is not 
in line with the DVA, the purpose of which is to provide victims with speedy 
remedies.327  
 
Magistrates differ on when an ejectment order should be made. Some are reluctant to 
make the order at the interim stage because of the drastic effect it has on the 
respondent.328 They are of the view that the respondent should be given an opportunity 
to respond before such a drastic decision is taken.329 There are also those magistrates 
who are determined to give effect to the purpose of the DVA. It is submitted that the 
courts should not shy away from making an ejectment order at any stage, especially 
in cases where the evidence is prima facie overwhelming that failure on the court to 
act will place the victim in greater danger. The inconvenience which the respondent 
                                                          
324 Lebaka v Minister of Safety and Security and another (O) unreported case no A114/2007 of 13 March 
2008. 
325 Ibid para 14. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Artz (note 65 above).  
328 Ibid.  
329 Ibid.  
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may suffer should not play much role because he/she is the author of his/her demise. 
However each case should be dealt with on its merits.  
 
There is a vacuum of guidance in the DVA when it comes to implementing this 
provision. While the DVA is commended for being unequivocal on the type of conduct 
that qualifies as domestic violence and the person who should obtain a protection 
order, it provides no guidance on how to approach the ejectment provision. Simply 
providing for an ejectment without any further guidance creates more problems. This 
is problematic because since domestic violence matters are within the domain of the 
magistrates’ courts, they do not have the benefit of judicial precedent. This leaves 
magistrates wondering in isolation, which in turn leads to inconsistencies. The DVA 
should be amended to provide the necessary guideline. For instance courts should be 
cautious and only issue ejectment order if there is evidence to suggest that the 
complainant does not have an alternative address and he or she will suffer serious 
harm if an ejectment order is not issued. Courts should never issue such orders on 
unsubstantiated say so of the complainant.  
 
(c) The relation between the ejectment provision and evictions330 
 
There are distinctions and similarities between an ejectment order and an eviction. 
The first distinction is that only an owner or a lessee may lawfully evict. On the other 
hand, it is arguable that the DVA creates a special right of occupation for people other 
than an owner or a lessee. Second, usually the high court has the jurisdiction to grant 
an eviction order; however the magistrate’s court may now hear such matters. An 
ejectment order is granted by a magistrates’ court. Third, each has its own 
requirement. In summary, the substantive331 requirements for an eviction are that the 
applicant must be the owner of the property and the respondent must be in illegal 
occupation of the applicant’s property,332 whereas it is submitted that the requirements 
                                                          
330 Ibid. 
331 Eviction proceedings are largely procedural. The procedure is set out in sections 4 and 5 of the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.   
332 Illegal Occupations comes about in various ways. A person may be an illegal occupier where, after 
the lease expires, he continues to hold over the premises. A person may also be an illegal occupier if 
he simply takes it upon himself to move into another person’s property without legal cause. 
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for an ejectment order are (i) the parties must be living together like husband and wife, 
and (ii) the respondent must have committed an act of domestic violence that merits 
an ejectment order. If parties are living together and have children, it may easily be 
inferred that they are living together like husband and wife.  
 
There are procedural steps that must be followed in order to obtain an eviction. These 
are found in sections 4 and 5 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act333. The owner of the property must first demand that the 
respondent evacuates the property. If the respondent does not evacuate the property, 
the owner must obtain a court order, either by way of application or action proceedings. 
The court order must be served or executed by a sheriff. This process may be 
protracted. Even if the eviction order is granted, it does not follow that the respondents 
will be evicted immediately. Eviction is last in line.334 On the other hand, an ejectment 
order is, justifiably so, a speedy process. As it has been shown above, unlike an 
eviction, the applicant in a protection order may simply obtain an ejectment order 
without notice to the respondent in controversial cases where an ejectment order is 
made at interim stage.  
 
The similarity is that the respondent, like an evictee under the common law and PIE, 
is excluded from his/her house. The difference is that the evictee does not have title to 
the property. Some have submitted that there is no distinction between an ejectment 
order in terms of the DVA and the common law eviction, especially in cases where an 
ejectment is made indefinite, and that if there is any distinction, it lies only in 
terminology.335 This argument cannot be entirely true. The respondent may lawfully 
regain possession of his property by having the protection order varied or set aside; 
whereas an evictee has no remedy.  
 
Of course one has to be careful in comparing an ejectment order to an eviction. These 
remedies are designed to respond to totally different situations. The former is designed 
                                                          
333 Prevention of Illegal Eviction from Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.  
334 For a brief summary of the process in this regard see T. Klos ‘Step-by-step guide to residential 
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to deal with an immediate situation that may be life threatening or subject the applicant 
to an unbearable situation if it is not granted. At least with the latter the respondent 
usually has the opportunity to organise himself and he chooses to ignore that 
opportunity to his detriment.  
 
(d) The duration of the ejectment 
 
The DVA is silent on the duration of most the orders that may be made in a protection 
order. This can only imply that the question of the duration was left to the court to 
decide. There is nothing in the DVA that prevent the court from making an indefinite 
order in this regard. There is also nothing sinister about an indefinite order in cases 
where the victim is the owner of the property. The crucial question is whether the court 
may be justified in making such an order either in cases of joint ownership (either by 
virtue of marriage or property law principles), or in cases where the respondent is the 
sole owner of the property? 
 
Nonetheless section 7 (7) (b) worth considering in this regard: 
 
‘If the court is of the opinion that any provision of a protection order deals with a 
matter that should, in the interest of justice, be dealt with further in terms of any 
other relevant law…the court must order that such a provision shall be in force for 
such a limited period as the court determines, in order to afford the party concerned 
the opportunity to seek appropriate relief in terms of such law’ 
 
There are a few things that must be noted about this provision. It permits the court to 
refer issue of ejectment to another court. It is dependent on a magistrates’ subjective 
opinion; in other words if the magistrate is of the view that there is nothing sinister about 
granting an ejectment order at an interim stage, he/she may proceed to do so without 
any consideration. This is another problem because almost complete reliance is placed 
on unguided discretion.  
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The position is different in, for instance, Namibia. The Namibian Domestic Violence 
Act336 provides that a provision granting the complainant exclusive occupation of the 
respondent’s residence is valid for a maximum of 6 months.337 If the provision relates 
to property jointly owned by the respondent and the complainant, the exclusion shall 
be valid for a maximum of 1 year.338 The courts may only depart from these stipulations 
to order a lesser period. One understands that it is impossible, and not advisable, to 
set time periods for everything. However, one has to equally caution against over 
reliance on judicial discretion as it can lead to inconsistencies. It is submitted that the 
setting of statutory maximum durations encourages the complainant to earn an 
independent living, starting by finding her own accommodation. This way the question 
of arbitrary deprivation of property on the part of the respondent does not necessarily 
arise.  
 
It is interesting to note that the Namibian DVA is a spitting image of the South African 
DVA. It goes without saying that Namibia, in drafting its Act in this respect, used South 
Africa as a case study. However, Namibia went miles further by providing as much 
detail as possible. There is no doubt that Namibia intended to adequately deal with 
domestic violence by providing sufficient guidelines in the Act. These submissions do 
not in any way mean that South Africa adopted mediocrity. It is hoped that, like some 
of the provisions of the South African DVA, the Namibian DVA does not only good look 
on paper but also yields good practice. With this in mind, one can safely say that the 
South African DVA was an improvement from the Prevention of Family Violence Act, 
and that the Namibian DVA was, arguably, an improvement from the South African 
DVA.  
 
South African magistrates are also not unanimous in applying the provisions relating 
to ejectment. As it has been pointed out above, there are magistrates who do not make 
an order of this nature because they feel that it is far reaching and open to abuse. 
There are also those who would make an ejectment order valid for a reasonable 
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duration to allow the complainant to find her own shelter.339 It is arguable that the court 
may make the order indefinite and, however, allow the respondent to apply for a 
variation of the ejectment order after reasonable time has passed allowing the victim 
to find suitable accommodation. 
 
An order of this kind, temporary or indefinite amounts to a deprivation of property, 
something which the constitution frowns upon. Below we shall consider if this 
deprivation may be constitutionally justified.  
 
(e) The constitutionality of the ejectment provisions340 
 
In South Africa, because of our political history where a person could summarily or 
permanently be deprived of property due to the colour of his skin, the right to property 
is a sacred one. Section 25 (1) of the Constitution provides that ‘no one may be 
deprived of property except in terms of the law of general application, and no law may 
permit arbitrary deprivation of property’. A reading of this subsection makes it clear 
that this provision has a limitation, that is, a person may be deprived of his property 
according to the law of general application. There is no need to refer to section 36 of 
the Constitution in this regard.  
 
 
An ejectment order in terms of the DVA is a limitation of the respondent’s right to his 
property. But is this limitation justifiable in terms of the law of general application in an 
open and just society? This question should be answered taking into account the 
circumstances of each case, particularly the circumstances under which an ejectment 
order is granted. An ejectment order will probably be unjust, and consequently 
unconstitutional, if it granted at interim stage and in circumstances where there is no 
immediate or real danger to the complainant if it is not granted. A drastic order of this 
nature should be granted only if the harm is real.  
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It is argued that the provision of houses or shelters is the duty of the state. Cases that 
require the respondent to vacate his/her home for the benefit of the complainant are a 
pointer to the failure of the state to provide adequate housing to those in need.341 This 
is a fair price to pay if the state hopes to succeed in the fight against domestic violence. 
It is further arguable that by failing to provide housing to complainants, the state shifts 
its duty to the respondent who in turn takes unfair advantage on the complainant. 
Therefore the state should empower victims by affording equal opportunities in terms 
of acquiring skills and employment. This way they are self-sufficient and less 
dependent. In the alternative the state must prioritise vulnerable women in providing 
housing.  
 
3.3.4. Seizure of firearms and dangerous weapons 
 
(a) Seizure of firearms  
 
The court may order a seizure of a firearm or a dangerous weapon in the possession 
or under the control of the respondent regardless of the question of ownership.342 This 
provision is unique to the DVA. A similar provision did not exist in the Prevention of 
Family Violence Act. In terms of this provision, the court may order seizure of a firearm 
or a dangerous weapon if it is satisfied on the evidence placed before it supporting the 
application that:  
 
(a) the respondent has threatened or expressed the intention to kill or injure himself 
or herself, or any person in a domestic relationship, whether or not by means of 
such arm or dangerous weapon; or 
(b) possession of such arm or dangerous weapon is not in the best interest of the 
respondent or any other person in a domestic relationship, as a result of the 
respondent’s –  
(i) state of mind or mental condition 
(ii) inclination to violence; or 
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(iii) use of or dependence on intoxicating liquor or drugs.343 
 
This provision appears to mirror section 102 (1) (a) and (c) of the Firearms Control 
Act.344 This section allows the registrar to declare a person unfit to possess a firearm 
on precisely the same grounds as section 9 of the DVA. However the scope of section 
102 is wider than the DVA in that the former applies to a variety of circumstances 
including domestic violence. For instance, section 102 also applies in instances when 
a person has failed to take steps for safekeeping of a firearm. Such person may be 
declared unfit to possess a firearm.  
 
It is unclear when the registrar, acting in terms of section 102 of the Firearms Control 
Act, may make a declaration that a person is unfit to possess a firearm, whether on 
application by a third party or a victim of the respondent or a person on his own accord. 
However, the section provides that the registrar may declare a person unfit to possess 
a firearm ‘on the grounds of information contained in a statement under oath or 
affirmation including a statement made by any person called as a witness…’345  This 
section makes it possible for a victim of domestic violence to instigate proceedings to 
declare the respondent unfit to possess a firearm by making information available to 
the registrar. In Minister of Safety and Security v van Duivenboden346 the court held 
that the police have a duty to take active steps in terms of section 102 of the Firearms 
Control Act347 in cases where there is sufficient information to do so.  
 
The distinction between the DVA and section 102 of the Firearms Control Act is that 
the former only allows the court to seize a firearm from the respondent, while the latter 
allows the registrar to declare a person unfit to possess a firearm on the evidence 
supplied to him or her. The DVA has narrow application in this regard because it does 
not affect the respondent’s ability to obtain another firearm after confiscation. 
Interestingly, section 102 (1) (a) of the Firearms Control Act makes it possible for a 
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344 Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000.  
345 Section 102 (1) of the Firearms Control Act. 
346 Minister of Safety and Security v van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA). 
347 The van Duivenboden case was decided during the operation of section 11 of the now repealed 
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person to be declared unfit to possess a firearm on the ground that a protection order 
has been issued against him.348 This provision is consistent  with section 9 (2) of the 
DVA which empowers the court to direct the clerk of the court to forward a copy of the 
evidence to the National Commissioner of South African Police Service (the National 
Commissioner) for his consideration in terms of section 102 of the Firearms Control 
Act. The DVA therefore has no powers beyond the mere seizure of the firearm.  
 
It is submitted that there is no logic behind the absence of a provision that enables a 
court issuing a protection order to simultaneously declare the responded unfit to 
possess a firearm. Section 9 (2) of the DVA simply passes the buck to the national 
commissioner who may in turn takes his own time thus causing an unnecessary delay. 
Firearms, if used, are deadly. There is equally no logic behind issuing a protection 
order amid allegations of violence involving a firearm, thus confirming that an incident 
of domestic violence has taken place, and yet leave the question of the respondent’s 
fitness to possess a firearm hanging. The DVA should be amended to allow for the 
impairment of a person’s fitness to possess a firearm especially in cases where there 
is overwhelming evidence of misuse of a firearm as early as possible.  
 
In terms of Section 103 (1) of the Firearms Control Act a person who is convicted of 
contravening a protection order is automatically declared unfit to possess a firearm 
unless he leads evidence as to why such a declaration should not be upheld.349 This 
is subject to the proviso that the accused is sentenced to imprisonment without the 
option of a fine.350 Clearly section 103 (1) creates a presumption of unfitness to 
possess a firearm in the absence of evidence to the contrary after a person has been 
convicted of contravening a protection order.351 While this section is a good 
mechanism, it is not the best option in cases of domestic violence because in the 
absence of a conviction, it cannot be invoked thereby failing to play a preventative role. 
                                                          
348 This will be probably in cases envisaged in section 9 (1) (a) of the Domestic Violence Act where the 
respondent has threatened to injure himself or another person. 
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breach of a protection order and one count of assault. The court held that in applying section 103 of the 
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350 Section 103 (1) (l).  
351 D. Smythe ‘Missed opportunities: confiscation of weapons in domestic violence cases’ (2004) 10 
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There is no justification for waiting until the damage is done before taking steps. It is 
submitted that when a court makes an order for seizure of a firearm and ammunition, 
the declaration of unfitness to possess a firearm should follow immediately if the 
evidence justifies such a declaration.352 This can only be achieved through an enabling 
provision in the DVA. 
 
The inability of the DVA’s to simultaneously provide for the issue of a protection order 
and directly impair a person’s fitness to possess a firearm other than through the 
auspices of sections 102 and 103 of the Firearms Control Act is regretted. This makes 
it possible that, until the national commissioner has made a negative determination, a 
respondent may voluntarily surrender his firearm pursuant to a protection order only to 
turn and legally obtain another firearm thus making section 9 (2) redundant and 
impotent.  
 
Research shows that, in domestic violence cases, a firearm is usually used to threaten 
victims.353 If it is used, however, grave results normally ensue. As a result of this, 
Smythe argues that an order for confiscation of a firearm should be made at interim 
stage.354 This will not be arbitrary because the respondent will get a chance to argue 
why an order confiscating his firearm should be set aside.355 Research also points out 
that it is difficult to enforce an order for the confiscation of the respondent’s firearm. 
Unless the respondent has a licence to possess a firearm, he can simply deny having 
a firearm thus implying that the complainant is making it up. The cause for these is the 
applicants’ inability to give a description of the firearm and further particulars.356 
 
It has also been suggested that applicants hardly request the court to make an order 
for confiscation of a firearm. They simply mention the use of a firearm in passing in the 
                                                          
352 Ibid 22.  
353 Parenzee, Artz and Moult (note 204 above; 61). These authors point out that those applications for 
a protection order that mention a firearm usually allege that the respondent threatened to use the 
firearm. It must be pointed out that a threat is enough to commence an enquiry in terms of section 102 
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354 Smythe (note 351 above; 21).  
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affidavit.357 Even if the order is requested and granted, it does not describe the firearm 
with enough details.358 The order can also be difficult to enforce in cases where the 
respondent has more than one firearm or an arsenal of weapons.359 As one police 
officer has pointed out, the respondent can simply ask: “which one?” And the order will 
speak of ‘a firearm’.360 Researchers have suggested the inclusion of a lethality 
checklist to overcome this problem.361 This suggestion is welcomed as it provide the 
courts with the necessary information to pronounce on the respondent’s fitness to 
possess a firearm should the DVA be enabled to impair a person’s ability to possess a 
firearm.  
 
It is equally arguable that the illegal acquisition of firearms through the black market 
makes it difficult to ensure that a person does not obtain a firearm in circumstances 
where their ability to do same is impaired. This argument, whilst sound, should not 
deter the courts from confiscating firearms. It is submitted that actively confiscating all 
prohibited firearms and impairing person’s ability to obtain one might eventually wear 
out the black market. This way the only way to obtain a firearm is by following the 
proper channels. Further, disseminating the knowledge that to possess an unlicensed 
firearm or to possess a firearm whilst one’s ability to do same is impaired is an offence 
might be a step in the right direction. 
 
(b) Seizure of dangerous weapons 
 
Section 9 (2) also provides for the confiscation of dangerous weapons other than 
firearms. The Dangerous Weapons Act362 simply defines a dangerous weapon as ‘any 
object, other than a firearm, capable of causing death or inflicting a serious bodily harm, 
                                                          
357 Ibid 19. The author suggests that section 7 (2) (a) imposes a duty on the court to make an order in 
this regard even if the applicant does not specifically request it. This is a sound submission considering 
that victims are usually lay persons who do not have the expertise to depose an affidavit, even if they 
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360 Parenzee, Artz and Moult (note 204 above; 65).  
361 Parenzee, Artz and Moult (note 204 above; 35).  
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if it were used for an unlawful purpose’.363 The problem with domestic violence is that 
virtually anything can be a dangerous weapon capable of inflicting a serious bodily 
harm when used.364 However a holistic reading of the Dangerous Weapons Act clearly 
shows that it was meant to deal with the public possession of dangerous weapons in 
circumstances that raise a suspicion that such person intends using the said weapon 
for an unlawful purpose.365 What is necessary for making a living, like a knife or a fork, 
can be a deadly weapon in domestic violence. At the same time the court can scarcely 
confiscate these. If it does, strangely so, it cannot confiscate everything or prevent the 
respondent from obtaining a similar object.  
 
Unlike a firearm, one does not require a licence to possess a dangerous weapon and 
every household has a dangerous weapon.  This triggers the question whether it is 
possible in practice to enforce an order for the confiscation of firearms? Clearly it does 
not make any sense to confiscate something which the respondent can repossess with 
utmost ease. It is submitted that a provision of this nature is designed to confiscate 
objects that are rare and not easy to obtain such as handcuffs, metal cane or other 
hard objects. While some of the objects are available in the market, it is possible for 
the law to regulate the sale of these objects by prohibiting the sale to certain categories 
of people.  
 
3.3.5. Rent, mortgages and emergency monetary relief (E.M.R.) by the 
respondent 
 
(a) General remarks 
 
Chapter one asserted that the victims of domestic violence are often economically 
dependent on their abusers and, as a result, they are less inclined to speak up or take 
action against the abuse for fear of losing the economic support that the respondent 
                                                          
363 Section 1.  
364 Parenzee, Artz and Moult (note 204 above; 64) point out the possibility that some complainants do 
not regard other objects as dangerous weapons as the law does.  
365 Section 3 (1) of the Dangerous Weapons Act.  
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provides.366 The possibility of losing support is more devastating for those victims who 
have no legal basis to claim financial support from the respondents, for instance those 
who are cohabiting. Studies show that economic abuse is very prevalent.367 Economic 
abuse is defined as: 
 
‘(a) The unreasonable deprivation of economic or financial resources to which a 
complainant is entitled to under law or which the complainant requires out of 
necessity, including household necessities for the complainant, and mortgage 
repayments or payment of rent in respect of shared residence; 
(b) Unreasonable disposal of household effects or other property in which the 
complainant has an interest.’368 
 
Therefore the court, when issuing a protection order, is empowered to ‘impose’ on the 
respondent obligations to continue paying rent or a mortgage, if applicable.369 The 
court is also empowered to order the respondent to pay emergency monetary relief 
(E.M.R.) to the complainant.370 Such orders or obligations may only be made with due 
regard to the ‘financial needs and resources of the complainant and the respondent’.371 
These provisions are novel to the DVA. No similar provisions existed under the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act. It is submitted that this provision is recognition of 
the link between domestic violence and economic oppression.372  
 
It appears that these provisions are applicable even if there is no pre-existing legal 
duty on the respondent to provide for the complainant. Section 1 (ix) (a) of the DVA 
makes it clear that necessity is also a ground to impose such order. It is trite in law that 
there is no legal duty to provide for a girlfriend or cohabitee. However, the DVA once 
                                                          
366 D. Smythe and L. Artz ‘Money matters: structural problems with implementing the DVA’ (2005) 
Agenda 66 24, 25. These authors also state instances where woman are not employed on farms in their 
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again confers a special right on a complainant who is not married to the respondent. 
The basis of this special right is necessity or the respondent’s unwelcome conduct 
towards the complainant. In other words, the act of domestic violence which triggers 
the granting of a protection order is the basis of the duty. The circumstances under 
which this special right may be conferred are determined with due regard to the scope 
of this machinery which is outlined below. Married woman may also benefit from this 
provision. This is useful because while married woman may approach a maintenance 
court, the chances of getting immediate relief are low especially in light of the back-log 
in our maintenance system.373 
 
While a legal duty to maintain is not necessarily a pre-requisite for making an order to 
discharge rent, mortgage or E.M.R., it is however submitted that the court may only 
make an order for the respondent to pay rent or mortgage instalments if it is his 
contractual duty to do so. This duty will of course exist in instances where the 
respondent is the tenant or mortgagor. The court merely enforces the respondent’s 
pre-existing obligations towards a third party, consequently benefiting the complainant. 
Logic dictates that the court should not order the respondent to take over the 
complainant’s lease or mortgage payment if he or she was not a party to that 
agreement. Doing otherwise would upset the established principle of freedom of 
contract.  
 
Even if it happens that as a result of the domestic violence, the complainant who is a 
party to any of these agreements, is unable to discharge his/her obligations in terms 
of an agreement, the court may not order the respondent take over the agreements. 
In this instance the court will order the respondent to provide E.M.R.374 The 
complainant continues being a party to the agreement, save the respondent will have 
a duty to discharge necessary payment for the time of the emergency. These 
provisions were included also to prevent the respondent from stopping rental or 
mortgage payments, thus leading to the eviction of the complainant or attachment of 
the property by the bank.375  
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It is interesting to note that the provision for rent and mortgage payments is phrased 
in such a way that it creates the impression that the court may simply order the 
respondent to take over the complainant’s obligations in cases where the complainant, 
as a result of the domestic violence, is unable to discharge her contractual obligations. 
This is incorrect. As it is pointed out above, the court does not force strangers into a 
contractual relationship. The provision simply empowers the court to order the 
respondent to continue discharging his pre-existing obligation if doing otherwise will 
affect the complainant and any children residing with her.376 If the respondent is not a 
party to any such obligation, the court simply makes an order for E.M.R. which will 
serve the same purpose.  
 
It is said the court may order the respondent to provide emergency monetary relief to 
the complainant only for expenditure that is a direct consequence of the domestic 
violence. Emergency monetary relief is defined as: 
 
‘…compensation for monetary losses suffered by a complainant at the time of the 
issue of a protection order as a result of the domestic violence, including – 
(a) Loss of earnings 
(b) Medical and dental expenses 
(c) Relocation and accommodation expenses; or 
(d) Household necessities.’377 
 
It is submitted that the intention behind this provision is to allow victims to have access 
to emergency funds to provide for their immediate needs, those of their children378 and 
to ensure that they are not left destitute by the respondent’s possible withdrawal of 
financial support.379 Since a legal duty to maintain is not a prerequisite for making an 
order of this nature, it goes without saying that the respondent may be required to 
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provide E.M.R. for the benefit of children that are not even his, provided that he had 
assumed a fatherly role other than adoption.  
 
There are numerous reservations about these provisions. It is argued that it may be a 
substitute for maintenance.380 Further, they are open to abuse by unscrupulous 
complainants because the Act does not state the maximum duration of these orders. 
There are also questions on how these provisions should be implemented. For 
instances, should they be implemented like a maintenance order? While maintenance 
orders are in the hands of, among others, maintenance officers, maintenance 
investigators, sheriffs and the department of justice, it is not precise as to who should 
enforce rent, mortgages and E.M.R. orders.381 These are considered next. 
 
(b) The relation between rent, mortgages, E.M.R. and maintenance 
 
There is a relationship between the provisions for rent, mortgages, emergency 
monetary relief and maintenance. For this reason, some have argued that the DVA 
has invoked maintenance provisions. The following has been said in this regard: 
Magistrates suggested that some complainants use the Domestic Violence Act 
when the maintenance system fails them - either when they have been 
unsuccessful in securing a maintenance order or when they have waited a long 
time for the maintenance order to be served, granted or varied. As expected, there 
were a range of opinions surrounding both the purpose and application of E.M.R.382 
 
The notion that rent, mortgages, E.M.R. and maintenance are the same is not 
necessarily true. There are distinctions between these remedies.  
 
In order to obtain a maintenance order, the respondent must first have a legal duty to 
maintain the applicant. Such a duty will exist between husband and wife, between 
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parent and children383 and between grandchildren and grandparents.384 It will not exist 
with cohabitees or between boyfriend and girlfriend. Second, the respondent must 
have the ability to provide for the applicant.385 On the other hand, with respect to rent, 
mortgages and E.M.R., strictly speaking, there is usually no legal duty on the 
respondent to provide for the applicant. As it has been stated above, the DVA creates 
a special right for the applicant. The basis of this right is necessity or the unwanted 
behaviour of the respondent.386  
 
A different process is followed when applying for a maintenance order. This process 
is set out in the Maintenance Act. The process is facilitated by maintenance officers 
and maintenance investigators. The process of obtaining a maintenance order can be 
frustrating and exhaustive in cases where the respondent does everything in his power 
to thwart the applicant’s efforts.387  On the other hand an order for rent, mortgage or 
E.M.R. can be obtained with relative ease and speed. The applicant can even obtain 
it without the respondent’s knowledge. However this is amongst controversial subjects 
in the law of domestic violence which have been discussed extensively above.  
 
Unlike a maintenance order, an order for rent, mortgage or E.M.R. cannot be made as 
a stand-alone order.388 A complainant cannot approach the court and apply for a 
protection order solely on the grounds that she requires some funds which she 
believes the respondent should provide. An order for rent, mortgage or E.M.R. is only 
made analogous to another order. For instance the respondent might be ordered in 
the protection order not to assault the complainant, not enter the shared residence and 
to continue discharging rent or mortgage payments and provide E.M.R. for the 
complainant.  
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The similarities between maintenance and rent, mortgage and E.M.R. are that the 
court is required to make provision for exactly the same needs. The courts may 
stipulate the duration which the order shall run in each case. However both Acts are 
silent on the duration living it to the discretion of the presiding officer to determine the 
duration of the order. The Namibian DVA provides for a maximum period of six 
months.389 This is commendable because it is a reminder that the purpose of a statute 
of this kind is to provide speedy temporary relief while the complainant gets back on 
his/her feet.  
 
The drafters of the DVA were aware of the thin line between the provisions for rent, 
mortgages, E.M.R. and maintenance. Section 7 (7) (b) provides that  
 
(a) If the court is of the opinion that any provision of a protection order deals 
with a matter that should, in the interest of justice, be dealt with further in terms of 
any other relevant law, including the Maintenance Act, 1998, the court must order 
that such a provision shall be in force for such limited period as the court 
determines, in order to afford the party concerned the opportunity to seek 
appropriate relief in terms of such law. 
 
This provision provides a clear guide; however, as it will be seen below, it affords 
presiding officers an opportune reason to avoid taking a decision if an application 
involves an order for rent, mortgage or E.M.R. While this may be seen as a way of 
ensuring that a matter is heard by a proper forum, E.M.R. presents a different scenario. 
If a court hearing an application for E.M.R. refers the matter to another court, the 
applicant will be placed in a worse of position because, in its very nature, E.M.R. will 
require the matter to proceed by way of action proceeding as it does not fall within the 
jurisdiction of a maintenance court. E.M.R. includes loss of earnings, medical and 
dental expenses, and costs of relocating and household necessities. This position is 
further complicated by the fact that E.M.R. is unique to the DVA. Furthermore it will not 
make sense to refer E.M.R. to maintenance court as it will overburden the court, more 
                                                          
389 Section 15 (e) of the Namibian Domestic Violence Act. 
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especially in cases where there is no legal duty on the respondent to maintain the 
complainant.  
 
(c) When should an order to pay rent, mortgages and E.M.R. be made? 
 
The courts are not unanimous on this question. As it has been hinted above, they are 
not even unanimous on whether these should be granted at all.390 Some presiding 
officers would rather refer the matter to a maintenance court for consideration.391 Some 
even held the view that the complainant should first deal with the question of 
maintenance in the maintenance court and then apply for a protection order once the 
question of maintenance has been dealt with.392 However this is not the correct 
approach. The DVA provides that a court may not refuse to impose a condition on the 
ground that another remedy is available to the complainant.393 Nonetheless it is 
important to consider the stage at which such orders may be made; whether they may 
be made at interim or final stage.  
 
By its very nature, E.M.R. is urgently required. This in turn supports an argument that 
such order may be granted as part of an interim protection order. However, may a 
similar approach be adopted with respect to rent and mortgages? Put differently may 
any order to this effect be granted at interim stage? The DVA places emphasis on the 
means test. The court must have regard to the financial needs and the resources of 
the complainant and the respondent.394  
 
It is submitted that it is difficult for a domestic violence court to adequately consider 
the means test for two reasons. Unlike a designated court, that is, a maintenance court, 
a domestic violence court is not properly staffed to deal with the means test. Second, 
the matter is usually brought as a matter of urgency thus depriving the court of the time 
to apply itself accordingly. The documents required to assess the matter are usually 
                                                          
390 Parenzee, Artz and Moult (note 204 above; 69). 
391 Ibid. 
392 Ibid.  
393 Section 7 (7) (a). 
394 Section 7 (3) and (4) of the Domestic Violence Act. 
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not before the court and in the absence of the necessary role-players, it is less likely 
that the respondent will volunteer the correct information unless it favours his case.  
 
Granting an order for E.M.R. at interim stage may be tantamount to granting an 
ineffective order especially where the respondent does not have the money to adhere 
to the court order. On the other hand, rent and mortgages may be granted at whatever 
stage. The reason for this is simple. It will be recalled from above that rent and 
mortgages are simply an order for the respondent to continue making payment. The 
respondent is already a party to the respective contracts and presumably making the 
necessary payments. This is not a new obligation but mere strengthening of an existing 
obligation. Whatever the circumstances may be, the court is given the power to grant 
such orders where circumstances require so. It cannot fail in its duties due to the 
difficulties may present themselves. Each case should of course be decided on its own 
merits. 
 
(d) How long shall an order be valid for? 
 
One of the burning questions about the provision for rent, mortgage and E.M.R. is the 
duration for which such an order may operate. The DVA provides that if the court is of 
the opinion that another court can deal with such matter, it may make an order valid 
for a limited period as the court determines to afford the parties concerned an 
opportunity to seek appropriate relief.395 One wonders what the position would be if 
the court does not have such opinion, or if no other court is able to deal with the matter. 
It has been submitted above that a girlfriend cannot approach a maintenance court for 
relief with respect to herself because there is no duty on the respondent to maintain 
her. This leaves a domestic violence court being the only competent forum to order 
the respondent to pay rent, mortgages or E.M.R with respect to a girlfriend.  
 
As it has been stated above, in Namibia a related order may only be made for a 
maximum of 6 months.396 In South Africa nothing prevents the court from making an 
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indefinite order in this regard. This will induce a sense if shock especially in cases 
where the respondent does not have a duty to maintain the complainant. Logic dictates 
that the court should specify the duration at all times rather than making an indefinite 
order or refraining from making an order altogether.397 An indefinite order means the 
respondent has to continue making payments until such time is able to have the 
protection order set aside or varied in this regard. In determining the duration of the 
order, the court should take into account the means test, the duration of the 
relationship and affected children.  
 
3.3.6. Access to children or no-contact order 
 
(a) General remarks 
 
‘Domestic and family violence is a pervasive and frequently lethal problem that 
challenges society at every level… It threatens the stability of the family and 
negatively impacts on all family members, especially the children who learn from it 
that violence is an acceptable way to cope with stress or problems or gain control 
over another person.’398 
 
It is known that in violent families the children often find themselves having to choose 
between parents. They watch as the weaker parent is abused. They tend to think that 
they are the cause of the violence and blame themselves for everything that 
happens.399 It should also be borne in mind that by virtue of age, children are often 
unable to express their feelings in words; therefore they express themselves through 
negative behaviour such as being violent to their peers or misbehaving at school.400 In 
worse cases children are direct victims. Therefore it is argued that in one way or 
another children are always victims of domestic violence – whether directly or 
                                                          
397 Artz (note 65 above; 27). 
398 S v Baloyi (note 6 above; 87B). 
399 Madzivhandila (note 23 above; 40).  
400 The National Department of Social Development (note 21 above; 18); Heaton (note 8 above; 266 – 
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indirectly. With this in mind, Padayachee, writing before the advent of the DVA, 
regarded children as ‘unintended victims’.401  
 
It goes without saying that the interest of children must be taken into account when 
crafting machinery to eradicate domestic violence. It is at this point that the Prevention 
of Family Violence Act must be commended. This Act made it mandatory for any 
person who examined, treated or cared for a child in circumstances that ‘ought to give 
rise to the reasonable suspicion that such child has been [deliberately] ill-treated’ to 
report such circumstances to the police, commissioner of child welfare or a social 
worker.402 
 
Section 7 (6) of the DVA enables the court, if it is satisfied that it is in the best interest 
of any child, to (a) refuse the respondent contact with such child403; or (b) order contact 
with such child on such conditions as it may consider appropriate404. The court may 
order supervised contact.405 Recognising that children are more prone to domestic 
violence, the DVA makes it possible for children to apply for protection orders without 
the assistance of a parent or a guardian. While these are good initiatives, but for 
reasons interrogated below, the courts seldom grant access orders.406 Further, this 
dissertation is not privy to any information regarding the issue of a protection order to 
a child applicant. Nonetheless it is submitted that children ought to benefit from both 
parents.407 A drastic order refusing a parent access to his child should only be made if 
the abuse is directed at the child.408 This is supported by the provision that an 
unassisted minor is able to apply for a protection order against a parent or a 
guardian.409 
 
                                                          
401 A. Padayachee ‘Children: the secondary victims of domestic violence’ (1994) 7 (2) Acta 
Criminologica 50.  
402 Section 4 (a) and (b) of the Prevention of Family Violence Act. 
403 Section 7 (6) (a) of the Domestic Violence Act. 
404 Section 7 (6) (b). 
405 Artz (note 65 above; 28). 
406 Ibid. 
407 Parenzee, Artz and Moult (note 204 above; 72).  
408 Ibid. See also B v B 2008 (4) SA 535 (W) where the court set aside an interim order on the ground 
that the violence was not directed to the child.  
409 Section 4 (4). 
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Be that as it may, there are other reservations relating to access to children. Many 
question duration for which it may operate. Some ask if the court may make such an 
order as an interim measure without the knowledge of the respondent. There are also 
practical difficulties associated with this provision. It cannot be enforced as a stand-
alone order.410 For instance, if the respondent is denied access to his children, the 
court has to order the respondent to move out of the home unless the child will be 
taken by social services. The court might also have to order the respondent to pay rent 
or mortgages and emergency monetary relief.411 There are also those who argue the 
closeness between no-contact orders and custody.  
 
(b) The relation between custody and no contact orders. 
 
Custody of a child usually entail that one parent will have exclusive rights to make 
decision with respect to matters that pertain to the child. In certain instances courts 
may make a joint custody order. This way, both parents exercise rights with respect to 
that child. Where a court grants one parent exclusive custody, it will usually allow the 
other parent access to the child. It will refuse access in cases where a parent is a 
danger to the child. Custody orders usually follow a divorce order or made in 
conjunction with a divorce order. It is because of these that one has to assess the 
relation between custody and no contact orders. 
 
As it has been pointed out, a domestic violence court may make an order in a 
protection order refusing the respondent access to his/her child. The notion that a child 
should benefit from both parents makes it difficult for the court to make such an order 
especially where the domestic violence complained of is not directed at the child but 
one of the parents, usually the mother. It goes without saying that refusal of access to 
the child will automatically result in only one parent accessing all rights with respect to 
                                                          
410 Andrews v Narodien 2002 (1) SACR 336 (C). In this case the parents of the minor child regarding 
visitation issues. The applicant (the father) had applied for a protection order solely for the purpose of 
access to the child. The court held that an order of this nature can only be made as ancillary to another 
order – see 352B.  
411 Parenzee, Artz and Moult (note 204 above; 73) point out that a no contact order is analogous to a 
maintenance order as a respondent might refuse to voluntarily maintain the child while he is denied 
access or contact with his child. They also point out that some mothers may refuse fathers who do not 
maintain their children access.  
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the child to the exclusion of the respondent. This is similar to a custody order. In 
practice, a protection order issued in favour of the mother will always protect a child 
as well. Terms such as ‘the respondent is ordered not to assault the respondent or any 
person residing with the respondent’ are familiar’.  
 
A no contact order may be present in various disguises. An order barring the 
respondent who shares a child with the complainant from entering the latter’s 
residence412 may be tantamount to a no contact order if the child lives with the 
complainant. An order against stalking may also be regarded as a no contact order. 
This is the case unless the court makes a specific order regarding the child or the 
respondent. It is submitted that whenever a court makes an order with respect to a 
complainant who shares children with the respondent, it must pronounce on the 
position regarding the children.  
 
Now that the closeness between custody and a no contact order has been highlighted, 
further questions arise. Custody issues fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the high 
court or children’s court as upper guardian unless the matter is a divorce matter heard 
in a regional court.413 Domestic violence matters fall within the jurisdiction of a district 
court and almost all matters are heard there except those cases for unlawful arrest 
which end up in the high court. The burning question is: Is it therefore competent for a 
district court to exercise authority over matters that originally fell within the jurisdiction 
of a superior court? This question must be answered in the affirmative because the 
DVA confers such powers on a district court. It must be pointed out however, that there 
are some discrepancies. A high court and a regional court hearing a custody matter 
have the benefit of professionals such as social workers and a family advocate. A 
district court (domestic violence court) does not have such benefits due to budgetary 
constraints; placing it is a compromised position. Perhaps the point of departure is that 
the aim of the DVA is to bring speedy relief in times where there is no time to comply 
with all the processes.414  
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413 Artz (note 65 above; 28). 
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(c) When should a no-contact order be made? 
 
Should a no contact order be made at interim or final stage?415 There is an argument 
that if the order is made at interim stage, it will result in the respondent being denied 
access to his child without an opportunity to state his case.416 But when one considers 
the vulnerability of children, the court is justified in making a no contact order at interim 
stage as any delay in this regard might place the child in greater danger in cases where 
the violence is directed at the child thereby defeating the purpose of the DVA which is 
to bring speedy relief. If the respondent feels aggrieved by this, he has the opportunity 
to appear in court and oppose the confirmation of such order.  
 
(d) How long should a no-contact order remain?  
 
While an order refusing the respondent contact or access to his child may be justified; 
but, may it last forever or until the child attains majority?417 The DVA does not set any 
duration, however it appears to confer discretion on the courts to grant an order for a 
limited time. But this applies if the court is of the opinion that it is in the interest of 
justice for another court to hear this matter.418 For instance it is in the interest of justice 
for a court to make a no-contact order for a limited time, and then refer the matter to a 
high court to determine custody. There is no provision in the DVA that suggest that the 
legislature had intended that no contact orders should be referred to the high court for 
confirmation or something to this effect. This provides room for a no contact order to 
be made indefinite, that is, until the child attains majority. The legislature did not intend 
this. Setting a specific duration is much desired. 
 
In Namibia a provision concerning temporary custody of a child and access to a child 
is valid until it is superseded by an order of another court.419 The Namibian lawmakers 
                                                          
415 Ibid. 
416 Ibid.  
417 It is submitted that the age of minority will enable the child to make a decision whether to rekindle a 
relationship with the respondent or not.  
418 Section 7 (7) (b).  
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clearly intended that temporary custody and access issues will be referred to another 
court for consideration. This is not explicit in our law. However the case of B v B420 
does suggest that it is possible for a superior court to supersede the protection order 
with respect to an order pertaining to children.  
 
Also, section 7 (7) of the DVA seems to avail in this regard. This section allows a 
presiding officer to make a temporary order if he is of the opinion that a matter should 
be decided by another court. It is unclear, why the presiding officer’s opinion features 
here. The purpose behind any machinery in the DVA is to provide speedy relief until 
such time when the situation has been remedied by a competent forum. Strictly 
speaking, the presiding officer cannot hold any opinion as envisaged by the section; 
he or she should make the order operative for a fixed period and then refer the matter 
to the correct forum.  
 
Therefore it is proposed that the DVA should be amended to provide for specific 
durations. Surely this is practical. For instance, the court should make an access order 
valid for 6 months. At the end of this period the order should fall away; in practice the 
respondent should not be arrested for making contact with his child. However, should 
he be violent towards the child or the complaint, the DVA should make provision for 




(a) Arrests in general  
 
In South Africa a decision to arrest is not taken lightly. This is more in light of our 
political history characterised by the use of such a measure to further a political 
interest. An arrest limits various rights. On the face of it, it is a direct limitation of the 
right to freedom of movement. And on a further analysis, it limits the right to human 
dignity due to the compromised living conditions of awaiting trial prisoners. It limits 
                                                          
420 B v B (note 408 above). 
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employment rights as detention forces a person to be absent from work and this affects 
their livelihood. This also affects those who are financially dependent on the detainee. 
The right to quality life is diminished. It should be borne in mind that the right to life 
entails the enjoyment of life.421 It is difficult to imagine how a person can enjoy the 
quality of life in these circumstances. For some people, an arrest could erode their 
right to education. In light of the foregoing, a decision to arrest a person is exercised 
with caution and for a valid reason under limited circumstances as the police may be 
held delictually liable for unlawful arrests. For these reasons, an arrest is manifestly 
unlawful and it is up to the state to justify it.422 All that is required of the plaintiff is to 
show that there was an arrest.423 
 
In Botha above, the position was summarised thus: 
 
‘An arrest constitutes an interference with the liberty of an individual concerned, 
and it therefore seems fair and just to require that the person who arrested or 
caused the arrest of another should bear the onus of proving that his action was 
justified in law.’424 
 
The reason for an arrest must be to bring the suspect to court and not for any other 
motive. In Reynold and others v Minister of Safety and Security425 the plaintiffs was 
arrested because she refused to hand over the car keys. The court held that the arrest 
was to coerce the plaintiff to do something and this was unlawful.426 The court pointed 
out that the plaintiff could not be arrested for obstructing the police in their duty 
because it is not the duty of the police to mediate domestic violence matters.427 It 
should be noted that in an attempts to mediate the matter, the police had requested 
the plaintiff to hand over her husband’s car keys. In Katise the court emphasised that 
                                                          
421 I. Currie and J. De Waal Currie The Bill of Rights Handbook 6th Ed (2013), 267.  
422 Dlamini v Minister of Safety and Security 2016 (2) SACR 655 (GJ) par 8. 
423 Ibid para 9.  
424 Botha v Minister of Police and another (note 144 above; para 30).  
425 Reynold and others v Minister of Safety and Security 2011 (2) SACR 594 (WCC). 
426 Ibid para 48. 
427 Ibid para 56.  
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the arresting officer must exercise his discretion to arrest properly, that is, in good faith, 
rationally and not arbitrarily.428 
 
(b) Arrests in terms of the DVA 
 
Arresting perpetrators of domestic violence is one of the tools in the DVA for 
combatting domestic violence. While the Prevention of Family Violence Act did provide 
for an arrest, little guidance was provided regarding the circumstances under which it 
could be made. In fact, a study of this Act shows that any breach was met with an 
arrest.429 As will be seen below, under the DVA a breach does not necessarily merit 
an arrest.  
 
Now, arrests are dealt with in sections 3 and 8 of the DVA. In terms of section 3 read 
closely with section 40 (1) (q) of the Criminal Procedure Act, a protection order is not 
a prerequisite for an arrest pursuant to domestic violence. Perhaps, as confusing as it 
may be, section 3 should be quoted once again because it is also useful to a victim 
who already has possession of a protection order but for some reason does not have 
a warrant of arrest.  
 
This section reads: 
 
‘3 Arrest by peace officer without warrant 
A peace officer may without warrant arrest any respondent at the scene of an 
incident of domestic violence whom he or she reasonably suspects of having 
committed an offence containing an element of violence against a complainant.’ 
 
It has been indicated above that two kinds of arrests appear to be permitted here; an 
arrest without a protection order at all and an arrest without a warrant at the scene of 
the incident of domestic violence on reasonable suspicion that the respondent has 
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committed an act of domestic violence. Whether an arrest may be carried out in terms 
of this section without a protection order has been questioned above. Nonetheless the 
section is useful because, at it has been alluded to above; complainants are not always 
armed with a warrant of arrest at the time of issuing of a protection order. 
 
In total, there are four different instances under which an arrest may be carried out in 
terms of the DVA. These are: an arrest with a protection order; an arrest without a 
protection order; an arrest with a warrant and an arrest without a warrant. These 
instances overlap. For instance, an arrest for breach of a protection order may be 
affected on the strength of a warrant. On the other hand it may also be affected without 
a warrant. For the sake of clarity, the discussion will be carried out under two headings 
namely, arrest for breach of a protection order without a warrant and an arrest for 
breach of a protection order with a warrant. It is important to do this because each of 
these grounds has its own requirements.  
 
(i) Arrest for breach of a protection order without a warrant 
 
It has been stated above that protection orders are the core machinery of the DVA. It 
has also been stated that a protection order may enjoin a respondent to desist from 
certain unwanted conduct which falls within the definition of domestic violence. The 
processes for obtaining a protection order have been extensively discussed above and 
therefore I shall proceed to the relevant discussions under the present heading.  
 
At hand we are concerned with circumstances where, for some reason, a victim who 
has a protection order does not have an accompanying warrant of arrest as a result of 
either loss, destruction or execution. The starting point is the wording of a protection 
order. The protection order will tell the arresting officer what type of conduct is 
prohibited. If the conduct committed by the perpetrator is not envisaged in the wording 
of the protection order, then no arrest may follow pursuant to the protection order.430 If 
                                                          
430 It should be recalled that in terms of section 2 of the DVA the complainant may elect to lay a criminal 
charge if the conduct complained of is criminalised by either the common law or any statute. If this is 
not the case, nothing more can be done by the police.  
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the conduct is envisaged in the protection order, an arrest may follow subject to certain 
conditions which are stated below. However, it should be borne in mind again that here 
we are concerned with whether an arrest may follow without a warrant. 
 
It appears that an arrest may certainly follow in terms of section 3 of the DVA at the 
scene of the incident by a peace officer if he or she reasonably suspects that the 
respondent has committed an act of domestic violence containing an element of 
violence against the complainant. The arresting officer may also rely on section 40 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act which permits an arrest without a warrant; and specifically 
section 40 (1) (q) which permits arrests pursuant to an act of domestic violence with 
an element of violence.  If the conduct committed by the respondent does not contain 
an element of violence, an arrest may not follow; even if conduct complained of is 
envisaged in the protection order. In this case the police officer must issue a warning 
to appear in court to the respondent.431 
 
The law requires that there must be some form of physical violence inflicted or 
imminent for an arrest to follow.432 If an act of domestic violence does not involve any 
physical violence, for instance, emotional abuse, no lawful arrest may follow.433 In 
Kruger v Minister of Police434 the court confirmed the viability of an arrest without a 
warrant, but discounted emotional abuse as a ground for an arrest for domestic 
violence because it did not have an element of violence.  
 
However, in the Langa435 case above, the court held that an arrest for an ‘assault by 
threat’ was justified under section 3 of the DVA read with section 40 (1) (q) of the DVA. 
It is submitted that the court erred in this regard as an assault of this nature does not 
involve an element of physical violence. It is conceded that the concept of ‘domestic 
violence’ can be misleading to some because it includes behaviour that does not 
                                                          
431 Section 8 (4) (c). 
432 Kruger v Minister of Police 2016 (7K6) QOD 223 (GNP). 
433 Ibid paras 17 and 18. 
434 Kruger v Minister of Police (note 432 above; para 19). 
435 Langa v Minister of Police (note 248 above). 
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include any physical violence, thus easily leading to a conclusion that any conduct that 
fits within the definition suffices for an arrest.  
 
(ii) Arrest for breach of a protection order pursuant to a warrant.  
 
Another way to affect an arrest for breach of a protection order is through a warrant. 
The same guidelines apply as above, that is, the wording of the protection order will 
define prohibited conduct. For the sake of the discussion we assume that the conduct 
is prohibited and ask ourselves what are the requirements to arrest the respondent in 
the circumstances?  
 
Section 8 of the DVA deals with warrants of arrest; it must be borne in mind that 
warrants are conditionally suspended pending compliance with the terms of the 
protection order. The suspension of the warrant may be lifted due to a breach of the 
protection order. Section 8 (4) sets out the process to be followed. Usually the 
complainant approaches a police station with a copy of a protection order and the 
suspended warrant. At the police station, the complainant must depose to an affidavit 
stating that the respondent has ‘contravened a prohibition, order, obligation or order 
contained in the protection order’.436 
 
A police officer who receives the documents mentioned above must decide on the 
strength of the affidavit whether to affect an arrest or not. In other words the police 
officer is called to exercise a discretion based on the facts before him.437 A police 
officer may attract liability if he acts in the absence of one of the documents, say the 
protection order. In Khanyile v Minister of Safety and Security and another438, the 
police were held delictually liable for affecting an arrest before the complainant had 
made an affidavit as envisaged.439 
                                                          
436 Section 8 (4) (a); Sibisi (note 164 above); in Seria (note 18 above; 144) the court identified three 
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Section 8 (4) (b) provides a guideline for before affecting an arrest. This section 
provides: 
 
‘8 Warrant of arrest upon issuing a protection order                                                     
…………. 
(4) (b) If it appears to the member concerned that, subject to subsection (5), there 
are reasonable grounds to suspect that the complainant may suffer imminent harm 
as a result of the alleged breach of the protection order by the respondent, the 
member must forthwith arrest the respondent for allegedly committing the 
offence…’ 
 
Consequently an arrest pursuant to a warrant may only follow if there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the complainant may suffer harm which is imminent. 
Otherwise, the police officer must hand a notice to appear in court to the respondent 
in terms of section 8 (4) (c). The following factors must be taken into account in 
deciding whether harm is imminent: the risk to the safety, health or wellbeing of the 
complainant;440 the seriousness of the conduct comprising an alleged breach of the 
protection order;441 and the length of time since the alleged breach occurred.442 
 
There is no duty on a police officer to conduct a thorough investigation of all facts 
before affecting an arrest.443 It is enough for him to rely on reasonable suspicions and 
once the jurisdictional facts for an arrest are present, he may arrest. However, a police 
officer may not simply rely on the complainant’s say so. In Dlamini444 the court 
observed the following: 
 
‘The arresting officer is not required to conduct a hearing before affecting an arrest. 
Whether an arrested person should be released, and if so, subject to what 
                                                          
440 Section 8 (5) (a). 
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conditions, arises for later decision by another person and that is the safeguard to 
the arrestee’s constitutional rights. Once the jurisdictional requirements are 
satisfied the peace officer has a discretion as to whether or not to exercise his or 
her powers of arrest. Obviously, the discretion must be exercised properly.’445 
 
The concepts ‘reasonable grounds’ ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘imminent harm’ are 
not defined in the DVA. But these are common terms in law and it is assumed that they 
retain their usual meaning. The concept ‘reasonable grounds’ has been interpreted to 
refer to that which is reasonable according to a reasonable man’s standards. In 
Seria446 it was held that a suspicion would be reasonable if a reasonable man in the 
arresting officer’s position and possessing the same information would have 
considered that there are good or sufficient grounds for suspecting that the 
complainant may suffer imminent.447 The court further illustrated: 
 
‘…(t)he reasonable man will therefore analyse and asses the quality of the 
information at his disposal critically, and he will not accept it lightly or without 
checking it where it can be checked. It is only after an examination of this kind that 
he will allow himself to entertain a suspicion which will justify an arrest.’448 
 
A reasonable suspicion must be objectively sustainable on the grounds that would 
induce a reasonable person man to draw such a suspicion.449 Indicators such as 
influence of liquor and that the respondent has already assaulted the complainant, that 
the respondent had attempted to inflict grievous injuries but for the complainant 
escaping are grounds that would point a reasonable person towards the conclusion 
that harm is imminent.  
 
Imminent harm means harm is certain and about to follow.450 In Kruger (above), the 
court held that imminent harm is  
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450 Greenberg (note 449 above; 397H). 
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‘…the danger of harm of a certain degree of immediacy that activates the 
protection…that is to harm which is impending, threateningly ready to overtake or 
coming on shortly.’451 
 
In Seria the court observed the following: 
 
‘If something is possible or even likely it is not true to say that it is ''imminent'', which 
word connotes an event which is both certain and is about to occur. Imminent peril' 
is described in West's Legal Thesaurus Dictionary as 'such position of danger to 
the plaintiff that if existing circumstances remain unchanged injury to the plaintiff is 
reasonably certain'. The phrase 'imminent harm' finds expression in the Canadian 
Criminal Code. The Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Adams described the concept 
as follows: (I)t is the danger of harm of a certain degree of immediacy that activates 
the protection. . . That is to say a harm which is impending threateningly, ready to 
overtake or coming on shortly. It is safe to say therefore that 'imminent harm' is 
harm which is about to happen, if not certain to happen.’452 
 
In Greenberg v Gouws453 the court held that the arrest of the plaintiff was unlawful 
because there was no reasonable suspicion that harm on the complainant was 
imminent. In this case, the alleged incident had taken place three days prior to the 
arrest; and the offending words (coughing blood) that were uttered by the plaintiff were 
not directed to the complainant but to her sister. The court held that at the time of the 
arrest there was no reasonable ground to formulate a suspicion that the complainant 
would suffer harm if an arrest on the plaintiff is not affected. The court also noted that 
had the complainant feared for her safety, she would have reported the incident 
immediately. There was no reason for a three day delay in coming to the police.454 
                                                          
451 Kruger (note 432 above; para 9). 
452 Seria (note 18 above; 146A – C). 
453 Greenberg (note 449 above). 
454 Ibid 398 G – I. 
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In Mohlabeng v Minister of Safety and Security455 the court held that there were no 
reasonable grounds to suspect that the complainant might suffer imminent harm where 
the evidence showed that it is the complainant who had assaulted the respondent.  
 
(c) What is the distinction between arrests in terms of the DVA and arrests in terms 
of the Criminal Procedure Act? 
 
The distinctions between an arrest in terms of the DVA and an arrest in terms of the 
Criminal Procedure Act are only procedural – in essence they are one and the same 
for various reasons. 
 
The DVA provides for an arrest in terms of sections 3 and 8 (4) (b). Perhaps before 
one can proceed to look at the distinctions between the DVA and the CPA (if any), it 
is worthwhile to first consider the DVA. Besides the warrant of arrest, the distinction 
between section 3 and section 8 (4) (b) of the DVA lies in the wording; in section 3 the 
requirement for an arrest is a suspicion on reasonable grounds that the perpetrator 
has committed an act of domestic violence against the complainant for which violence 
in an element. On the other hand, section 8 (4) (b) allows an arrest on a suspicion 
based on reasonable grounds that the complainant ‘will’ suffer imminent harm. Section 
3 speaks of something that has already taken place hence the use of the word ‘has’; 
while section 8 (4) (b) refers to the imminence of the harm or the violence. In summary 
section 3 permit an arrest amid violence that has passed while section 8 (4) (b) permit 
an arrest amid imminent harm. In other words both these sections require violence and 
there is no substantive distinction as such – of course one requires a warrant of arrest; 
instead there is a procedural distinction based on the time of the violence or harm. 
 
Section 40 (1) (q) of the Criminal Procedure Act permits an arrest of a person who is 
suspected of having committed an act of domestic violence for which violence is an 
element. This wording is similar to that of section 3 of the DVA. The only difference is 
that section 3 permits an arrest at the scene of the incidence while the CPA does not 
                                                          
455 Mohlabeng v Minister of Safety and Security (TPD) unreported case no 24796/05 of 28 January 
2008. 
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have such a restriction. There are two major similarities. The first is that violence is a 
requirement for both; and second, they arguably permit an arrest in the absence of a 
warrant and/or a protection order.  
 
Going back to the question in the heading; it would appear that there is no substantive 
difference between an arrest in terms of the various provisions of the DVA and section 
40 (q) of the CPA. The only distinction lies in the procedure, and of course the 
circumstances of each case will determine the procedure and consequently the correct 
Act under which an arrest will be carried out.  
 
An arrest is a very sensitive subject; much more when there are relationships involved 
and scores to settle. It goes without saying that this machinery may easily lend itself 
to abuse. At the same there is a cry that this machinery is not being used especially in 
sensitive matters such as domestic violence. Some police officers preferred 
negotiating the matter instead of taking the necessary measure and affecting an arrest. 
Some just did not regard domestic violence as meriting an arrest. Now a police officer 
who fails to affect an arrest where circumstances merit it commits a breach of duty for 
which he may be held personally liable for any damages suffered by a complainant as 
a result of the omission. The omission may be referred to the Civilian Secretariat for 
Police (CSP) for consideration and recommendation. The CSP may recommend the 
dismissal of the police officer.  
 
3.3.8. Sentencing  
 
Sentencing is the most crucial aspect of criminal proceedings. The court gets the 
opportunity to pass message not only to the accused person before it, but also to 
potential perpetrators. The court also gets the opportunity to strengthen public 
confidence in the courts and the rule of law. In Phillips456 the court stated the position 
regarding the sentencing of domestic violence perpetrators as follow: 
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‘It  goes  without  saying  that  a  more  balanced  approach  to  sentencing  was 
required (See S v Swart 2004 (2) SACR 370 (SCA) para 13). A clear message 
needs to  be  sent  to  both  the  respondent  and  those  who  might  be  minded  
to  disregard protection orders granted in terms of the Domestic Violence Act that 
such conduct will not be countenanced  by  our  courts.  This court’s abhorrence of 
the respondent’s conduct in this regard must therefore be reflected in the imposition 
of an appropriate sentence.’457 
 
Domestic violence matters are mostly heard in district magistrate courts. The 
maximum penal jurisdiction of the district court is 3 years.458 Section 17 of the DVA 
provides for a maximum sentence of five years for domestic violence. Previously it was 
argued in the magistracy that a district court should not hand a sentence exceeding 
three years and that if the court is of the view that a higher sentence should be handed, 
it shall refer the matter to the regional court for sentencing.  
 
In S v Qhekiso459 the district court had sentenced the accused – a repeat offender of 
domestic violence - to five years. The district head of the judiciary was of the view that 
the sentence was exceeding the authority of a district court. Further, she continued, 
there was nothing in the DVA that gave a district court authority to exceed its punitive 
jurisdiction. The court held that this supposition was incorrect. It had regard to section 
92 (1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act460 which allows a district court to exceed its penal 
jurisdiction if an Act of parliament permits this.461 Furthermore, the DVA defines a 
‘court’ as a district court and therefore the court held that the district court was justified 
in exceeding its normal penal jurisdiction of three years.462 
 
It must be mentioned, once again, that the maximum sentence in the DVA is an 
improvement from its predecessor, the Prevention of Family Violence Act as latter 
                                                          
457 Ibid para 26. 
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prescribed a fine or maximum 12 months imprisonment.463 The reason for the capping 
of penal jurisdiction of the DVA is unclear and should be reviewed as there may be 
circumstances that are so gruesome that they merit a sentence that exceeds the 5 
years.  
 
The DVA only recognises a fine and/or imprisonment for sentencing. It has been 
argued that direct imprisonment may not be the best option in cases of domestic 
violence where the accused is a breadwinner.464 It has been suggested that 
counselling or community service should be considered as well. Periodical 
imprisonment has also been suggested for more serious cases where the accused is 
employed in order to allow him to continue working to support his family. Suspended 
sentences do not receive favourable support as the respondent does not learn 
anything from it.  
 
3.4. SOMETHING TO CONSIDER – WOMEN IN RURAL AREAS 
 
Domestic violence in rural areas presents a different challenge. Little research has 
been done in this regard. This is largely due to the absence of material or records on 
reported incidents. One would find such records in the police stations or the courts. 
However, there is a scarcity of police stations and courts in the rural areas. Most of 
these services are located in the cities. It is hard to get to the cities, especially when 
there is an emergency.  
 
Protection orders are issued by courts, served and monitored by the police. The reality 
is that women in rural areas will have a hard time obtaining a protection order. For 
them, this involves going to and from town. With little or no money, they are highly 
likely to abandon the whole process. Even if they eventually obtain it, it will be hard to 
have it executed immediately. The delay of going to town to access a police station 
will defeat the aim of the DVA, which is to provide immediate relief.  
                                                          
463 Section 6 (b) of the Prevention of Family Violence Act. See also the South African Law Commission 
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464 South African Law Commission (note 104 above; 125). 
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When one considers these difficulties, a question that immediately comes to mind is 
whether this is a shortcoming of the DVA or outside the DVA. It is submitted that if a 
woman who resides in a rural area does finally make it to a court and apply for a 
protection order, they will get one if they meet the requirements. And if they finally 
make it to a police station to execute a protection order, it shall be executed. This in 
essence means that the DVA is working, save for the discussions in chapter 3. 
Therefore the issue with women in the rural areas is not a shortcoming of the DVA but 
an indication of the state’s neglect of rural areas as far as the provision of some social 
services is concerned. 
 
One is inclined to argue that the Traditional Courts Bill should not have been 
dismissed. While it might not have adequately implemented the DVA, at least it 
purported to create some legal forum for women in the rural areas to report incidents 
of domestic violence. There is room for an argument that traditional courts are in a 
better position to implement the DVA. While a presiding officer in a magistrates’ court 
is usually oblivious to the matter, and treated it as it appear on paper, a presiding officer 
in a traditional court will have more insight into the matter as he resides in the same 
















SUMMATION OF ARGUMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to critically evaluate the machinery in the 
Domestic Violence Act for combating domestic violence in South Africa. Domestic 
violence takes place against the backdrop of section 12 of the Constitution as well as 
international law. This being the case, combating it is not only a moral obligation, but 
also a legal obligation in terms of international law and the Constitution. In essence 
this means that any advances made towards the combating of domestic violence are 
actually a realisation by the state of its legal mandate. On the other hand, failure means 
the state commits a breach of its duty.  
 
This dissertation turns on the machineries in the DVA, setting out the nature of each 
of the machinery, the challenges facing such machineries, and the extent of the proper 
implementation of that machinery by relevant institutions, particularly the criminal 
justice system. 
 
The DVA offers two sets of machinery; the ones that flow outside a protection order 
and ones that flow from a protection order. A victim of domestic violence who does not 
have a protection order may derive some remedies from the DVA; these are the right 
to receive advice on their rights in terms of section 2 of the DVA; civil action for violation 
of their right in terms of section 2; the arrest of the perpetrator in terms of section 3 of 
the DVA and section 40 (1) (q) of the Criminal Procedure Act and opening of a docket. 
It was also argued that, while a perpetrator may be arrest in terms of the DVA, he 
cannot be charged under the same Act because its only recognises the breach of a 
protection order as an offence. This has prompted the argument for the creation of a 
stand-alone offence of domestic violence.  
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It was pointed out in chapter three while the argument for the creation of a stand-alone 
crime of domestic violence is well in place, it presents some practical difficulties. Four 
issues were raised with this argument. The first deals with protection orders, whether 
they will fall away if the call for the offence goes through? Second, will the proposed 
offence allow room for reconciliation as a protection order does? It should be recalled 
that a protection order only criminalises non-compliance. On the other hand it appears 
that the proposed offence will criminalise transgressions right from the start without 
giving the respondent an opportunity to desist from the unwanted behaviour. The third 
issue is the definition of this proposed offence. It is submitted that the current definition 
of ‘domestic violence’ is commendable; however, it came about with a protection order 
in mind. Therefore if we do away with protection orders, a new definition must be in 
place. Finally, how will offenders be sentenced under the proposed offence? There is 
a belief amongst academics that the proposed offence will carry with it a higher 
sentence.465 Currently, the DVA provides for a maximum sentence of 5 years 
imprisonment or a fine. Therefore the point of departure is that if the offence goes 
through, it should be redefined and the sentencing should be reviewed taking into 
account the gravity of some cases.  
 
The machineries that flow from a protection order are summarised below.  
 
(a) Ejectment of the respondent  
 
A court may make an order ejecting the respondent from the common home or part 
thereof. The respondent may be ejected from his own home in favour of the 
respondent. Such order is not dependent on a legal duty to provide for the complaint. 
It is argued that the basis of this duty is the respondent’s unwanted conduct towards 
the complainant. This is a special right created by the DVA. Four issued arise regarding 
such an order. 
 
First, at what stage should such an order be made? Should the order be made at 
interim stage without notice to the respondent? Or should the courts make such order 
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on the return date? It was submitted that the courts should not shy away from making 
such an order at interim stage especially in cases where there is a serious threat on 
the complainant. Unfortunately, often the respondent will only become aware of the 
order when he has to move out466, however, this is justified for two reasons. The 
respondent is the author of his own demise and he can always anticipate the return 
date and defend the matter much earlier. 
 
Second, is the ejectment order the same as an eviction? Practically these two 
remedies serve the same purpose. However, the former is temporary and it is only 
available to a victim of domestic violence. The latter is permanent and it is only 
available to an owner of property or someone with legal title. The requirements for 
each of these remedies are not the same. The requirements to obtain the latter are 
onerous, while the former is easily accessible under permitting circumstances.  
 
(b) Seizure of firearms and dangerous weapons 
 
In domestic violence cases firearms are normally used to threatened the complainant, 
however if used, they are deadly. Section 8 and 9 of the DVA permits the seizure of 
any firearm or dangerous weapon from the respondent to ensure the safety of the 
complainant. Various arguments were made about this machinery including the fact 
that magistrates have a difficult time implementing it. However it should be highlighted 
once again that while the DVA is able to simultaneously issue a protection order and 
dispossess the respondent of a firearm or a dangerous weapon, it does not alter his 
fitness to possess same thereby making it possible for him to acquire another one.  
 
The only thing that the DVA provides for is the referral of the matter to the national 
commissioner of police to consider declaring the respondent unfit to possess a firearm 
in terms of section 102 of the Firearms Control Act. In the alternative, section 103 of 
the Firearms Control Act provides that on conviction for breach of a protection order, 
unless the court finds otherwise, the respondent is unfit to possess a firearm. This is 
an anomaly and probably goes against the spirit of the DVA which to provide a speedy 
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remedy. Section 103 only kicks in once the damage has been inflicted; that is, on 
conviction. The DVA is unable to play a preventative role in this regard. 
 
The difficulty in confiscating firearms is exacerbated largely by the fact that the 
complainant often does not have much knowledge about the firearm in the possession 
of the respondent. If the complainant is unable to give a correct description of the 
firearm, the court cannot make an order. Other difficulties arise when the respondent 
has more than one firearm and the protection order speaks of a firearm. The main 
question is “which one”? It is also difficult to confiscate a firearm from a respondent 
who does not have a licence to possess same. He can simply deny ever handling one.  
 
With respect to the confiscation of dangerous weapons, it was argued that the difficulty 
involved is that in domestic violence cases almost everything is a dangerous weapon. 
For instance one normally regards a spoon as crockery; however it can easily turn into 
a weapon. At the same time the court cannot confiscate such things for two reasons. 
There are useful for day to day living and they are easily obtained in the market.  
  
(c) Rent, mortgages and emergency monetary relief 
 
Domestic violence may take the form of economic deprivation. Sometimes the act of 
domestic violence itself may result in the complainant incurring certain expenditure 
such as medical expenses. Economic deprivation may be summarised as the 
unreasonable withholding of financial benefits (e.g. food, water, electricity, rent or 
mortgages) that the respondent is entitled to under law or necessity.467 In the 
circumstances the DVA enables the court to make an order compelling the respondent 
to continue making providing such benefits and to compensate the respondent for 
expenses incurred as a result of the domestic violence in the form of emergency 
monetary relief (E.M.R.). 
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It is highlighted once again that this machinery may either arise out of a legal duty to 
provide or out of necessity as a result of the respondent’s unwanted conduct towards 
the complainant. In most instances it arises in the absence of a legal duty to provide 
on the part of the respondent, thereby conferring a special right on the complainant 
who otherwise would not be entitled to any financial relief from the respondent. 
 
Three issues should be highlighted regarding this machinery. First some have pointed 
out that it resembles a maintenance order; second, the question of how long this order 
shall be valid for remains outstanding as the DVA does not set durations; and third, 
who shall see to the implementation of same. Maintenance is implemented by 
maintenance court personnel, whereas a domestic violence court does not have this 
benefit. 
 
(d) Access to children or no-contacts orders 
 
Children are ‘unintended victims’ of domestic violence.468 This is because the domestic 
violence inevitably affects the children be it directly or indirectly. Section 7 (6) of the 
DVA enables the court, if it is satisfied that it is in the best interest of any child, to (a) 
refuse the respondent contact with such child469; or (b) order contact with such child 
on such conditions as it may consider appropriate470. The court may order supervised 
contact.471 
 
It was shown that the courts are reluctant to make an order denying the respondent 
access to his children. This is because it is accepted that children should benefit from 
both parents. 472 It was argued that because of the vulnerability of children, courts 
should grant no-contact orders as early as possible if tangible evidence presents itself. 
However a court cannot make a stand-alone no-contact order, otherwise it falls within 
jurisdiction of the high court. In other words a person cannot approach a domestic 
                                                          
468 Padayachee (note 401 above).  
469 Section 7 (6) (a) of the Domestic Violence Act. 
470 Section 7 (6) (b). 
471 Artz (note 65 above; 28). 
472 Parenzee, Artz and Moult (note 204 above; 72). 
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violence court solely to obtain a no-contact order. It has to accompany another order 
as a result of an act of domestic violence.473  
 
The duration of a no-contact order is unclear. The DVA does not sent any duration in 
this regard. It is argued that as the DVA stands, there is nothing sinister if a no-contact 
order is made indefinite. There is no justice in this as it allows a short cut to custody. 
The DVA should enable the court to set duration.  
 
(e) Arrests  
 
The DVA provides for the arrest of a perpetrator for breach of a protection order. It has 
been alluded to in chapter 3 that an arrest may also occur in the absence of a 
protection order. However an arrest under the DVA in the absence of a protection order 
may be an exercise in futility. Therefore two kinds of arrests are prevalent in the DVA: 
(i) Arrest without a warrant of arrest (section 3 of the DVA read with section 40 
(1) (q) of the Criminal Procedure Act) 
(ii) Arrest with a warrant of arrest (section 8 of the DVA).  
 
A person may, at the scene of the incident of domestic violence, be arrested for breach 
of a protection order without a warrant of arrest on a reasonable suspicion that he has 
committed an offence that involves the element of violence against the complainant. It 
was pointed out that the concept ‘domestic violence’ can be misleading in this regard 
because not all acts of domestic violence involve an element of violence.  
 
A police officer may also execute a warrant of arrest in terms of section 8 (4) (b) of the 
DVA if there is reasonable ground to believe that the complainant may suffer imminent 
harm if the respondent is not arrested. It is clear that not every act of domestic violence 
merits an arrest. If there is no warrant of arrest, the arrest in question has to be carried 
under section 3 of the DVA; and a warrant of arrest is executed in terms of section 8 
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(4) (b) on reasonable ground to believe that the complainant will suffer imminent harm 
if it is not executed.  
 
Above it was also highlighted that section 3 can only be invoked after the facts; that is, 
after an act with an element of violence has been inflicted. Section 8 on the other hand 
permits an arrest for ‘imminent’ or future harm. This being the case, it is concerning 
that police officers continue to misinterpret these sections resulting in action for 
unlawful arrest against the state.474 It was submitted that because of the drastic nature 
of an arrest, it should be made when circumstances permit and the police must be 
aware of this.  
 
(f) Sentencing  
 
Sentencing is a very important aspect of criminal proceedings. In domestic violence 
matters the court also gets to send out a strong message to would-be perpetrators 
through this machinery that certain behaviour will not be tolerated. Currently the DVA 
allows a maximum of 5 years imprisonment or a fine.475 This dissertation is highly 
critical of setting a maximum sentence especially for something as evil as domestic 
violence. A minimum sentence of 5 years suggests that the harm inflicted, nor matter 
how appalling, cannot merit more than 5 years maximum sentence or a fine. This 
should not be the case as it trivialises a victim’s cause.  
 
(g) Counter protection orders 
 
Chapter two discussed counter protection orders. A counter protection order is a 
protection order applied for by the respondent in response to the complainant obtaining 
one. Magistrates are not unanimous about how to handle such application. Some 
magistrates are of the view that since it does not appear to be a genuine application, 
it should be rejected. Other magistrates are in favour of hearing the application on the 
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grounds that the respondent also has a right to be heard. The latter view was favoured 




In light of the totality of arguments raised in this dissertation, the following core 
recommendations are made: 
 The legislature must look into the legal protection available to victims who do 
not yet have a protection order. This will coincide with the response to the 
argument for a stand-alone domestic violence offence.  
 The DVA must be amended to provide for the duration of orders made in a 
protection order. 
 The DVA must be amended to empower the court to simultaneously issue a 
protection order and pronounce on a respondent’ fitness to possess a firearm. 
 The DVA must prohibit the refusal to hear an application for a counter protection 
order on the ground that there is a pre-existing order.  
 The legislature must consider ways to implement the DVA in rural areas where 




The main purpose of this dissertation was to critically evaluate the machinery of the 
DVA for combating domestic violence in South Africa. In chapter one it was made clear 
that in South Africa domestic violence is very rife. Various attempts have been made 
to overhaul this social evil over recent years; most notable of these is the passing of 
the DVA. The purpose of the DVA is to provide maximum protection to victims of 
domestic violence by issuing protection orders. The DVA makes it possible for the 
courts to make certain orders which this dissertation refers to as machineries.  
 
This dissertation has critically evaluated these machineries by setting out the nature 
of the machinery, the problems associated with the implementation of the said 
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machinery and possible solutions. The discussions were backed up by published 
research, case law and legislation. To cement these, important recommendations are 
made above. Domestic violence is a serious issue in society. It is therefore important 
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